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Notes 
Alie11s' Right to Teach: Political 
Socialization and the Public Schools 
In recent years, aliens1 have made great strides against state-imposed 
employment discrimination. 2 Some commentators read recent Supreme 
Court opinions in Sugarman v. Do11galls and In re Griffiths• as in-
validating virtually all state laws that require United States citizenship 
as a prerequisite to employment.;; Nonetheless, many states still bar 
aliens from teaching in public elementary and secondary schools. 
This Note analyzes the constitutionality of state-imposed restrictions 
on the employment of alien teachers. It argues that Sugarman and 
Griffiths, while greatly limiting the scope of permissible discrimina-
tion against aliens, recog11ize an exceQted area for jobs which have a 
critical relationship to the identity and legitimacy of the political 
community. Public school teaching might fit within this area of allow-
I. All references arc to permanent resident aliens. An alien is "any person not a 
citizen or national of the United States." 8 U .S.C. § JJOl(a)(3) (19i0). To acquire per-
manent residence, an alien must possess an immigrant visa and thus have "been law-
fully accorded the pri\'ilcge of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant 
in accordance with the immigration laws ... ," 8 U.S.C. § JIOl(a)(20) (1970). Virtually 
all aliens permitted to be employed for an indefinite time ha\'e permanent residence 
status. The only other aliens legally permitted to work in the United States do so 
on a temporary basis. These persons arc lksignated "nonimmigrant" aliens. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(l5) (19i0). Telephone interview with Ralph Farb, Deputy General Counsel, Im-
migration and Naturalization Service, Wash., D.C., Sept. 12, 1975. 
2. The extent to which state and local law has restricted the employment oppor-
tunities of aliens can be seen in the limitations only recent!)' in\'alidated. Taggart v. 
Mandel, 391 F. Supp. 733 (D. Md. 19i5) (state statute making citizenship a prerequisite 
to licensing as a notary ~ ublic); Sundram v. City of Niagara Falls, 77 Misc. 2d 1002, 
357 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup.t., Niagara Co. 1!)73) (city ordinance making citizenship a 
prerequisite to licensing as a taxi cab d ri1·.ci:): Examining Bel. o[ Eng'rs, Architects & 
Sur\'eyors v. Flores De Otero, No. 74-520 (D.P.R., Dec. 19, J9i4), prob. juris. noted, 
95 S. Ct. 1988 (19i5) (Puerto Rico statute requiring that applicants be citizens in order 
to be granted full licenses as en~eers, archi tects or s11 l'l'q:o rs) . The Supreme Court 
is presently considering whether the fcdcrnl civil scn·ice can exclude aliens. Mow Sun 
Wong v. Hampton, 500 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir.), cert. grn11tcd, 417 U.S. 944 (1974). 
For a discussion of the full scope o( these Jaws, sec M. KoN\'ITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE 
ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW (1946): Note, Comtit11tio11ality of Rcstrictio11s 011 Aliens' Right 
to Worh, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 1012 (195i); Note, Protectio11 of Alicu Rights Under the 
Fourteenth Amcndmcnt, 1971 DUKE L.J. 583; Comment, Alic11s, Et11J1loyt11cnt, and Equal 
Protection, 19 V1LL. L. REV. 589, 590-95 (19i4). 
3. 413 U.S. 634 (1973). 
4. 413 U.S. 717 (1973). 
5. See Das, DisC1'imination i11 Et11J1loy111c11t Agai,1st Alieus-T/Jc I111J1act of the Con-
stitution and Federal Civil Rights Lau•, 35 U. J>rn. L. REV. 499 (l!Ji4); Comment, supra 
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A.liens' Right to Teach 
able discrimination if the state has an inlerest in using its public 
schools for such a critical political function-in particular, the educa-
tion of students for participation in the political community. The 
necessary assessment is whether the nature of a teacher's role in the ~ 
process of political socialization creates a substantial state interest 
which could justify denying teacher certification on the basis of 
alienage. The Note concludes that the states do have some legitimate I 
interest in the process of political socialization in the public schools. ~ 
But because of First Amendment considerations and the imprecision 
of the certification laws in their present form, this interest is insuf- ·I 
ficient to validate current state laws discriminating against alien 
teachers. 
J. Alienage and Equal Protection 
The right of the states to provide for and regulate public education 
has long been recognized. 0 As part of this responsibility, all of the 
states supervise the licensing of teachers in the public schools. 7 Twenty-
one states use United States citizenship as a qualification for certifi-
cation as a public school teacher, 8 thus restricting an alien's oppor-
tunity to teach. 
Two main types of restrictions are imposed. 0 In six states, a resident 
alien is unable to secure a permanent license to teach whether or not 
he or she plans to be naturalized. 10 In 12 other states, an alien may 
6. See, e.g., Epperson , .. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (l!l68) (dictum); Pierce v. Society 
or Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (dictum); Myers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1922) 
(dictum). Most states have constitutional provisions I·cquiring that the state legislature 
create a system of public education. See A. MORRIS, Tur. CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN 
U>UCATION 1)3 (J9i4). ~ 
7. All 50 states require that a teacher be certified before teaching in a public school. 
Su T. STINNETT, A J\IAl'\UAL ON STANDARDS AFFECTING SCHOOL PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED 
STATES 3 (Nat') Educ. Ass'n 19i4). In addition, 29 states require certification of some 
t<·aching personnel in private, parochial, or independent schools. See id . at 3, JO. Unless 
otherwise noted, all references below are to certification requirements for public school 
tnchcrs only. 
J'or purposes of equal protection analysis, discrimination against aliens in the employ-
ment of public school teachers constitutes state action by ,·irtuc both of the state-imposed 
rcnirication requirements and the public chan1cter o[ the municipality or school district 
pro,iding the employment. Although this Note will focus on the mandatory certification 
•niuiremcnts, the analysis would apply equally to any local policy to pass o,·er aliens in 
hlring teachers. 
8, The number of states requiring citizenship for certification has declined by one-
thh<l in the last eight years. (In 196i the number was 32.) See T. STINNETT, A J\IAl'\UAL °' C:CR11F'JCATION REQUIRBIENTS FOR ScHOOL l'ERSONNEL IN THE UNJ"IED ST:\TES 28 (Nat') 
Lluc. :\ss'n 19i0). In many states, the state board of education is authorized to set 
't"quirrn,cnts for certification. Id. at 31. Thus, restrictions on aliens' right to teach arc 
•p<>S(:<l both by statute and by the regulations issm'd by state departments of education. 
9. The following sur\'cy of types of citizenship rcc1uirements was completed in 
frlJruary, J 9i5. 
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be certified provisionally upon declaring his or her intent to becornc 
a citizen. 11 Cutting across these categories, in IO states an alien ca 
be certified when participating in a federal or state exchange pro. 
gram.12 In addition, four states will grant a temporary certificate at 
the request of a school principal or other official who is willing to 
employ an alien. 1s 
The Supreme Court recognized in 1886 that the equal protection 
clause extends to aliens.a Nevertheless, because of the courts' use of 
the rational relation standard 15 and acceptance of the states' asserted 
STINNETI, mprn note 7, at 24); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § i5-6004 (1971); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 391.060 (1965); South Carolina (see T. STINNETI, suprn at 24); cf. Rhode Island Re-
quirements for Certification (on file with l'ale Law ]ormaal) (if an alien lacks citizenship 
only hecause he or she has resided in the United States for too short a period to be 
eligible for naturalization, the citizenship requirement may be waived). 
II. IDAHO CODE § 33-1202(4) (1963); ILL. ANN. STA1". ch. 122, § 21-1 (Smith-Hurd 
1972); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71 , § 38G (19i4); J\f1cH . CoMP. LAws ANN. § 340.852 
(1975); N.J. REV. STAT. § 6.11-3.JO (1970) (including an exception for foreign language 
teachers who have not declared their intention of becoming citizens and who have 
resided in the United States for less than IO years); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 3001, 3001 -a 
(McKinney Supp. 1974); N .D. CEr-.T. CODE § 15-36-07 (1971); DEP'T OF EDUC., OKLA, 
TEACHER EDUCATION, CERTIFICATION AND ASSIGNMENT HANDIIOOK 56 (1971) (on file with l'ale 
Law Journal) (hereinafter cited as OKLAHOMA CERTIFICATION HANDBOOK); TEXAS EDUC. 
CODE § 13.044 (1972); WASH. REv. Coo£ ANN. § 28A.67 .020 (1970); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 18A-3- l (1971); Wyoming (see T . STJNSETI, suprn note 7, at 24). 
12. REGS. OF C(?NN. STATE AGENCIES § 10-J46-2(d) (1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 231.17(2) 
(Supp. 1974); loAHO CoDE § 33-1202(4) (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 122, § 21-1 (Smith. 
Hurd Supp. 1975); M1CH. CoMJ'. LAWS ANN. § 340.852 (Supp. 1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 
§ 75-6005 (Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 391.070 (1968); OKLAHOMA CERTIFICATION HAND-
BOOK, suprn note II, at ' 56; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28:\.67.020 (1970); w. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 18A-3-l (1971). 
8 U.S.C. § I IOI(a)(l!i)O) (1970) authorizes a nonimmigrant alien to work temporarily 
in the United States if he or she is part of an exchange program. This applies to 
any alien 
having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of aba ndoning 
who is a bona fide student, scholar, trainee, teacher, professor, research assistant, 
specialist , or leader in a field of specialized knowledge or skill , or other person of 
similar description, who is coming temporarily to the United States as a participant 
in a program designated by the Secretary of State, for the purpose of teaching, 
instructing or lecturing. studying, observing, conducting rcsca1·ch, consulting, demon-
strating special skills, or receiving training .... 
13. REGS. OF CoNN. STATE AGENCIES§ I0-146-2(d) (1971); J\lo:-.T. REV. CODES .-\1'\N. ~ 75-
6005 (1971); N .D. CENT. CoDE § 15-36-ll (Supp. 1973); letter to Lon S. Dabby from 
W .H. Jones, Director, Div. of Teacher E<luc., State Dep't of Educ., Va., Dec. 24, 1974 
(on file with l'ale Law Jo11rnn/). 
There are two states that do not fit any of the categories abo,·e. In l'lorida, an 
ali en may be certified if his or her services arc needed and he or she takes an oath 
of allegiance. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 231.17(1), (2), (3) (19i4) . In South Dakota, any alien 
who meets the usual qualifications may be temporarily certified. S.D. Regs. (on file 
with }'ale Lnw Journal). 
14 . Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (in\'alidating refusal of San l' rancisco 
board of supervisors to grant licenses for operation of Jaun<lrics to Chinese residents 
of the city). 
15. See Note, Pro(ection of Alien Rights Um/er the Fourteenth Ame11d111e11t, supra 
note 2. at 588; Comment, s11prn note 2, at 590-99. The Supreme Court has traditionally 
used a two-tier approach in e,·al11ating claims that a state statute violates the equal 
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in preserving jobs for their own citizens, 10 the early successes 
in opposing employment discrimination were few and far 
CCII-If Jn 1971, the Supreme Court stated in Graham v. Richard-
dausc of the Fourteent_h Amendment. Sec Gunther, Forc~·ord : /11 Sea.rel, 
l)o</,-i11c On A Cha11g111g Cow·/: A Model foi· a Newer Equal Prot.ect,011, 
1- Re,·. J, 8 (1972). Under the "rational relation" test, a state mnst <lemon-
.... the challenged classification rests on grounds reasonably related to the ad-
ol a permissible objective. Develofnncnls i11 the Law-Eq11nl Protection, 82 
JlrY. )065, 1079 (1969). See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) 
iiutional safeguard is oCCendcd only if the classification 1·csts on grounds 
er,dc°'-ant to the achievement of the State's objective"). However, a class ification 
a "suspect" criterion in\'Okcs a more stringent level of judicial rc,·icw. 
airingcnt standard of prolection is also in,·okcd when a classification touches 
~mental in1erest.) The operative effect of declaring a classification suspect 
dat ,uie must bear the "heavy burden" of showing a "compelling" interest to 
dat Ltw. LO\ing v. \"irginia, 388 U.S. I, 9 (1967). See D evelop111e11/s in the Law-
~t,on, supra at 1087-1120. In addicion, the state must demonstrate that the 
ad,:mccs the interest with prcc1s10n. 
pa naon·· of a cwsification is the manner in which it relates to the purpose 
•· es..<·ntially the question is "whether all and only those persons similarly 
• It ~pect to the purpose of the law" are treated equally by the classification. 
A c):1',ification may be underinclusi,·c in that it does not include within the ,..-u similarly situated. Altcrnati\'ely, it may be o\'erinclush·c in that it in-
•ho arc not similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law. 
a cb-.,ification is both o,·crinclusi\'e and underinclusfrc. See Tussman &: ten-
Jlr, f,t 11"l P.-otection of the Lnws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949). A pcrfccL classifica-
11, impossible w atlain. Howc,·er, Lhe degree of allowable imperfection ,·arics 
i'I WftoHl of classification. \\'hen a suspect category is invoked, the courts will 
nmnce from a perfect classification and may demand that "less drastic 
-.-cl 10 achic,·e tl1c statutory purpose. Sec Gunther, suprn at 21. 
elii,r p&•t, the st.ates have tried to justify restriction of alien employment by 
a -tf><"Cial p ublic interest" in prese1Ting jobs for state citizens. Heim v. 
l'.S. 175 (1913); Truax ,·. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1915); Rok "· Legg. 
%IS, 245 (S.D. Cal. 1939). See Note, Co11stitutio11ality of Resll·ictions 011 
to ll"onl:, supra note 2, at 1016-18. The rationale was best articulated by 
In P~"<>ple , ·. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, aff'd su/J 110111. Crane v. 
l 'S. 195 (1915): 
J aliens is discrimination indeed, but not arbitrary discrimination, for 
ol exclusion is the restriction of the resources of the state to the ad-
ud profit of I.he mcml>crs of the state ... ·) 
~.E. at -429. 
determining what use shall be made of its own moneys. may legit-
---· ---'1 lhe " ·clfarc of its own citizens rather than that of aliens. W"hate\'er 
n1hcr tlu:n a right, may be made dependent upon citizenship. In its 
po.n1y, th~ state is not required to dedicate its own resources to citi-
alilc. 
, .L at HQ. 
'· Raich . ::!39 U.S. 33 (1915), the Court in\'alidatecl a state stalule which 
~"1t of the •·mplo~ecs in any bu,incss l>c U .S. cililens. The Court 
11,cht t«> work for a living in the common occupations of the com-
I 
'") ~cc of the personal freedom and opport'.11~ity that it was the 
11th) .\ m.mdmcnt to secure." Id . at 41. The dcc1s1011 was based both 
•••liiilll-....,. ~nd ~ the exclus.i\'c constitutional authority of the federal go\'ern-
1111~t•on and naturalization. Su note 18 infra. 
•- ·~ I< Ca_mc Comm·n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), Lhc Conn rejected the 
cul _Ci,hmg licenses to citizens. Again the decision was grounded 
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son that classifications based on alienage were "suspect," 18 and also 
rejected the "special public interest" of a state in preserving jobs for 
its citizens.19 In so ruling, the Court paved the way for the two de. 
cisions that have greatly narrowed the allowable area of restrictions 
on alien employment. 
A. Sugarman v. Dougall: The Excepted Area 
In 1973, in Sugarman v. Dougall,2° the Supreme Court considered 
an equal protection challenge to a provision of New Y9rk State's 
civil service law excluding aliens from jobs classified as "competi-
tive."21 The state asserted a substantial interest in guaranteeing that 
a civil servant who " 'participates directly in the formulation and ex. 
ecution. of government· policy' "22 be unimpaired in the fulfillment of 
18. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (I9il) (footnotes omitted): 
[T]he Court's decisions have established that classifications based on alienage, like 
those based on nationality or race, arc inherently suspect and subject to close ju-
dicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a "discrete and insular" 
minority ... for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate. 
Despite the Graham declaration, alicnage may be 'distinguished from race as a 
suspect category. First, alienagc is not an "unalterable trait." Rather, it is a "govern-
mentally created status" from which a permanent resident alien can remove himself 
voluntarily by applying for naturalization. (Once an alien has secured an immigrant visa 
and thus has qualified for permanent residency, there are no further numerical quotas 
to limit his or her chances for naturalization.) See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U .S. 56, ?!I 
(1972) (dictum that earlier cases in\'oked strict scrutiny where "certain classifications based 
on unalterable traits such as race and lineage" were used); Diaz ,·. " ' einberger, 361 F. 
Supp. I, 8 (S.D. Fla. 1973) ("the fact that alienage is a governmentally created status 
suggests that it may not constitute such a consistently illegitimate distinction as to 
warrant mechanical application of the compelling interest test"). 
Second, alienage is a political status subject to Congress's power to regulate naturali-
zation and immigration. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl . 4: "The Congress shall have Power 
... To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization .... " Though many alienage 
cases have turned on an . equal protection/suspectness analysis, always remaining in the 
background is the possibility that a disability accorded aliens by the federal government 
will be sustained by virtue of federal power to regulate naturalization and immigration 
and that a disability accorded aliens by a state will be voided by virtue of its interfer-
ence with that exclusive federal power. But sec note 37 infra. 
19. 403 U.S. 365, 374-76 (1971). The Court gave several reasons for rejecting the 
"special public interest" rationale. For one, it was based on a right/privilege distinction 
that was no longer ,·iable. Second, the state's concern with limiting expenditures was not 
sufficiently compelling. Third, the state could have no "special interest" in tax re\'enues 
to which the alien also contributed. The rationale was under attack for many years 
before G,·aha111; indeed it was originally Ull(krmined by Takahashi v. Fish & Game 
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1948). 
20. 413 U.S. 634 (1973). 
21. At the time of the action, New York ch·il ser\'ice employees were divided into 
"classified" and "unclassified" positions. Of the four categories of classified positions, 
only the competitive class (filled on the basis of a competitive examination) required 
citizenship. The other categories of classified ci\'il ser\'ice (including upper echelon posi-
tions in the state exccuti\'e, municipal and judicial departments) and the unclassi(icd 
ser\'ice (including clccti\'e offices, executh·e and kgislative appointments, and teaching 
positions) did not require citizenship. Id. at 639-40. 
22. Id. at 641 (quoting from appellants' brief). 
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brief). 
. llr<riance to a foreign government. Though the Court 
by a -o . . I d" 1· . t hold that the prov1s10n exc u mg a 1ens was too 1mpre-
«> . h . f h , did ot wholly reJeCt t e premise o t e state s argument. 
die C.:urt accepted t~at there_ w~s some limited area ~f em-
for which citizenship const1tut10nally co_uld b~ r~quired.24 
•d lines provided by the Court to describe this excepted 
1'11 ;ut in terms which, though ambiguous, may be broad 
~he Court noted the states' interest in preserving "'the basic l 
~-~~ of 3 palitical co~n:iunity' "
25 and suggested that citizens~ip 
·racation was perm1ss1ble not only for Yoters, but for elective 
1 
and "important nonelective executive, legislative, and ju-
:'-'• lillliiPlillA 'tiou.s .... "26 The Court reasoned that incumbents of such 
t"J2arc "officers who participate directly in the formulation, 
or review of broad public policy" and thus "perform func-..... ,.,. .. ,, - -
,.., go to the heart of representative government."21 
ea...Mr1inar1 did not make clear ,vhether aliens may be flatly excluded 
c pasitions of state or municipal employment which cannot 
· ed as "offices"28 and which do not involve the formulation 
11 642-43. In view of the proffered justification, the restriction was both 
,T and o\'erinclusi\'e. It was underinclusive because it did not require citi-
.. the upper·le\'el jobs in the classified and uncbissified civil service where 
M!if"!-r was :irguably essential to effective performance. Similarly the, restriction was 
T because it indiscriminately excluded aliens from jobs far remove'd from 
lion and execution of governmental policy, such as sanitation workers and 
#, at 645. 
at 646-47. Despite the diffident wording of the last section of Sugarman 
"._ .. do ,.-e hold that a State may not, in an appropriately defined class of positions, 
ctwnuhip . . .. " 413 U .S. at 647), the Court's description of the excepted area 
malty dicta . llather it was critical to the Court's holding that the New York civil 
•IC excluding aliens was underinclusive. See id. at 642-4!1. • 
at 647, quoting Dunn v. Illumstein, 405 U.S. !130, 344 (1972). See 413 U.S. 
fri ution omitted): 
ire a State"s interest in establishing its own form of government, and in 
participation in that government to those who are within "the basic con-
e( a political community." ... ·we recognize, too, the State's broad power 
Its political community. But in seeking to achie,·e this substantial purpose, 
lmination against aliens, the means the State employs must be precisely 
la light of the acknowledged purpose. 
tlJ U.S. at 647 (emphasis added). 
II (nnphasis added). 
h nonclcctive positions constitute offices under state law Yaries considerably 
lo llate. Among the characteristics considered in determining whether a po-
.. oHicc or employment are (I) the delegation of sovereign powers; (2) par-
In important policymaking and decisionmaking in the governmental unit; 
ttquimncnt of an official oath and official bond; :md (4) appointment for a 
Ima, with authority conferred by law. See E . .l\IcQL,LLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICI· 
- - , ... ..,, •• TloNs § 12.!IO (rev. 3d ed. 1973). The lack of any clear standard for deter-
lio ii an "officer" and who is a mere "employee"' is a strong reason for not 
rrma11's 1·efcrence to "officers" as exhaustin~ all permissible areas of dis-~---. 
are generally considered to be employees rather than officers. See cases cited 
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of high-level policy. However, Sugarman's emphasis on the state's sub. 
stantial interest in defining and preserving a political c9mmunity doei 
suggest that exclusion is permissible when the position is, in some 
sense, essential to preserving the identity of the political community. 
The Court's explicit exception for "officers" may fairly be read ·as a 
consequence of this underlying concern; the excepted area thus might 
also include other jobs having a critical relationship to the preserva. 
tion of the political community, even if those jobs cannot be classified 
as "offices."29 
B. In re Griffiths 
In re Griffilhs,80 decided the same day as Sugarman, may seem to 
narrow the excepted area of employment for which citizensh'ip is a 
permissible state-imposed qualification. The case concerned the ex. 
clusion of an alien, a Netherlands woman named Fre Le Poole Grif. 
fiths, from admission to the bar in Connecticut.31 In an effort to meet 
the " 'heavy burden' " 82 required to justify a classification based on 
alienage, the Connecticut Bar Examining Committee pointed to the at-
torney's role as an officer of the court. The Court in turn recognized 
the state's interest in ensuring that licensed attorneys be qualified, 
but concluded that an attorney's _Eowers, whether to sign writs or take 
depositions, "hardly involve matters of state policy or acts of such 
unique r~ s.£2,nsibjlity_ as to--;;:;'trust them only to citizens." 33 The Court 
in Griffiths also refused to hold that the mere licensing of a lawyer 
by the state was sufficient to place him "so close to the core of the 
in 56 AM. JuR. 2o Municipal Cor/>orntions § 234, at 295 n.G (1971); 68 id., Schools § 129, 
at 459 n.79 (1973) ; E. McQUILLIN, suprn § 12.31, at 184-85 n.49. 
29. This reading of Sugarman is 1·einforccd by the Court's cryptic comment that it 
was not ruling out the possibility that 
on the basis of an individualized <letennination, an alien may not be refused, or dis-
charged from, public employment, nen on the basis o[ uoncitizenship, if the re-
fusal to hire, or the discharge, rests on kgitimate stale interests 'that relate to 
qualifications for a particular position or to the characteristics of the employee. 
Id. at 646-47. 
One might attempt to narrow S11garnu111 by pointing to the fact that it anchored the 
right of slates to control the qualifications o[ officers :1ml ,·otcrs in the text of the Tenth 
Amendment and Article IV, § 4. See 413 U.S. at 648. But the states· interest in political 
socialization, if equally essential to effecti,·e government, coul<l be gi,"Cn the very same 
textual support. 
30. 413 U.S. 717 (1973). 
31,- The plaintiff had lived in Connecticut for five years. She was eligible for naturali-
zation, but had taken no steps toward becoming a citizen. Id . at 718. The Connecticut 
supreme court upheld the exclusion. Ju ,·c Frc Le Poole Griffiths, 162 F onn . 249, 294 
A.2d 281 (1972). 
32. 413 U.S. at 721, quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 3i9 U.S. 184, 196 (1964); cf. 413 
U .S. at 730 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) . Sec note 15 suprn. 
33. 413 U.S. at 724. 
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• • I process as to mike him a formulator of government policy:·::-1 C:::u face, GriflitJu suggests that the Sugarman exception will be 
alllrl"U"''·ly defined. Ho"'C\cr, tl~nature of the bar committee's argu-
t in Gn"/fiths may limit the reach of the decision. The bar com-
,.aa tt tt aed 1eavily upon a awyer's status as an officer of the court, 
11 • ' l l bl. ff. ~ -anpting to ana1°?1z.e an attorneys ro e to regu a: pu ac_ o. ice."" 
1'1c Court in Grif11tlu dearly held that the lawyer 1s not w1thm the 
('fr,ft'f'rd area of official governmental positions closely related to 
Political community.38 but the opinion fails to illuminate the 
~r mode of analysi5 for detcrmi'.1ing whetl~e_r oth~r state-licensed 
paitions which cannot be charactenzed as offioal might fall within 
l exception. 1 
C. Perkins v. Smith ( ~ 2 
Jn ,·iew of Graham's rejection of the 'special public interest" ratio-
le :md S11garman's definition of the excepted area, a state's justifica-
for alien discrimination must apparently shift from economic 
to Political interests.::' . .\n important example of successful reliance on 
/d. :at i29. 
/d. at i2~·25, 72i-29; Brief for Appcllcc at 19-21. 
l.awycrs do indeed ocxup~ professional positions of 1·csponsibility and influence 
.. , Impose on them dulio rorrl'iati,·c with their right of access to the courts .... 
'ht . . &hr-)' arc not officials c,( gcr.crnmcnt hy , ·irtue of their being la\\1·ers. 
c.s. :at 729. 
SJ. The "excepted area" illr"'ed by Sugarman and G1·iffiths for state discrimination 
tl aliens is probably DO( m.rrowcd by any preemptive effect of the federal gov-
__.nt'1 power to regulate immigration and naturalization. Suga,-man and G1·iffiths 
... IIOI formally reach any ~.:.ion of preemption, as the civil service and bar com-
ft'Strictions were rnidro oo equal protection grounds. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 
&,!\, 6~6 (1973); In re Criffilhs, 413 U.S. 717, 718 n.3 (1973). Howner, the Court's 
pUcit n.'{-ognition o[ the o.(tpttd area in S11gan11a11 seems to imply that once a state 
llthlicd the standards of cqrul protection, it will have no difficulty in meeting the 
«c of the su prcmacy cb05C. 
long as the states sought 10 justify broad exclusion of aliens from employment 
1k b:uis of the state's -,pccul public interest" in preserving employment for state 
, the conflict with fnla..l power was potentially more acute. Under the Immi-
iain and !'.aturalization :\ct. the admission of some aliens is dependent on an assess-
,.,. b)' the Secretary of ubrn- of the labor market conditions in the alien 's field of 
tncnt. 8 U.S.C. § 118'.!i~/ I!) (1970) (aliens seeking entry "for the purpose of per-
..._ln,t 51..illcd or unskilled bbor- arc excluclcd unless the Secretary of Labor determines 
.. •1hrrc arc not sufficient •orkers in the United States who arc able, willing, 
,r~. and anilablc at tf,,e: time of application ... aud at the place to which 
al1m is destined to pcrl•xm such skilled or unskilled labor"). Reliance by a state 
d.- "5)X'{ial public intcroC ntionalc imolvcd a conflicting conclusion that employ-
-.. In the state was nccda:f for state citizens. In addition, what the Tnrnx Court 
In IAriling down ;a brw,J iutc-imposed restriction of aliens' prh-ate employment 
apply :is well to brood 1ouiclions of state and municipal employment: 
~ ~uenion of an auth~ty 10 deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a li.,·c-
-,ci \\·hen lawfully ad111Jtttd 10 the State would be tantamount to the assertion 
ef the right to deny them rrurancc and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot 
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political interests to uphold a restrictive statute is Perkins v. Smith 
decided by a three-judge district court in Maryland and now on ap 
Perkins. concerned the exclusion of aliens from service ort state 
federal juries, an exclusion imposed respectively by state and fed 
statutes. --
The Perkins court sustained the exclusion, holding that a ju 
largely unreviewable role as the arbiter of factual issues in crimi 
and civil cases made it a critical decisionmaking body, "one of 
institutions at the heart of our system of governm~nt." 8° Citizens 
was necessary for effective performance as a juror because aliens, 
a class, were less "conversant with the social and political instituti 
of the society" and with the "nuances of local tradition and languag 
In addition, an alien's foreign allegiance might distort the way 
or she chose to apply the laws. 40 Since any independent attempt 
ascertaining loyalty would undercut existing naturalization procedur 
the use of citizenship as a gauge of allegiance was "compelled by cir, 
cumstances."H 
live where they cannot work. And, if such a p0licy were permissible, the practical 
result would be that those lawfully admitted to the country under the authority 
of the acts of Congress •. , would be segregated in such of the States as ch01e 
to offer hospitality. 
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915). 
38. 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974), aj1peal docketed, 43 U.S.L.W. 
21, 1974). 
39. 370 F. Supp. at 137. 
40. A juror "who Jacked any concern for the fairness of the outcome could se,·erdJ 
obstruct or distort the course of justice." Id. at 138. Indeed, a "single persuasi\'e a 
unprincipled juror could C\'en direct the course of justice into channels deliberate 
chosen for their deleterious effect on this country." Id. The fact that Pe1·ki11s deala 
with what is arguably a political right and not with economic discrimination secq 
significant to the validation of the restriction. One can view jury sen·ice as a political 
right in that the jury, by utilizing its power of nullification, can modify the substantil-e 
Jaw passed by the legislature. Thus, one can argue that restricting an alien's right 
to serve on a jury is merely a recognition of "a State's constiunional responsibility 
the establishment and operation of its own government .... " Sugarman \', Dougall. 
413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973). 
41. Judge Winter, in his concurrence, differed with the majority by finding that 
there were "less drastic means" of ensuring that alien jurors were fluent in English and 
familiar with American laws and institutions; nonetheless Winter strongly agreed that 
allegiance and "commitment" to the United States were fundamental to a juror's quali, 
fication. 370 F. Supp. at 140. "Citizens, as a rnlc, harbor positive feelings toward their 
sovereign and possess a sense of identity with their fellow citizens." Id. al 141. Where 
American law "resolves a question of public policy" or "dcfin[es] interpersonal relation· 
ships" differently than the law of an alien's own country, it is 
not unreasonable to belie\'e that 1·esident aliens may be likely lo permit their positive 
feelings toward their foreign sm·ereigns and their sense of identity lo their fellow· 
countrymen to impair their commitment to the enforcement and application of 
American law in those situations .... 
Id. In addition, native-born and naturalized jurors who are eligible to vote and run 
for public office "have, at least theoretically, some influence upon the content of tht 
laws" and would reasonably be expected to "ha\'C a greater commitment to their proper 
application and enforcement than those lacking such influence." And of course such 
. Aliens' Right to Teach 
Perkins, recently echoed by a Fifth Circuit decision in United States 
v. Gordon-Niklwr,4 2 has an important bearing on an alien's right to 
teach because it establishes that at least some state positions which are 
not high-level governmental appointments may fall within the Sugar-
man exception. The opinion recognizes that critical functions going 
·• 'to the heart of representative government' " 43 are sometimes dele-
gated to positions outside the upper levels of any governmental or 
bureaucratic hierarchy. The Perkins court does fit jury service within 
the explicit language of the Sugarman exception for offices, noting that 
jurors hold " 'important nonelective ... judicial positions' " and "par-
ticipate directly in the execution" of the law.H But Perkins makes no 
mention of the term "office," and thus puts a more functional gloss 
on Sugarman's language, judging the bounds of the excepted positions 
by their actual relationship to the political community. 
II. Teachers and the State's Interest in Education 
In order to place teachers within the Sugarman exception, the states 
will have to show4G a close relationship between education, the teacher, 
personal commitment "is not susceptible of objectiYe measurement." Id. at 141. Thus 
Perki11s recognizes that formal allegiance may be important as a signal of the attitmlc of 
persons im·oh-ed in making judgments that depend on an intangible sense of commitment. 
42. 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975). Gordori-Nikkar concerned the exclusion of aliens 
fron1 federal juries only. The issue was raised by the motion of a criminal defendant 
to quash a jury panel on the ground that the exclusion of resident aliens deprived her 
of the Sixth Amendment right tu trial before a jury reprcsentati,·c of the community. 
The Gordo11-Nikkar court t1otnl the Supreme Court's dictum in Carter \". Jury Comm·n, 
396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970), that states arc "free to confine the selection [of jurors] to 
citizens .... " 518· F.2cl at 976 n.4 . But it also relied heaYily on Pcrki11s 's equal protection 
analysis: 
We agree with the [Perki11s] court's conclusion that there was a compelling interest 
"in ensuring that pcrso1ls who scn·e as jurors arc personally committed to the proper 
application and enforcement of the laws of the United States" which therefore 
justifies the exclusion of aliens. 
518 F.2cl at 976. Though the Gorcloll -Nikkar decision cited as an additional justification 
Congress's plenary authority to regulate the entry and residence of aliens, a ground 
peculiar to federal measures excluding aliens, the court explicitly noted that the Perki11s 
ground was sufficient. Id. at 977. An interest in ensuring that jurors arc committed to 
the "proper application of the laws" is applicable of comsc both to state and federal 
juries. .• 
43. 370 F. Supp. at 137, quoti11g Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). 
44. Id., quoting and paraphrasing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 63·1, 647 (1973). 
45. The arguments that follow in the text, which might support the denial of teacher 
certification to aliens, ha,·e not been offered by any state in litigation. Howe,·cr, these 
arguments are probably the only grounds left for a justification in light of Sugarman 
v. Dougall and In re 9riffiths. The arguments arc dubbed the "state's position" 
throughout the remainder of the Note. 
There is only one court decision dealing with the restriction of the alien's right to 
be certified as a public school teacher. In Miranda Y. Nelson, 351 F. Supp. 73::i (D. Ariz. 
1972), aff'd me111., 413 U.S. 902 (1973), a three-judge district court imalidatcd both a 
state constitutional proYision which denied aliens the opportunity to be employed in any 
state, county or municipal job, and a state law enacted under the authority of that 
99 
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 85: 90, 1 !175 
and the political community. The validily of the restrictions against 
aliens will depend in the first instance on whether a public school 
teacher performs functions that are so intimately involved with the 
maintenance and identity of the political community as to make a11 
alien unsuitable in the part. 
1 Education does have an essential role in forming and preserving the character of the political community.40 One primary function of l'du. 
prov1s10n which made aliens ineligible for employment in any public institution, 111 • 
eluding public schools. ~:,1 F. Supp. at 739-40. The court based its decision 011 hoth 
equal protection and prt'<"mption grounds. Id . at 740. The state's only apparent lll'ICll• 
mcnt in support of the bws was the ··special public interest" rationale (see 1101(• 16 
suprn), which had been trt·atcd with lillle sympathy by the Supreme Court less than two 
years earlier in Graham "· Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372-75 (1971). 
While Miranda voided an alien employment restriction grounded on the state's pt~1• 
prietary interest in prcs<TYing jobs for its citizens, it sheds Jillie light on the g<'ll<'t'ul 
status of restrictions against alien teachers. For one, Miranda dealt with a broad, 1111 • 
precise exclusion of aliens from all state emplo):_mcnt, including teaching. Thus, while 
the litigation happened to involve a teacher, the state's argument and the court's analyMla 
did not focus in any way on the special functions of the teacher in political sod<·ty, 
Secondly, the case preceded Sugarman and Gl"iffiths; hence the state's justification wu1 
not tailored to the standards articulated in those cases. Finally, the fact that Min1111/n 
was affirmed without opinion by the Supreme Court limits the preccdcntial ,·alue of 
the case. See Edelman v. Jordon, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) (Summary affirmances whkh 
preceded Edelman "obviously arc of prcccdcntial value .... Equally obYiously, thi•y 
are not of the same p·recedcntial \'aluc as would be an opinion of this Court trcatin1t the 
question on the merits"): Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1975) (Burger, C:.J., 
concmring) ("When we summarily affirm, without opinion, the judgment of a tht'l'C· 
judge District Court we affirm the judgment but not necessarily the reasoning by wldch 
it was reached .... Indet"<I. upon fuller consideration of an issue under plenary n·vlcw; 
the Court has not hesitat<-<l to discard a rule which a line of summary affirmanct•s 111uy 
appear to ha\'c cstablisht-d."); Note, Summm-y Disposition of Supreme Co111·t AJifir,1/,1: 
The Significance of Li111itt"d Discretion and a Thco,-y of Limited Pn:adent, 52 11.U,L, 
REV. 373 (1972). As a rl'sult, Miranda cannot be said to provide much guidance foi· 
analyzing a carefully drawn state statute requiring citizenship for teacher ccrtificntlon. 
The only other determinations of the constitutionality of statutes denying nllcns 
teaching certificates arc the formal opinions of three states' allorneys general. The Al• 
torney General of California found a provision of the California Education Code l'X· 
eluding alien teachers to be unconstitutional. 53 Or. CAL. Arr'Y GEN. 63 (1970) (011 file 
with Yale Law Journal). The opinion was based entirely upon the equal protection 
reasoning of Pmdy & Fit1patrick "· State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 
(1969), where the California supreme court struck down a broad exclusion of nll1•11N 
from public employment because of the imprecision of the exclusion. As in J\lin1111/,1, 
the Attorney General's :111alysis was not peculiar to the teaching profession; hence the 
opinion pro, ides Jillie gui<lancc for resolving the present problem. The attorneys gl'11t•1·11l 
of Pcnnsyh·ania and New )ency ha,·e also concluded that statutes excluding alien tearhct·N 
arc void. The Attorney General of Pennsylvania, writing prior to S11garn1a11 and Grif/il/1.1; 
reached tl1e significant condusion that teaching, like medicine, "is not a central go,·ern. 
mental function ... " and hence could not support a citizenship requirement. 3 PA. llu1.1 .. 
204 Uan . 27, 1973). The opinion of the Allorncy General of New Jersey relied on Sui:111·. 
ma11 and G,·iffiths to find the statute 11nconstit11tionally imprecise. N.J. All'y Gen. Fo1·11111l 
Op. No. 10. Sept. 2~. 1974. 
For a related challenge 10 1·cstrictions on granting tenure to alien teachers on a coll1•1<e 
faculty, sec Younus v. Shal>at, 336 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ill. 1971). 
46. In The Republic, S..>cratcs praises the role o[ cducati~ in determining the chnr-
acter of a political comnni'inty : 



















































Aliens' Right to Teach 
cation is to provide the ot1zen with intellectual skills sufficient for j 
effective participation in the political system. A second function is 
to t1.!,_nsmit common values, attitudes, and political knowledj e.47 
A. Literacy and Political Participation 
For a citizen to participate effectively in a political system that re-
lies on the evaluation of ideas and on informed choice, it is impor-
tant that he possess at least minimal skills of reading and writing.48 
But the restriction of teacher certification to those qualified to teach 
reading and writing can more effectively be accomplished by testing 
all applicants, including aliens, for verbal and written fluency. Ex-
clusion of aliens from teaching positions in the public schools thus 
is not substantially related to the educational task of ensuring that 
citizens are literate. · 
B. Political Socialization 
A more fundamental way in which education affects the political 
community is in the process of political socialization-the transmission 
of political knowledge, attitudes, and values from one generation to 
grow. Training and education being kept good engender good natures; and good 
natures holding fast to the ·good education become even better than those before 
• · , . Then to put it shortly, this one thing needful-training and education-is 
what the m·erseers of the city musl clea\'e to, and they must take care that it is not 
corrupted insensibly. They must guard it beyond everything .... 
l'uTo, THE REPUBLIC BooK IV, 424B (W. Rouse transl. 1956). The United States has 
recognized since its inception the importance of public education to the political com-
lllunity. See, e.g., the Ordinance of 1787, art. lll, 1 Stat. 51-52 n.(a): "Religion, morality, 
Ind knowledge, being necessary to good go\'ernment and the happiness of mankind, 
schools and the means of education shall fore,·er be encouraged." One reason frequently 
suggested for providing public education is iL~ role in nurturing "good" citizenship. See 
D. JAR.OS, SOCIALIZATION TO POLITICS 9-12 (1973); A. MORRIS, supra note 6, at XIV (197-1); 
lkrkman, Students i11 Court: F,·ee Speech a11rl the F1111ctio11s of Schooli11g i11 America, 40 
HA1tv. Eouc. REv. 567, 569 (1970). 
f7. These purposes of education often arc not differentiated explicitly by the courts. 
E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, ,193 (1954): 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local go,·ern-
ments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education 
bot_h demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic 
SOc1cty. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities , 
~~n service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today 
It. is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing 
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment. 
f8 .. The importance of general intellectual skills to political participation has been 
• primary justification for the promotion of compulsmy public education. See, e.g., 
MINN. CoNsT. art. Vlll, § 1: 
Th~ stability of a republican form of government depending mainly upon the in-
lcll1gence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature to establish a gen-
eral and uniform system of public schools. • 
See In re Shinn, 195 Cal. App. 2d 683, 686, 16 Cal. Rptr. 165, 168 (1961) (dictum). Educa-
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another.40 This shaping of political culture can be critical to the 
character and .stability of the political community, for each new gen. 
eration "emerges upon the political scene as a tabula rasa . upon 
which a political system must seek to imprint its image ... if it 
to persist in some form."~ 0 
With the family and the peer group, the school is recognized as a 
crucial agent of political socialization.51 A teacher's role in the process 
of political and cultural learning becomes critical because a teacher 
is quite often the first nonfamilial spokesman of society that a child 
regularly encounters, and functions in the classroom as a model for 
Lion seems Lo be positively correlated with nrious indices of political participation, such as 
following politics and election campaigns, engaging in political discussions, belonging to 
voluntary organizations, and believing oneself capable of influencing the government 
G. ALMOND & s. VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE 317-18 (1965). Of course, such correlation 
does not establish that literacy is the cause of or prerequisite to political panicipaLion. 
49. Fred I. Greenstein, a leading sociologist, has defined political socialization as 
follows: 
Narrowly concei,·ed, politkal socialization is Lhe cleliberate inculcation of political 
information, values and practices by instructional agents who have been formally 
chargecl with this 1·esponsibility. A broacler conception woulcl encompass all po-
litical learning, formal and informal, deliberate ancl unplanned, at every stage of 
the life cycle, including not only explicitly political learning but also nominally 
nonpolitical learning Lhat affects political ·behavior, such as the learning of politically 
relevant social aLLitucles ancl the acquisition of politically relevant personality 
characteristics. . 
Greenstein, Political Socialization, 14 lNT'L ENCYCLO. OF THE SOCIAL Sci. 551 (1968) . See 
Easton & Hess, The Child's Political World, 6 J\[11nn:sT J . OF l'ou. SCI. 229, 230 (1962). 
50. Easton & Hess, mprn noLe 49, at 232. Sr•e Greenstein, s11prn noLe 49, at 551. 
51. On the role of Lhe school in the political socialization process, sec EDUCATION AND 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (J. Coleman ed. 1965); R . DAWSON & K. PREWITT, POLITICAL 
SOCIALIZATION (1969); D. EASTON & J . DENNIS, CIIILDREN IN TIIE J>oLITICAL SYSTEM : ORI· 
GINS OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY (1969); R. HESS & J. TORNEY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF PO-
LITICAL ATTITUDES IN CHILDREN (Anchor Books 1968); i\L JENNINGS & R. NIEMI, THE 
POLITICAL CHARACTER OF ADOLESCEI\CE (19i4); R. i\lERELMAN, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND 
EDUCATIONAL CLIMATES (1971); C. MERRIAM, T11E ~IAKING OF CITIZENS (1931); cf. Tapp 
& Levine, Legal Socialization : Strntegies for a11 Ethical Legality, 2i STAN. L. REV . . I (19i4). 
Indeed because Lhe school is the only major agent of the process subject Lo formal 
control and clirecLion by the community, some commentators Yicw it as Lhc mosL im-
portant means of introclucing a child to the political system. See R . HESS & J. ToRNEY, 
supra at 120; Greenstein, suprn note 49, at !i53-54. The school cleals with children 
throughout impressionable and formaLi,·c periods of clc,·elopment and is insLrumenLal in 
conveying early concrete perceptions of the political institutions, Yalues, and attitudes . 
upon which the commtmiLy is based. R . DAWSON & K . PREWITT, m/1rn at 178. Justice 
Douglas was quite likely correct in describing the school as the "cradle of our democracy." 
Acller v. Bo~rd of Educ., 342 U .S. 48:i, 508 (l!l:i:?) (Douglas, J .• 1\issenLing). 
Dawson and Prewitt have identified several ways in which the public school acLs as 
an agent of political socialization. "Classroom ritual Jifc"-saltILing the flag, patriotic 
songs, discussion of national heroes and events, and systematic exposure to other symbols 
and ceremonies- may produce an atLachmcnt to the nation ancl iLs political Yalues and 
institutions. R. DAWSON & K. PREWITT, suprn at 155-58. A scconcl major instrument of 
political socialization is the school curriculum. In deciding on the subjects which arc to be 
taught and Lhe materials to be used, Lhe school system consciously attempts lo provide 
the student with formal political knowledge. Id . at 147-55. 
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Aliens' Right to Teach 
cptable behavior and social attitudes."2 This special task of the 
:ace cher could place his or her employment within the excepted area 
,~ f f . . 1 . 
recognized by S11~ar~an or unc~10ns essent1a. t~ ~ re~resenta~1ve 
litical commumty. 03 The premise of the d1scnmmat10n against 
~ens would be that an alien, who often has not been fully exposed 
10 
American political culture, cannot serve as effectively as the citizen 
as :an agent of political socialization.04 
To examine the validity of that premise, it may be helpful to use 
tlic models suggested by Robert Hess and Judith Torney0 ~ Lo describe 
the wap in which a teacher influences the political orientation of his 
or her students. 
l!. [f]or the child the teacher represents an authoritati,·c spokesman of society. The 
ac:acher is often the first mo<lcl of political authority the beginning student en-
counters. How new this kind of authority is lo a child can be seen by comparing 
,he p;uent and the teacher. When a child responds lo his parent as an authority 
figure. he <locs not separate the role from the incumbent of the role ..•. The 
public school teacher as an authority figure, on the other hand, is much more like 
a p<>litical authority. The child learns that the authority role and incumbent of 
,he role arc separate factors . ... [H]e discovers that rewards and punishments 
from authorities are affected by i<lcntifiablc constraints that operate on the par-
ikular person in the role. The teacher, like the policeman, president, or mayor, is 
put of an institutional pallern, a constitutional or<ler. 
IL o,wsos 8: K. PRFwrrr, suprn note 51, at 158. In addition, 
attitudes toward achie,·emcnt, toward change, toward fair play, toward manipula-
bility of the em·ironmcnt, toward cooperation, as well as toward obedience and 
competiti,·eness, can be shaped by the culture of the classroom .... [S] uch com-
ponents of one's world have important "spill-over" effects and shape political 
outlooks. 
1'. at 165. 
The courts have recognized the extraordinary 1·esponsibility that our society places on 
w teacher. Su, e.g., Shellon v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960), quoting Adler v. Board 
o( Educ., !142 U.S. 485, 493 (1952) (" 'A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. 
There he shapes the altitude of young minds towar<ls the society in which they live. 
In this, the stale has a vital concern.'") Justice Frankfurter decribed teachers as "the 
prinu o( our democracy" and emphasized their "special task" in society which must 
be fulfilled "by precept and practice." Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) 
(Jnnkrurter, J., concurring). 
S,. The states would have to show that a purpose of the discriminatory statutes was to 
"''ure dfcctivc political socialization. They might point LO provisions in their educational 
b., concerned with the promotion of good citizenship. For example the stale of Vvash-
lniton might point LO the following rather straitlaced provision: 
So person, whose certificate or permit authmizing him lo teach in the common 
tehooh of this stale has been revoked due to his failure lo endeavor to impress on 
the minds o( his pupils the principles of patriotism, or Lo train them up Lo the 
Uuc:- comprehl'nsion of the rights, duty and dignity of American citizenship, shall 
IJ(" permitted to teach in anv common school in this slate. 
\\' ·""· Rn. Conr § 28.-\.67.030 (1970). 
s-4. Su, e.g., R. DAWSON & K. PREWITT, supra note 51, at 160-61: 
One major reason why teachers operate so effectively in this connection [as con-
\C}or1 of consensus values] is that they arc products of the same political sociali-
ution for which they scn·e as agents. Teachers generally do not nec<l to be taught 
10 bud the virtues of the nation. Their own political selves have been shaped in 
a<co1dancc with the very consensus values they now transmit. 
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I. ldenf///111/lon with the Teacher 
The "J,t,,1,11t1 · " d 1 I . . . . . b h d 
the behayl,,, cdat10n_ mdo e emp 1as1zes 1m1tat10n y t e stu. ent 
d 
1111 att1tu es of the teacher.~ 6 · In exchanges with t 
stu ent, a 11, 1 • • bl . 
t 1 . '" 1er mevita y conveys many of his or her own cu~ ura att1111,t,,~ ' fl . 1 · . I . . 11 b d h f • 
1 
, 111 uencmg po 1t1ca onentat10n we eyon t e orrnai 
curncu 11111 1111 I . ff . 1- · l · f · Tl , ' any consc10us e ·ort to impart po ltICa 111 ormat1on •t 1e sta Lt'~ 1 • b I' 1111rcrn would be that regardless of any conscious attemPt i an \t' lt •,11 her to avoid affecting the political outlook of students_ 
t ey wi 
1
_h1• ~I/ influenced. Thus an alien teacher would "distort" the 
process o ~111 1 1, . .f 1 . . . h II 1zat10n, 1 one accepts t 1e premise that aliens are likely 
:~ ave pol It l1 ,t1 and cultural attitudes different from those of citizens 




1•11s1 y or const1tut10na y e teste for as part of 
e cert1 , .. 11 I , h b 
1 





1·111 ii t ion has a formal foreign political allegiance, may 
impe e t Ii, II l . 1· . f ·1 d . 1· . 
1 . ~Ila soc1a 1zat10n o pup1 s to a omest1c po 1t1cal al. egiance. 'I 'I, I f d" "d d 11 · d · 
I . 1 
II \ concern or un 1v1 e a eg1ance un erhes statutes 
W UC 1 a 0\\' . . 
b 1111 alien to teach once he or she has declared an mtention 
to ecome ii \ lt1ited States citizen.c;s 
2· Acquiri'ttH i>olitical Knowledge 
I 
An al ttcnq11 lo exclude aliens from public school teaching could 
a so re Y 011 1 h " I · " d l f 1· · l · 1· · Th' 
d l 
. I' accumu at10n mo e o po 1t1ca sooa 1.zauon. 1s 
mo e views 11 I' . 1 . 1. . d" b · · f I' . 
1 
k ' 11 lllca soc1a 1zat10n as procee mg y an accret10n o po-
itica t~\\'h·d~c and information. Unlike the identification model, 




~~·g·11 11w1n that an alien teacher is less effective than a citizen 
~n u 
1
~ ~lA' I hh part of political socialization might be two-fold. First, 1 cou_ e <\\~\ltd that an alien is not sufficiently conversant with the 
7encan P11H1kal system to effectively teach formal aspects of political 
cu turef. SI t'( '<11\\\, there is some evidence that nv1c education is more 
success u w h\' \\ 1 f 1 f l · I · · I . 
1 
h l 1e orma content o t 1e curncu um 1s 1n 1annony 
wit 
1 
It e P0 Hth ,1l orientation of the teacher, so that his or her more 
casua staten\\'\ b 1. . d · I 
1 
f \Ill a out po 1t1cs an government are consonant wit 1 
t le ormal <'11\·\·kulum.oo Thus, the states could assert that even if the 
56. Id. at 2·1, 
57. For exm11~,\ · · 
or democratic 1 ' \ \he manner in ll'hich the class is con<lucte<l, whether authontanan 
supra note 51' 
11
"" .\\'fret the political views of the stu<lcnts. R. DAWSON & K. PREWITT, 
, II\ \\,\ , . 
58. For a lis1,1,_. \It. 
59. R. HEs.~ ,"' "' 1111ch slatutcs, sec note 11 supra. 
60. See R. l\&_ \ , \'oRNEY, suJna note 51, at :?3; Greenstein, supra note 49, at 551. 
sup,·a note 51 ."''' ''- & K. PREWITT, supra note 51, at 149-50; R. HESS & J. ToRNEY, 
' ~\ \ ~~,'12; Litt, Civic Ed11calio11, Co1111111111ity Norms and Political 111· 
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An Alien's Right to Teach 
. ~ of the narrowing of the field of permissible discriminatiol\ 
'lC\ d G "ff . h I . ' M :IU»' aliens in Sugarman an n it s, t 1e argument m support ot 
• teacher certification to aliens must rest principally on tht' 
tng 11· · · · · bl. h l • ~rtion of a compe mg interest m usmg its pu 1c sc oo s 
pc,litical socialization. The courts may view the statutory requir~ 
(or naturalization-including five years' residence and demon-
~ familiarity with American history and government-as support 
&he prop0sition that _a~ al~en _is ~ot sufficiently convers.ant with 
.. -.. -.-·1r.:1n mores and political mst1tut10ns to act as an effecuve agent 
itical socialization in the public schools.61 As Justice Rehnquist 
cd in his dissent in Sugarman, the major goal of the naturaliza. 
pf'\>ttSS is to ensure that aliens demonstrate the familiarity with 
·an culture which citizens as a class are presumed to gain fron1 
-..-. ... •t ~ucation and basic social contact."62 The courts also may 
to the rationale used in Perl<ins and in Gordon-Niklwr, whert' 
, "·ere c:,..cluded from jury service because they were assumed to 
familiar with national and local institutions. 
l "ct the state's interest must be deemed sufficient to justify a suspect 
' ficition. One consideration that might demote a legitimate state 
&nut from status as a compelling one is the First Amendment prob-
r.aiscd in the state's attempt to control the process of socialization. 
addition, the means used by the state to advance the interest may 
~ sufficiently precise. 
use the teacher's role in the process of socialization encompasses 
It .. t1on, 28 A~r. Soc. REV. 69. 73, 74 (1963). Litt stu<lie<l ci\'ic education in tlll'C\' 
ltlsh w:hools, in upper middle class, lower mid<llc class, and working class neigh, 
... .._.,._ lie concluded that the influence of the formal ciYics curriculum was greatest 
le "3, congruent with the attitudes towards goYernment and political participation 
I hdd in the community. 
I l ' .C. ~ 1'123 (1970) pro,·idcs that an alien seeking naturalization must show "an 
-.ilrnbncling or the English language" and "a knowle::dge and understanding of tht' 
antuh or the history, and of the principles and form of go,·ernment, of th~ 
Su1n..·· TI1e House Ju<liciarr commented on this pro\'ision : 
h lhc 1yucm of citizenship classes sponsored by the Immigration and Naturali-
Sc-nicc :ind the local school system, the alien is aided in preparing himself fol' 
••'--.. Ip, and e\'cry effort is made to give him fundamental and uniform know!· 
el our political and social structure. 
aa. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Scss. 78 (1952). 
'-P1man \'. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 659 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting fron1 
111t ity in both S11garn1an and In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)). 
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the distinct phenomena of identification and direct })'.lt~ , -.al teachin 
the character of the state's interest should be assessed it ~ 1tt of eacf 
A. First Amendment Co11siclerntions 
In educating the young in citizenship, there should he unusuall 
scrupulous attention to the First Amendment, 63 "if ,,~ are not y 
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth h, di~count i t~ 
portant principles of our government as mere platituctt","•H In ev:. 
uating the requirements of the First Amendment in tht' present co . 
text, 05 a distinction may be made between attempts by the state ~ 
exclude from its public schools political influences det'll\t•d to be u ~ 
favorable and efforts to i11cl11de socializing influences that transfer :. 
litical information thought to be important. p 
1. Identification with the Teacher 
A fundamental value which lies at the core of the political syste 
is freedom of speech and thought. It would be ironic incb·cl for stat: 
concerned with the education of a critical citizenry to exclude in~ 
fluences from the public schools that might cast douht 011 the un-
thinking acceptance of generally held political values and attitudes. 
Yet, at the heart of the argument based on the identification model 
is the fear that the unconscious transfer of foreign pol it ital and cul-
tural values will "distort" the political socialization pnx:c,s. Dcnyin 
teacher certification to aliens on this ground necessarily amounts t! 
an effort to exclude "unfavorable" influences from the l*K:tss of 
0
_ 
litical socialization. p 
In Pierce v . Society of Sisters, in recognizing parenL<s' JJ~ht to have 
their children educated in private schools, the Court 1ejc:cted the 
state's use of the public schools to "standardize" the n<."Xt generation 
of citizens. 66 Similarly, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 67 the C<1un invalidated 
63. The rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, including frct:tl,,:u_ r,f ,pecch 
protected against stale action by the due process clause of the Foun,-;.u:1 Amc.-nd ' arc 
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U .S. 380 (1927) ; Gitlow "· New York, 268 U.S. f,'l,t -~,;r I> mcnt. 
, ·. Louisi_ana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968). Thus they arc applicable to t4' .. • r;~lati~~c~; 
the public schools. 
64. West Va. Bd. of E<luc. \' , Barnette, 319 U .S. 624, 637 (1943). 
65. The arguments made below in regar<l lo the limits placed In " "' Pin t A d 
ment on a slate's interest in political socialization in the puhlic scJ.,;;'.4 ;irl'lfv a frmcl~
1 
.: 
. . . I ' f I . . 1-1 · h '- - - • ,r 1011 to any attempt Lo require c1\1zens up or tcac 1111g 111 nonpuu 1c sc <X>u. 
66. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U .S. 510, 535 (1925) (emphasis ad!"~-: . 
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all goYernments in 11.r ~ '""" , 
cxclu<les any general power of the Stale LO sla11clm·dize its childrai \>' rrring- re 




of the Stale .... 
67. 262 U.S. 390 (192:1). l\Icyer prl'C'l'dcd the express incorporatiou « J "' \mn.-lmcnl 
rights into the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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·~ statute prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages in the 
• ,c}lools, spurning Nebraska's contention that allowing foreign-
dents to be taught their native language would "inculcate 
l(U the ideas and sentiments foreign to the best interests of this 
.... Interpreting ]\.feyer in a later decision, the Court has as-
&h3t 3 state may not conduct its schools to deliberately "foster 
eous people."00 The Court's strong support for academic 
~ and careful restriction of loyalty oaths for teachers71 also 
,a..C\111111& the view that the First Amendment will not tolerate laws that 
p;ill of orthodoxy over the classroom." 72 Rather, students should 
~ to "that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 
cl a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of au-
:lll!l~tuU\'C selection.' "
73 
C>'clusion of alien teachers out of a fear of the unconscious 
of foreign attitudes and values is an effort to standardize and 
IL al '98. See Farrington , ·. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (ill\'alidating re-
• fon-ign language schools in the Territory of Hawaii). 
1'Wff ,·. Des l\foines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 
Tinllrr, the Court restrained the defendant school district, on First Amend----~,cb, fmm disciplining two high school students for wearing black arm bands 
&he \"ict Nam " 'ar in Yiolation of a school regulation. In citing Meyer, 
9'()4C'd tJiat the dl'cision "expressed this Nation's repudiation of the principle 
k might so conduct its schools as to 'fos ter a homogeneous people.'" Id. 
• ~,., Keyishian , ·. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), i1walidating New 
• tcinbcrg Law. The law required the stale board of regents to issue regu-
thc disqualification or rcmo\'al of faculty in the state educational system 
·di~loyal" and to make a list of "subYersiYe" organizations, membership in 
romt itute prima facic e\'idence of disqualification for employment. The 
C,s,urt found the statute and implementing rt'gulations im·alid on First Amend-
• :rnd stressed the Yalue of academic freedom: "Our Nation is deeply com-
..afcauardi ng academic freedom, which is of tr:rnscendant \'alue lo all of 
•"· at 603. 
,. ~cl\· H ampshire, 35-1 U.S. 23! (1957), the Court reversed a contempt 
Inn a uni,·ersity professor who refused to testify about the content of his 
an inu-stigation comlucted hy the state allorney general. " 'hilc the Court 
Wding on the Yagucnt'ss of the New Hampshire statute authorizing the at-
al to conduct such an i111piiry, the Com t also emphasized the importance 
frttdom: . 
11.ould underestimate the \°ital rnlc in a dt'mocracy that is played by those 
an<l train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual 
• our colleges and uni\'crsities would imperil the future of our Nation. 
kt' I>rvcl0Jn11r11ts i11 the Law-.·lcndemic F,·ccdom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045 
'41p,cmc Court has consistl'lllly held the statutes requiring such oaths to be· 
-1 uguc. See, e.g., f.lfhramll , ·. Rus.sell, 384 U.S. I 1 (l 966); Baggett v. Ilullit, 
(l!l<>f); Cramp "· Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 2i8 (1961); cf. Key-
,d of R<-g<·nts, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See \'an Alstyne, The Co11stit11tio11al 
7f'eelarn <111(/ J>rofr:s.rnrs, 1!170 DUKE L.J. 841; Note, Academic Frncdom i11 the 
1: Tl,e Right tu Tearh, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. ll76 (1973). 
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homogenize the process of political socialization. As such, it is incon-
sistent with First Amendment values. Though there are some diffi. 
culties with arguing that the citizenship requirements themselves 
violate the First Amendment, 74 the inconsistency may well render 
illegitimate any state interest based on the identification model of 
political socialization. At the very least, such a justification is suffi. 
ciently opposed to the spirit of the First Amendment to be properly 
disqualified from status as a compelling interest.n 
2. Acquiring Political luformation 
The accumulation model of socialization 1s concerned not with the 
unconscious transfer of values and attitudes, but rather with the di-
rect and formal imparting of political information. The states would 
assert th~t the alien teacher performs this function less effectively 
than the citizen for two reasons . First, aliens, as a class, are presumed 
to be less conversant with the political information to be transferred. 
Second, because the presentation of this material is more effective 
when the content is in harmony with the political orientation of the 
te~cher, aliens may be less successful in their presentation even if 
they have the requisite knowledge. This aspect of political socializa-
tion focuses not so much on the exclusion of unfavorable influences 
as on the affirmative task of conveying political information. 
74. The difficulties are several. l'or one, there is no explicit speech or line of thought 
being repressed. Secondly, and more significantly, a decision invalidating these laws as 
violative of the First Amendment would call into question all efforts at political so· 
cialization. For in a real sense, all political socialization invo!Yes an imposition of values. 
75. The Supreme Court used analogous reasoning in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 
23 (1968). In Williams, the Court invalidated several Ohio election laws that made it 
yirtually impossible for any political party other than the Republicans or Democrats to 
be placed on the state ballot used to choose electors pledged to candidates for the 
presidency and vice presidency. Id . at 24. Two political parties challenged the statutes on 
the ground that they denied equal protection to the parties' supporters. The Court 
found that the questioned statutes "place[d] burdens" on the First Amendment right of 
freedom of association . Id . at 30. As a result, the Court demanded that Ohio demonstrate 
a "compelling interest" in order to justify the laws. 
In an effort to meet this test, the state asserted that it had a compelling interc~t 
in the promotion of a two-party system. However, the Court refused to classify th 15 
interest as compelling for purposes of the equal protection analysis because the interest 
itself was inconsistent with First Amendment values. Justice Black, writing for the Court, 
stated: 
(Ohio] claims that the State may validly promote a two-party system in order 
to encourage compromise and political stability. The fact is, however, that the Ohio 
system docs not merely favor a "two-party system"; it favors two particular parties 
... and in effect tends to give them a complete monopoly. There is, of course, 
no reason why two parties should retain a permanent monopoly on the rfght to 
have people vote for or against them. Competition in ideas and governmental 
- policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment 
freedoms .... 
Id. at 31-32. 
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Aliens' Right to Teach 
The legitimacy of the state's concern with the harmonious relation-
ship between the content of the curriculum and the personal political 
orientation of the teacher is open to question, because of general 
judicial disfavor for state inquiry into personal political beliefs. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has recognized the legitimacy of the state's 
interest in using its schools for the shaping and preservation of the 
political community by transfer of important political information. 70 
Therefore, the state's interest in ensuring that its teachers possess the 
requisite knowledge of the political system and political institutions 
would appear to be compelling. 
B. Imprecision 
The Supreme Court in Sugarman noted that a statute restri_cting 
alien employment must be drawn with great precision, excluding 
aliens only where necessary to the protection of the state's compelling 
76. Take, for instance, the flag salute cases. In Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 
U.S. 586 (1940), the Supreme Court upheld a state regulation requiring that pupils in 
public school participate in a daily flag salute ceremony. Justice Frankfurter, writing 
for the Court, emphasized the state"s interest in using its schools for the promotion and 
prcsenation of the political community. 
The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment. 
Such a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind and spirit which 
may serve to gather up the traditions of a people, transmit them from generation 
to generation, and thereby create that continuity of a treasured common life which 
constitutes a civilization. 
... The influences which help toward a common feeling for the common country 
are manifold. Some may seem harsh and others no doubt are foolish. Surely, how-
ever, the encl is legitimate. 
Id. at 596, 598. It was for this reason that the Court would not '"exercise censorship over 
the conviction of legislatures that a' particular program or exercise will best promote in 
the minds of children who attend the common schools an attachment to the institutions 
of their country." Id. at 599. 
In West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the Court overruled 
Gobitis on the question of compelling students to salute the flag. However, the Court 
Sttmed to question only the means by which the state sought to use its schools for 
political socialization and not the legitimacy of the end itself. Justice Jackson, writing 
for the Court, asserted: 
As the present CHIEF JUSTICE [Stone] said in dissent in the Gobitis case, the State 
may '"require teaching by instruction and study of all in our history and in the 
structure and organization of our government, including the guaranties of ci\'il liberty, 
lVhich tend to inspire patriotism and love of country." 310 U.S. at 604. Herc, how-
C\'er, we are dealing with a compulsion of students to declare a belief. They are not 
merely made acquainted with the flag salute so that they may be informed as to 
lVhat it is or even what it means. The issue here is whether this slow and easily 
neii:lected route to aroused loyalties constitutionally may be short cut by substi-
l luting a compulsory salute and slogan. 
d. at _631 (footnotes omitted). The courts traditionally have been reluctant to interfere 
CXt~ns1vely with the curriculum of the public schools, emphasizing that they arc ill-
equipped to substitute for school boards or legislatures in the determination of what is 
~ntial to a successful program of compulsory public educatio~. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. 
Oder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Meyer v. 
109 
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interest.77 Therefore, even if one concedes that the state's interest in 
the accumulation aspect of political socialization is compelling and 
that it places public school teaching within the Sugarman exception, 
the analysis still is not complete. Discriminatory state statutes, as pres-
ently enacted, generally exclude aliens from all teaching positions in 
the public schools, without regard to grade level or subject matter. 
There are several more precise and "less drastic means" 78 for advanc-
ing the state's interest. 
The statutes in their present form exclude alien teachers at all grade 
levels. While the process of political socialization continues throughout 
life, the most critical period seems to be between the ages of three 
and 13. 79 The state's interest in political socialization, though argu-
ably compelling in elementary school education, thus wanes consider-
ably in the high school. The varying interest of the state in primary 
and secondary education was recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder,80 where 
the Court held that a state could not compel the attendance of Amish 
children in the public schools beyond the eighth grade. One com· 
mentator concludes that this decision struck a severe blow to any 
state interest in secondary education.st As such, the precision demanded 
by use of a suspect classification would limit the permissible exclusion 
of alien teachers to the elementary school level. 
If the state's compelling interest in political socialization is limited 
to the formal transfer of political information, it would also appear 
that the exclusion of alien teachers must be limited to subjects in which 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1922.) Though the reluctance of the courts to intervene in 
public school operations has been waning (su, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1974); 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. , 393 U.S. 503 (1969)), one 
still might expect considerable deference as to the content of curriculum. 
77. See p . 95 & note 23 supra. 
78. See note 15 supra. 
79. See, e .g., R. HESS & J. TORNEY, supra note 51, at 131; M. JENNINGS & R. N1E~1. 
supra note 51, at 181-206; Easton & Hess, supra note 49, at 236; Greenstein, supra note 
49, at 554. These works suggest that much of one's basic political socialization occurs 
before the end of the elementary school years. This, of course, is not 10 suggest that 
political attitudes and orientation do 1101 ch:rnge after the eighth grade, but only lhal 
the state's interest is stronger in primary education. 
80. 406 U.S. 205, 227 (1972) ("[T)here is at best a speculati\·e gain, in terms of meet· 
ing the duties of citizenship, from an additional one or two years of compulsory forrnal 
education [beyond the eighth grade).") . 
81. Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the Finl A mend111e11t s 
Religious Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 213, 229-30 (1973) . ll should be noted that even on 
the elementary school level, the slate 's interest in public education may be outweighed 
by other concerns. Thus, in 1925, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, the Court 
held that the state's interest in public education must yield 10 the parents' right _ to 
provide for equivalent education in prh·ate schools. The Court affirmed an injuncuon 
restraining the slate of Oregon from requiring compulsory attendance at public schools. 
Similarly, in concluding that teaching is not a "central gO\·crnmcntal function" and hence 
unable lo support a citizenship requirement, the Allorney General of Pennsylvania noted 
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Aliens' Right to Teach 
this information is most central, such as civics and history.8 ~ There-
fore, the statutes in their present form are overbroad in a second way, 
for they exclude alien teachers regardless of the subject matter they 
are to teach. Since, at the elementary school level, one teacher most 
often teaches all subjects, if the state wishes to exclude aliens it should 
be required to create specialist positions for teachers of history and 
civics. Indeed, the state can probably protect its interest in the teach-
ing of these subjects by testing the competence of individual teachers 
at the certification stage,83 thus invalidating any automatic exclusion 
of aliens from public school teaching. 
82. Even in these subjects there is some contro\'ersy as to the impact of the teacher 
on the political orientation of his students. See Jennings, Ehman & Niemi, Social Studies 
Teachers and Their Pupils, in M. JENNINGS & R. NIEMI, mprn note 51, at 207. 
83. All states require teachers to attend an accredited teacher education institution to 
be eligible for certification. See T . SnNNETI", supra _note 7, at 35. This alone may 
make unnecessary the exclusion of alien teachers from the public schools, for it ensures 
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This appeal presents the question whether the 3J DC erred in 
olding unconstitutional a NY statute which excludes from public 
teaching all aliens other than those who have applied for 
United States c jtizQR s ~ip . ..,__ 
FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: 
Appees brought this action under §1983 to contest the validity 






no alien may be employed to teach in the public schools of NY unless 
and until that alien has made application to become a United States 
citizen and thereafter proceeds, in due course, to become a citizen. 
Petrs,aliens who have el~ted to retain their native citizenship 
(non-applicant aliens), have both applied .for certificatio~ o~~ --------- - ---- --
in the public schools. However, because they do not fit within the -limited exceptions to Section 3001(3) petrs have been denied certifi-
cation. It is undisputed that, in both cases, the denial of certifi-
cation has borne no relation to petrs' general character or qualifications, 
but rather, is soley the product of their status as non-applicant aliens. 
In a portion of the opinion not challenged here, the 3JC con-
sidered the question whether it should consider the constitutional 
issues in light of this Court's admonition in Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 
528 (1974), that a 3 JC should consider such issues only if non-
constitutional statutory Supremacy Clause issues, within the jurisdi-
ction of a single judge, prove not to be dispositive. Because of the 
sweeping nature of the challenge here, the 3 JC, after extensive 
citation of authority, concluded that Supremacy Clause claim here was , 
more properly viewed as a true "constitutional" argument beyond the 
jurisdiction of the single judge. The 3JC then proceeded to the equal 
protection argument which it foun1 dispositive. 
Citing this Court's recent decisions involving discrimination 
against aliens, the 3 JD concluded that "any challenged State statute 
or regulation placing aliens, as a class, at a disadvantage vis-a-vis 
citizens must withstand the rigors of close judicial scrutiny." JS, 
App. at 10a. The 3 JC recognized the state's interest in the qualifi-





state might require citizenship in "an appropriately defined class - --of positions." The 3 JC nevertheless concluded that the NY statute 
failed Sugarman's requirement that the "means the State employs must 
be precisely drawn in light of the acknowledged purpose." Id., at 653. 
The court found the state's argument that a citizen presumptively has 
an undivided allegiance while a resident alien has a potential conflict 
of loyalties insufficient to save the statute. The court found both 
Sugarman and In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), inconsistent with 
such a sweeping justification. The weaknesses of the argument in this 
particular setting were described as follows: 
"As with the statute challenged in Sugarman, Section 
3001(3) is damned by its imprecision. It excludes all 
non-applicant aliens, regardless of nationality, from 
all teaching positions in the public school system, 
regardless of grade level or subject matter. It thus 
bars British subjects seeking certification to teach 
mathematics or physical education as well as Soviet 
citizens seeking to teach civics or economics. The 
statute's imprecision becomes even more glaring when one 
considers that tpe prohibition does not extend to those 
who. teach the thousands of New York children attending 
private schools. Indeed, even in the public schools, 
under an amorphous exception to Section 3001(3), the 
State would permit a non-applicant alien to obtain 
certification to teach certain subjects requiring 'skills 
or competencies not readily available among teachers 
holding citizenship.' " JS, App. at 13a. 
The court noted finally that the position of NY ~eemed "repugnant 
to the ve:··y heritage the State is seeking to inculate" in that it 
would tend to "cast a pall of orthdoxy over the classroom." JS, App. 
at 15a. The court concluded that nothing that could save the statute 
would come from an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the further 
enforcement of the statute was enjoined. 
CONTENTIONS: 
Appants argue that because both citizens and aliens can obtain 
•• 
(, 
• > .. -4-
teaching certificates close judicial scrutiny is inappropriate here. 
Appants further argue that this case falls within the area mentioned 
in Sugarman where a state can require citizenship. This second position 
is based on the general radiations about citizenship that are likely 
to result from teacher/pupil contact, regardless of the subject matter 
taught. Finally, appants argue that the exceptions to the citizenship 
requirement are only temporary. For full-time employment a teacher 
must meet the standards of the challenged statute. 
DISCUSSION: 
The inclusion of aliens who are well on their way to abandoning 
that status hardly justifies the application of a less searching 
scrutiny. I think that the argument that all teachers necessarily are 
involved in 
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statute. The 3 JC was right 
rejection of the argument. 
is a motion to affirm. 
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No. 76-808 Appeal from D.C. for 
S.D.N.Y. (Feinberg, CJ; 
Pierce; Connor; DJs} 
Federal/Civil Timely 
time I prepared the memo in the above case I ~as not 
on October 29, 1976, to note -No. 76-208, which presents a challenge to a NY statute 
assistance to resident aliens under 
circumstances to those in the instant case. Although the 
in certain respects, they are the same 
against aliens can be avoided by the 
) 
alien's decision to apply for citizenship. Because that element 
~ is likely to be a central consideration in Mauclet, the instant 
case is an appropriate hold for that case~ 
1/24/77 Baker 
C 
II. No. 76-808 - Nyquist v. Norwick (NPJ or revers 
ummaril ) 
Appellees brought this action before a three-judge 
District Court under§ 1983 to contest the .validity of§ 
3001(3) of the New York Education Law, which provides that no 
alien may be employed to teach in the public schools of New 
York unless and until that person has made application to 
become a United States citizen and thereafter proceeds, in 
due course, to take steps to become a citizen. Appellees are 
aliens who have applied for certification to teach in New 
York public schools; certification was denied, however, 
because appellees have el_ectj!d to ! etain al,.i en status and 
citizensh' of their native ountry. -
The District Court declared the New York law 
unconstitutional. Although that court recognized that under 
Dougall the State may require citizenship for_ "an 
appropriately defined class of positions," it concluded that 
New York's complete ban on teaching by aliens was not 
"precisely drawn in light of the acknowledged purpose". In 
particular, the District Court observed: 
"As with the stat·ute challenged in Sugarman, 
Section 3001(3) is damned by its imprecision. ,/JJ/·A 
It excludes all non-applicant aliens, regardless _,,/-A . (!"''~ 
of nationality, from all teaching positions in ;v~· 
the public school system, regardless of grade t:.JJr-L 
level or subject matter. It thus bars British · .C/ fo-(]:--r. ) 
subjects seeking certification to teach , ~, 
mathematics or physical education as well as 14, f : ,Jv -~ 
Soviet citizens seeking to teach civics or ~ ~&A 1il.,u 
economics. The statute's imprecision becomes f/'I'./ ~ft rf _ 
even more glaring when one considers that the -~~ ,.,.A~· 
prohibition does not extend to those who teach tJtif JAJfl,~,Apf 
the thousands of New York children attending B'1 !J.JP"~'~:AA 
private schools. Indeed, even in the public (' ,, 
schools, under an amorphous exception to Section c::;:) ~~ · 
3001(3), the State would permit a non-applicant -,_,,~;c,e-- : ' 
alien to obtain certification to teach certain ~-
subjects requ1r1ng 'skills or competencies not ptr 
readily available among teachers holding 
citizenship.'" 
I think that a state could legit·imately exclude aliens 
from certain types of teaching positions; it seems undeniable 
that many classes of teache-rs play an important -- and highly 
discretionary -- role in forming the values of young students 
and as "role models". Foley may not provide the District 
Court with much guidance in this area. People can select 
their doctors and lawyers but neither parents nor students 
can pick their teachers. 
Accordingly, I will vote either to note probable 
jurisdi~tion or reverse summarily. 
76-808 
Heretofore Held for No. 76-208 - Nyquist v. Mauclet 
4. No. 76-808 - Nyquist v. Norwick. e case is an appe 1 ~ 
from a three-judge court determination of the unconstitutionality of a.----
New York statute that excludes aliens from teaching in the public schools 
unless the alien has applied to become a citizen and thereafter proceeds 
to become one. Appellants claim that the statute does not discriminate 
against aliens since some applicants for citizenship can qualify and that 
the exclusion is valid since it is related to the inculcation of citizens i 
in schools. These arguments echo arguments made in Mauclet. I th 
however, the choice is between affirming or holding for No. 76-839, Foley 
v. Connelie. I am inclined now to favor the hold. '/P 
lfp/ss 9/ '78 
Sept. 18, 1978 
76-808 Ambach, Commissioner of Education v. 
Norwick, et al 
A three-judge court invalidated the New York 
statute that prohibited resident aliens from teaching in 
the public school unless they had made application - as 
they were privileged to do - to become American citizens. 
As would be expected, the three-judge court 
relied heavily on In re Griffiths, Graham v. ~ichardson, 
and our decision during the 1976 Term jn Nyquist v. 
Mauclet, 423 u.s. 1 (1977) (involving New York scholarships 
and student loans) in holding that "strict scrutiny" is 
the standard of analysis. 
In MaucJet, that involved student scholarship and 
loans, I dissented because I thought the New York plan of 
financial assistance to college students did not 
discriminate against a suspect class, and that therefore 
strict scrutiny was not the standard. The line New York 
had drawn was not between aliens and citizens, but merely 
between aliens who elected to retain foreign citizenship 
and all others. Although my view was subscribed to by the 
Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, a 
majority of the Court differed. Thus, unless last Term's 
decision in Foley v. Connelie (see below) affords a 





require that I follow Mauclet in determining the 
applicable standard of analysis. 
At this time, and subject to further thought and 
discussion, I believe I could sustain this New York 
statute. I could elect - as I rarely ever have - not to 
follow stare decisis where I believe, as I do on a 
constitutional question, that the Court is dead wrong. 
2. 
I also might be persuaded that the exception 
recognized in Foley v. Connelie - viewing poJice officers 
as having essentially "political" responsibilities - is 
applicable to public school teachers. Although their role 
is not political in the sense either of making or 
enforcing laws, it is quite fundamental in responsibility 
for educating young minds in the fundamentaJs of democracy 
and in understanding and respecting the ruJe of Jaw. 
Absent this education and respect, neither the holders of 
political office who enact our laws nor those 
responsibility for its enforcement can function 
effectively jn preserving our system of freedom under law. 
This is an area in which the sheer logic of past 
opinions can be viewed as pointing in directions that are 
not easily harmonized. I am not, certainly at this time, 
entirely comfortable with any resolution . of this case in 
terms of how one would write an opinion. I have a rather 
definite view (perhaps based on my long years of 
association with public educatjon) that a state should 







, . . 
its teachers, especially where provision is made to 
accommodate the resident alien who makes the choice 
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A three-judge court invalidated the New York 
statute that prohibited resident aliens from teaching in 
the public school unless they had made application - as 
they were privileged to do - to become American citizens. 
As would be expected, the three-judge court 
relied heavily on In re Griffiths, Graham v. Richardson, 
and our decision during the 1976 Term in Nyquist v. 
Mauclet, 423 U.S. 1 (1977) (involving New York scholarships 
and student loans) in holding that "strict scrutiny" is 
the standard of analysis. 
In Mauclet, that involved student scholarship and 
loans, I dissented because I thought the New York plan of 
financial assistance to college students did not 
discriminate against a suspect class, and that therefore 
strict scrutiny was not the standard. The line New York 
had drawn was not between aliens and citizens, but merely 
between aliens who elected to retain foreign citizenship 
a~s. Although my view was subscribed to by the 
Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, a 
majority of the Court differed. Thus, unless last Term's 
decision in Foley v. Connelie (see below) affords a 
distinguishing precedent, stare decisis normally would 
require that I follow Mauclet in determining the 
applicable standard of analysis. 
At this time, and subject to further thought and 
discussion, I believe I could sustain this New York 
statute. I could elect - as I rarely ever have - not to 
follow stare decisis where I believe, as I do on a 
constitutional question, that the Court is dead wrong. 
2. 
I also might be persuaded that the exception 
recognized in Foley v. Connelie - viewing police officers 
as having essentially "political" responsibilities - is 
applicable to public school teachers. Although their role 
is not political in the sense either of making or 
enforcing laws, it is quite fundamental in responsibility 
for educating young minds in the fundamentals of democracy 
and in understanding and respecting the rule of law. 
Absent this education and respect, neither the holders of 
political office who enact our laws nor those 
responsibility for its enforcement can function 
effectively in preserving our system of freedom under law. 
This is an area in which the sheer logic of past 
opinions can be viewed as pointing in directions that are 
not easily harmonized. I am not, certainly at this time, 
entirely comfortable with any resolution of this case in 
terms of how one would write an opinion. I have a rather 
definite view (perhaps based on my long years of 
association with public education) that a state should 
have the right to impose a citizenship qualification on 
its teachers, especially where provision is made to 
accommodate the resident alien who makes the choice 
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No. 76-808 Appeal from D.C. for 
S. D. N. Y. (Feinberg, CJ; 
Pierce; Connor; DJs) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
time I prepared the memo in the above case I ~as not 
on October 29, 1976, to note --No. 76-208, which presents a challenge to a NY statute 
assistance to resident aliens under 
circumstances to those in the instant case. Although the 
in certain respects, they are the same 
against aliens can be avoided by the 
-· -2-
alien's decision to apply for citizenship. Because that element 
~ is likely to be a central consideration in Mauclet, the instant 
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II. No. 76-808 - Nyquist v. Norwick (NPJ or revers 
ummaril ) 
Appellees brought this action before a three-judge 
District Court under§ 1983 to contest the validity of§ 
3001(3) of the New York Education Law, which provides that no 
alien may be employed to teach in the public schools of New 
York unless and until that person has made application to 
become a United States citizen and thereafter proceeds, in 
due course, to take steps to become a citizen. Appellees are 
aliens who have applied for certification to teach in New 
York public schools: certification was denied, however, 
because appellees have el._,ect~ d to retain a_!_ien status and 
citizensh' of their native ountry. -
The District Court declared the New York law 
unconstitutional. Although that court recognized that under 
Dougall the State may require citizenship for. "an 
appropriately defined class of positions," it concluded that 
New York's complete ban on teaching by aliens was not 
"precisely drawn in light of the acknowledged purpose". In 
particular, the District Court observed: 
"As with the stat·ute challenged in Sugarman, 
Section 3001(3) is damned by its imprecision. ./JJ,·A 
It excludes all non-applicant aliens, regardless -1-~ . (!"''~ 
of nationality, from all teaching positions in ;v~· 
the public school system, regardless of grade t:.~-
level or subject matter. It thus bars British · .9/ JJb-t;:;--r. > 
subjects seeking certification to teach , ~' 
mathematics or physical education as well as (/) , ~.-,Jv -~ 
Soviet citizens seeking to teach civics or . ~ r ft 1J,v 
economics. The statute's imprecision becomes ~ ~ Y-f _ 
even more glaring when one considers that the ·~~ ,.~,A~ · 
prohibition does not extend to those who teach /J'ffe! l AJf~ ~,A~ 
the thousands of New York children attending 6Yl. ~~,~~AA;· 
private schools. Indeed, even in the public < )(WI.· 
schools, under an amorphous exception to Sectionc:;)~ ~ / ..,.., 
3001(3), the State would permit a non-applicant --,_,,0/-,11,"-
alien to obtain certification to teach certain ~ 
subjects requ1r1ng 'skills or competencies not p1r 
readily available among teachers holding 
citizenship.'" 
I think that a state could legitimately exclude aliens 
from certain types of teaching positions: it seems undeniable 
that many classes of teache-rs play an important -- and highly 
discretionary -- role in forming the values of young students 
and as "role models". Foley may not provide the District 
Court with much guidance in this area. People can select 
their doctors and lawyers but neither parents nor students 
can pick their teachers. · 
Accordingly, I will vote either to note probable 
jurisdiction or reverse summarily. 
76-808 
Heretofore Held for No. 76-208 - Nyquist v. Mauclet 
4. No. 76-808 - Nyquist v. Norwick. e case is 
from a three-judge court determination of the unconstitutionality of a-----
New York statute that excludes aliens from teaching in the public schools 
unless the alien has applied to become a citizen and thereafter proceeds 
to become one. Appellants claim that the statute does not discriminate 
against aliens since some applicants for citizenship can qualify and that 
the exclusion is valid since it is related to the inculcation of citizens ~__....... 
in schools. These arguments echo arguments made in Mauclet. I th flk, 
however, the choice is between '!i!irming or hold~ng for No. 76-839, Foley 





To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 76-808, Ambach v. Norwick 
I. The Equal Protection Claim 
A. Applicability of the Rational Relationship Test. 
I judge from your memorandum of September 18, 1978, 
that no discussion of the caselaw background for the dispute 
over the proper eaual protection standard is necessary. 
1. Nyquist v. Mauclet. 
The distinction you drew in Mauclet between a statute 
excludinq all aliens and one excluding only aliens who may but 
choose not to become citizens applies with equal force in this 
case. 
2. Foley v. Connelie. 
The appellants suggest that in view of the central 
role that the public school teacher plays in the civic~ 
2. 
education of c hildren, Foley y. Connelie, 98 S.Ct. 1067 (1978),~ 
indicates that the proper standard of review for the equal ~ 
protection challenqe is the rational relationship t§..st. In ~~~~--------- -
Foley, the Court upheld the constitutionality of New York's 
statute limiting eligibility for appointment as a state trooper 
to citizens of the United States. After reviewing many of this 
Court's decisions on the rights of aliens, Chief Justice 
Burger's opinion for the Court reached the following 
conclusion: 
"rwJe have recognized that citizenship 
may be a relevant qualification for 
- =--------" ,---=.....,.,....___.-., _,.,....-. 
ful._fillin9-. t ~ se 'important nonelective --executive, legislative and judicial 
positions,' held by 'officers who -
participate directly in the 
formulation, execution, or review of 
broad public policy.' rsugarman v.) 
Douoall, r413 U.S. 634,] 647 r(1973)1. 
rwle must necessarily examine each 
position in question to determine 
whether it involves discretionary 
decisionmaking, or execution of policy, 
which substantially affects members of 
the political community. 
"The essence of our holdinqs to 
date is that although we extend to 
a]iens the right to education and 
public welfare, alonq with the ability 
to earn a livelihood and engage in 
licensed professions, the right to 
qovern is reserved to citizens." 
98 S.Ct. at 1071 (footnote omitted). If the classification in 
question affects eligibility for a position within the 
"qovernance" category, the rational relationship test is 
-., ....... 
applicable. Id. at 1070, 1073. 
In concludino that policemen fall within the 
governance category because of their participation in the 
exe~ution of broad public policy, the Court stressed that the 
3. 
police function is "one of the basic functions of qovernment" ~ 
____________, - --- - ~ 
and that "rtlhe police function fulfills a most fundamental 
obligation of qovernment to its constituency." Id. at 1071. 
While police officers in the ranks do not formulate policy, the 
Court observed, they have broad discretionary powers affectinq 
many people in significant ways. The Court especially stressed 
the authority of police officers to intrude, through searches 
and arrests, on the privacy of individuals. 
New York has provided for public education since it 
became a State; the State constitution has mandated free public +t!> 
education since 1894. 
- =-~=-e::.;:: -==-· 
The public education function has a 
~ 
direct and fundamental impact on the lives of all the students 
that are educated in the public schools. Under New York law, 
the public schools are charged not only with scholastic 
/T) It v 




attitudes, and principles of behavior. --............. This latter charge is~ 
~-~ 
 
These expressed in the State laws governing curriculum. 
require courses in civics, and New York and United States 
history. Children over eight years of age are required to 
. . . @) · 1l · · d · · h · ). · 1 d · part1c1pate 1n courses 1n patr1ot1sm an c1t1zens 1p, inc u 1n9 
...... ----------~ .... --~ .... _______ __._. 
study of the federal and state ~onstitutions and Declaration of 
In~ epende~ce in order to promote "patriotic and civic service 
and ••. foster ..• qualities essential •.• to meet the 
objectives of citizenship in peace or in war." N.Y. Education 
Law §801(1), (2)~ nd (3). In secondary education, there must 
be instruction in "the principles of government proclaimed in 
the Declaration of Independence and established by the 
constitution of the United States", N.Y. Education Law 
§3204(3)(a)(2); "instructional exercises" on the federal and 
state bills of rights, the flaq, and patriotic holidays are 
also required in all public schools. 
There is no need to belabor the discretion of the 
{ 
teacher within these broad curricular requirements. Even where 
local school boards add further details to these requirements, 
5. 
the teacher necessarily retains a great deal of control over ~~ls-
what is taught and how it is presented. ~~ To some extent, the ~ 
teacher's discretion in the teaching of academic subjects is 
checked systematically by the use of standardized achievement 
tests at various staqes in the educational process, e.g., the 
Regents Examination in New York. But the teaching of 
democratic values and attitudes is not susceptible to such 
sY.stematic measurement, and consequently it is difficult to -
impose any check on the teacher's discretion in this area of 
instruction. 
I am doing some reading on the role of the public 
school teacher in the political socialization of students, and 
will summarize my findings in a supplemental memorandum. 
The appellees offer several reasons why public school~, 
teachers should not be regarded as similar to policemen und~ 
the standard laid down in Foley v. Connelie. They suggest that 
all of the positions that can be reserved for citizens --
jurors, voters, and police officers -- are governmental 
monopolies, in contrast with those that cannot be so reserved, 
such as civil servants, attorneys, and enqineers. They point 
~ 
out that teaching ( or education) is not such a monopoly, ~&---
because New York allows private schools. 4--~ 
In each instance referred to by appellees, inclua~· 
I 
those in which the appellees say that the qovernment "h~s no 
monopoly," the case arose because the qovernment controlled 
access to the particular job or jobs in question. The same is 
true of certification as a public school teacher; I do not see 
that the possibility that some teachers may teach in a private 
school without certification affects the function of the public 
school teacher in executing the broad policies of public 
education. 
The appellees also note that under New York law, 
6. 
public school teachers are considered "employees" rather than 
"officers" in determining their eligibility to hold elective~ 
public office. In addition, they cite San Antonio School 
District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973), where the Court 
concluded that education is not a fundamental right. Though 
the appellees do not articulate the conclusion to be drawn from 
this premise, I assume that it is that activity in the 
execution of a public function not satisfyinq a fundamental 
right cannot come within the "governance" exception of Foley. 
r..L/~L . . _ 
Finally, the appellees arque that teachinq, unlike poljcing, is--~~ 
a "common occupation of the community" ana therefore falls 
outside of the Foley exception. 
The state law distinction between "officers" and 
"employees" noted supra has no obvious bearinq on the Foley 









The important inquiry is whether the position of public schoo ~ 
teacher "involves discretionary decisionmaking, or execution of f-
policy, which substantially affects members of the politica~ .. 
community." Foley, 98 S.Ct. at 1071. 
I am not aware of any decision holding that there is a 
fundamental right to law enforcement. It 
that the police function is a fundamental 
government. It seems to me that the same ------ -------------
education. _____..,. 
In Truax v. Raich, 
invalidated an Arizona 
more than five persons to employ not fewer than 80% qualified 
electors or native-born citizens of the United States. Other 
than using the terms "common occupations of the community" and 
"ordinary means of earninq a livelihood" interchangeably, the 
Court does not give any indication of what counts as a "common 
occupation." In Foley v. Connelie, the Court indicated that 
working as a policeman does not count as working at a "common 
occupation." 98 s.ct. at 1072. 
To the extent that some types of public employment may 
count as employment in a "common occupation of the community," 
the relevant distinction between such public employment and 
other public employment that is more governmental in nature is 
drawn by Foley v. Connelie. Any public employment that does 
not fall within the Foley principle may be considered a "common 
•. 
occupation." I prefer approaching the problem from the Foley 
end, and leaving "common occupations" as the residual category, 
because the criterion in Foley is defined more fully than the 
Truax "common occupation" notion. 
The appellees fail to stress their best argument 
against the application of Foley in the present case. Public 
school teachers have nothing to do with qoverning the 
community, that is, with makinq and applyinq laws, except to -
the extent that they must obey the laws detailina their duties 
as teachers. ~ ~f ~~~
pt/ ~ J/k__ ~ ~f- '1'  
B. 
~-~~~~~~ 
B. The State';"P:;-;.~, i~i'fi ~4--</C<.-~ 
The State says that its purpose in adoptinq §3001(3)) 
is to ensure that public school teachers are qualified to 
impart effectively to their students the values and attitudes~ , ~ 
fundamental to American social and political life. 
The appellees do not attack the legitimacy of this 
purpose. They do make a diversionary attack by arguing that 
the State has no legitimate purpose in encouraginq aliens to 
become citizens. The State, however, has never claimed this as 
a purpose underlying ~3001(3). 
The appellees do make several arguments intended to 
show that the State has no substantial interest in the 




they point out that since 1967, the legislature has given the 
Commissioner of Education the authority to alter by regulation 
the exclusion at issue. The appellees contend that this 
delegation of authority to the Commissioner indicates that the 
State has no strong interest in the maintenance of the 
9 • 
exclusion. Second, appellees refer to the New York law ~ 
0 ~ allowing alien parents of public school students to serve 
argue that if aliens can gov~ 
~ 
the schools, the state interest in excludinq them from teachin~~ 
in the schools cannot be substantial. "':?J/ 
~t:-~ · 
local boards of election. They 
The appellants have not addressed these two points in 
their Brief, but I imagine their rejoinders would be the 
following. The Commissioner of Education is the official 
charged with implementing the Education Law. Since the only 
purpose of ~3001(3) is to advance the purpose of civic 
education in the public schools, it makes sense to place 
control over the exclusion in the Commissioner. This 




State's interest in civic education.* The curricular 
requirements regarding civic education that are contained in 
state law, and the exclusion of non-applicant aliens from 
certification under state law, are immune from interference by 
local school boards. Admission of aliens to membership in -,----·--
local school boards, though responsive to other purposes than 
civic eaucat1on of public school students, is not inconsistent 
with the State's announced purpose for ~3001(3). 
* The appellees also argue that a decision by the Commissioner 
to retain the certification exclusion cannot be reqarded as a 
decision by the State that the State has a substantial interest 
in the exclusion. In support of this view, the appellees cite 
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wonq, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). The plaintiffs in 
that case challenged the constitutionality of the Civil Service 
Commission's rule excluding aliens from the competitive civil 
service. The Court noted that adoption of the rule had not 
been required by Congress or the President. The Court 
therefore refused to allow the Commission to rely on policy 
justifications for the rule that were drawn from outside the 
scope of the Commission's responsibility for promotion of an 
efficient civil service. This left only a sinqle proffered 
iustification for the rule -- since some important and 
~ensitive civil service positions must be restricted to 
citizens, administrative expenses are minimized by excluding 
all aliens from the civil service. For reasons not here 
important, the Court rejected this justification for the rule. 
The contrasts between Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong and the 
present case are apparent. Here the State legislature has 
explicitly delegated the authority over the exclusion of alien 
from teacher certification to the Cornm1ssioner of Education. 
Further, the reasons proffered by the Commissioner to justify 
the exclusion fall within the area of responsibility with which 
he is charged. He argues that given his responsibility for 
educatinq publ1c school pupils in the attitudes and values of 
democratic society, the exclusion of non-applicant aliens is a 
necessary rule. 
1 0 • 
~~1. 
~~~L~ - -
C. The Fit Between the State's Purpose and §3001(3) ~ 
·· .. ~ ....L.6!A,.ih . 
The appellants claim that §3001(3) is related ~ 
rationally to the achievement of the State's purpose. J:t4 c:...-i.. ~ 
statute excludes a group of teachers who are unqualified to ~ 
impart the values and attitudes of American social and ~  
political life to their students. Instruction in civic ~a~~ '$, 
and attitudes, just as in any other sets of values, must be as 
-{~ ~uch by e~mple a~by di~couE._.se. Aliens who may but refuse to 
~ . become citizens cannot provioe that example. 
The appellees argue that §3001(3) is not related 
rationally to the State's purpose because it allows the 
certification of aliens who are ineligible to become citizens 
or to declare their intent to become citizens. But the failure 
to exclude all unqualified teachers does not make a statute 
that excludes some of them less than rational. Further, aliens 
who are ineligible for citizenship receive only temporary 
certifications. 
The Court defined the required fit between ends and 
means, under the strict scrutiny test, in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 
supra, 432 U.S. at 7. "In undertaking this [close] scrutiny, 
'the governmental interest claimed to justify the 
discrimination is to be carefully examined in order to 
determine whether that interest is leaitimate and substantial, 
and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to achieve ,, 
~ "" the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.'" (quoting 
~~ 
Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 605 (1976)). 
The appellees raise several arguments nirected at showing that 
~3001 (3) is neither necessary to the State's purpose nor 
precisely drawn to serve that purpose. 
12. 
The appellees argue that the ~3001(3) restriction on~ 
certification is unnecessary because the oath required of all ~ 
teachers is sufficient to ensure that the State gets teachers 
who are committed to American political principles. The oath, 
prescribed by ~3002, is the following: 
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I 
will support the constitution of the 
United States of America and the 
constitution of the State of New York, 
and that I wiJl faithfully discharqe, 
accordinq to the best of my ability, 
the duties of the ••• (title of 
,~,, 
position and name or designation of 
school, college, university or ~~~ .. "'-' 
institution to be here inserted), to 
which I am assigned." kJ ~, - J 
The State imposes many of the same requirements for ~ -instruction in civics and State and national history on private - -__ _, 
schools as it imposes on public schools. Appellants' Brief, 
pp. 12-13. The appellees argue that if the State does not need 
to exclude non-applicant aliens from teaching in private 
schools, it does not need to exclude them from public schools 
either. The appellants respond that the interests of the State 
in private education are different from those it seeks to -
realize in public education. In particular, it recognizes that 
'-- ----- -.. 
private elementary and secondary education is devoted to the 
inculcation of different kinds of values in students, 
particularly religious values. Whi]e the State imposes some 
requirements regarding civic eaucation, it recognizes and 
respects the _ different function fillen by private schools, and 
so reauires only that their teachers by "competent." 
The appellees argue that §3001(3) is under-inclusive 
because it allows the certification of aliens who have not 
identified with and become a part of American political 
society. Appellees refer to several provisions of New York ~~ 
l , ... 
law, including those allowing temporary certification of aliens' / 
ineliqible for citizenship and of aliens with skills not -----
available among previously certified teachers. The appellants -----~ 
respond that because of the small numbers and limited duration 
of these exceptional certifications, their impact on the 
accomplishment of the State's purposes in civic education are 
small. 
The appellees also contend that ~3001(3) is over-
inclusive because it excludes non-applicant aliens who by 
reason of their own national heritage are qualified to impart 
to public school students the requisite civic values and 
attitudes. One of the appellees, for example, is a citizen of 
Great Britain, and she argues that there is little or no 
difference in the values and attitudes of social and political 
behavior in that country and the United States. 
The appellees assert that §3001(3) is over-inclusive 
also because it bars non-alien applicants from teaching~ 
subject, including subjects such as mathematics and foreign 
requirements regarding civic education, it recognizes and 
respects the different function fillen by private schools, and 
so reauires only that their teachers by "competent." 
The appellees argue that §3001(3) is under-inclusive 
because it allows the certification of aliens who have not 
identified with and become a part of American political 
1 3. 
society. Appellees refer to several provisions of New York ~~ 
l , ... 
law, including those allowing temporary certification of aliens'/ 
ineliqible for citizenship and of aliens with skills not ......___ ____ 
available among previously certified teachers. The appellants --~--~ 
respond that because of the small numbers and limited duration 
of these exceptional certifications, their impact on the 
accomplishment of the State's purposes in civic education are 
small. 
The appellees also contend that ~3001(3) is over-
inclusive because it excludes non-applicant aliens who by 
reason of their own national heritage are qualified to impart 
to public school students the requisite civic values and 
attitudes. One of the appellees, for example, is a citizen of 
Great Britain, and she argues that there is little or no 
difference in the values and attitudes of social and political 
behavior in that country and the United States. 
The appellees assert that §3001(3) is over-inclusive 
also because it bars non-alien applicants from teaching~ 
subject, including subjects such as mathematics and foreign 
languages where there is little or no place for civic 
education. The appellants point out that under the early 
childhood and upper elementary certificate sought by appellees, 
teachers instruct in all subjects, including reading, writing, 
English, geography, United States and New York history, civics, 
arithmetic, and science. Teachers certified to teach at the 
secondary level can be required to instruct outside of their 
certification one day per week. The appellants also argue that 
every teacher, whatever his certification, teaches by example 
on such matters as patriotism and citizenship. The appellants 
concludes that no practicable system of certification could 
exclude resident aliens who have not applied for citizenship 
from positions where they will shape the political values of 
public schools pupils. 
The appellees also point out that only ten other 
states presently have and enforce a requirement that public 
school teachers be citizens or aliens who have declared their 
1 4. 
intent to become citizens. 
~-hf 
~ J/L-t' -
II. Other Constitutional Objections to §3001(3) 
The three-judge DC based its holding on the Equal ~ 
~ 
Protection Clause, and did not consider the other objections t  
I will describe and v-u.., c//J the statute advanced by the appellees. 
discuss those claims briefly. 
A. Due Proce~s Claim. 
Citing Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), 
Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), 
and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), appellees arque 
that the New York statute creates an unconstitutional . 
irrebutable presumption that they are unqualified to teach in 
the public schools. They contend that because the operation of 
the presumption turns on a classification -- alienage -- that 
the Court has marked for special scrutiny, the presumption 
violates the Due Process Clause. 
All legislative classifications create irrebutable 
presumptions. The Due Process question in Vlandis, La Fleur, 
and Stanley was not the existence of a legislative 
classification, but the fundamental fairness of the challenged 
classification. The question in the present case, under the 
Due Process Clause, is whether it is fundamentally unfair to 
create an irrebutable presumption that non-applicant aliens are 
unqualified to be public school teachers. 
B. First Amendment Claim. 
The appellees argue that by excluding non-applicant 
aliens from positions as public school teachers, New York 
stifles the expression of various points of view, "cast[ing) a 
pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." Keyshian v. Board of 
Reqents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). New York does not exclude, 
however, all aliens from serving as public school teachers, so 
it is unclear what unique contribution to the exchange of ideas 




claim that they would put forth to their pupils the suggestion 
that it is better not to be a citizen, or that it is better not 
to adopt the civic attitudes and values that are held out to 
school children as normative in our society. 
Further, to the extent that appellees might claim the 
First Amendment right to make this unique contribution, I would 
conclude against such a right. The notion that "[t]he 
classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas'", Keyshian, 
supra, 385 U.S. at 603, rests on the assumption that all of 
those participating in the market come to it with a common 
basic understanding about the way the market works. Ideas of 
majoritarian rule within certain limits fixed to protect 
minorities from abuse and exploitation, of attention to and 
discussion of differinq points of view, and of toleration for 
those with differing ideas, are the essential groundrules of 
the marketplace. To a large extent, these are the civic 
principles and values that are imparted to school children in 
the elementary grades, at least. At this level, I do not think 
that we are interested in exposinq children to other potential 
sets of groun~ules, since we do not want to offer them a 
choice. It is no coincidence that Keyshian involved university 
teachers. 
C. Supremacy Clause Issue. 
The appellees contend that the New York statute is at 
odds with the federal laws requlating immiqration, and is 
1 6 • 
• 
therefore invalid by reason of the Supremacy Clause. They 
argue, in qeneral terms, that Congress has not disabled aliens 
from employment -- from "paying their way" and that a state 
law that does burden the employment prospects of aliens is 
inconsistent with the federal law. The federal Jaw provides 
for consideration of questions of political allegiance and 
intention to become a citizen at the time that an alien is 
admitted to the country. For the State to make an inconsistent 
determination, appellees contend, is also inconsistent with 
federal law. 
Appellees contend, more particular]y, that the New 
York statute is inconsistent with federal law governinq the 
admission of alien teachers to the country. Since 1976, 8 
U.S.C. §1182(a). (14) has provided that alien teachers with 
qualifications superior to available resident teachers may be 
admitted. The New York statute, accoraing to appel].ees, is 
inconsistent with this statute since it forbids certification 
of such teachers in preference for less qualified resident 
teachers. 
This argument was raised in the appellees complaint, 
but was not considered or decided by the three-judge DC. In 
the Jurisaictional Statement and the Motion to Affirm, all of 
the parties treated this case as raisinq only equal protection 
claims. The Appellants' Brief on the merits continues with 
this approach. 
1 7 • 
Appellees argument that the New York statute is pre-
empted by federal immigration laws does not seem to me to have 
much to recommend it. The appellees ao not cite any provision 
of the federal law that is inconsistent with the New York 
statute. As the three-judge DC put it, "the purported conflict 
underlying plaintiffs' Supremacy Clause argument is not between 
Section 3001 (3) and any specific enactment of Conqress, but 
rather, between Section 3001(3) and the exclusive power to 
regulate immiqration and naturalization ve~ted in the federal 
government by ••• the Constitution." (JS Sa). Appellees 
general pre-emption argument proves too much, for it lea~s to 
the conclusion that no alien, once admitted to the country, 
could be excluded from any position because of alienage. And 
the more narrow argument, resting on 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(14), 
does not show any real conflict between the federal and state 
laws. The federal statute does not purport to measure the 
qualification of alien teachers to provide the civic education 
that concerns New York and is said by it to underlie §3001(3). 
Summary: Though the appellees raise other 
constitutional bases for sustaining the judgment of the DC, I 
think that the case should be decided on Equal Protection 
grounds. 
The Equal Protection question is a difficult one. As ..__......_,_____ __ .....:... ____________ _
to the standard to be applied, the governance ex~tion of 
18. 
Foley is not an exact fit, since public schooJ teachers do not 
participate in making or applying laws. But the role of public 
school teachers in instillinq civic values and attitudes is 
important to the maintenance of the political community. 
The appellees strongest point is their criticism of 
the fit between the State's purpose and the means adopted, 
~3001 (3). I think it is a close question whether the 





To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: Ambach ·v~ Norwick, No. 76-808: Teacher's Role in 
Political Socialization 
The role of the public school and the teacher in the 
political education and socialization of children has been the 
subject of a number of studies by political scientists. My 
review of some of this literature did not uncover any consensus 
on the major questions. 
Not all of the observers agree that ' the school is of 7 
any particular importance in teaching political attitudes and 
values. H. Hyman, Political ·socialization 69-74 (1959), 
attributes political attitudes and values to a child's family 
experience. Diamond, "Studies and Projects in Citizenship," in 
F. Patterson, ed., Adolescent Citizen 72 (1960), attributes 
political value formation more to community structure, and the 
"morale and spirit" of the school, than to classroom 
instruction. 
Other writers appear to be convinced of the central 
importance of the public school in political socialization. 
v.o. Key, Public ·opinion · and ·American Democracy 316 (1961), 
comments that "all national education systems indoctrinate the 
corning generation with the basic outlooks and values of the 
political order." Hess and Torney, Development of Political 
Attitudes in Children 365 (1967), conclude that "the public 
school is the most important and effective instrument of 
political socialization in the United States." 
As for the particular role of the teacher in 
fulfilling whatever place the school may have in political 
socialization, I have discovered nothing helpful. Those 
writers who view the school as important not surprisingly tend 
to attach some importance to the teacher's part in the project. 
E.g~, Hess and Torney, supra, at 217-18. This linkage accords 
with one's commonsense expectations, but I have not found any 
convincing ernoirical confirmation of that intuition. 
My reading has been limited to about a dozen books. 
Perhaps more extensive research would turn up more helpful 
information, but I doubt it. Everything of recent vintage 
appears to be the work of political "scientists" more concerned 
---------------------
with measuring something than establishing precisely what it is 
that we need to have the measure of. As a consequence, the 
studies tend to go off in various directions, and even the 
2. 
general summary statements in the foregoing paragraphs mask 
significant differences in the purposes of the studies from 
which they spring. 
It does seem to me that many of the statements that 
minimize the importance of the school stem from studies focused 
on the transmission of fairly specific political information 
and allegiances, e~g~, political party allegiances. The 
schools may be concerned in the early years (though not in the 
high school years) with much more basic political 
3. 
socialization, especially in early years. In those grades, it 9 
seems to me, the primary purpose of civic education in the ~ 
schools is to inculcate basic attitudes about law, society, 
public discourse, majority rule, and tolerance of minorities. 
At least two of the studies that I read characterized the civic 
education of the early years in just this way. E. Friedenburq, 
Coming ·of ·Age · in America~ · Growth ·ana ·Acquiesence 221-26 
(1967), comments that schools attempt to generate support for 
the political system by inculcating the most inclusive values 
espoused by the system. This approach to political 
socialization limits the school's influence, but at the same 
time strengthens it within that limited scope because it 
stresses values, attitudes, and behavior that is approved 
widely. Similarly, Hess and Torney, supra, at 217, notes that 
~
"[c]ompliance to rules and authorities is a major focus of 
civic education in elementary school. Teachers' ratings of the 
importance of various topics clearly indicate that the 
strongest emphasis is placed upon compliance to law, authority, 
and school regulations." 
Several of the studies cited supra, along with other 
~ 
works by social scientists, are discussed in the attached Note 
from the Yale Law Journal. I think that you will find it of 
interest. 
4. 
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DRAFT OPINION 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
RE: Ambach v. Norwick, No. 76-808 
DATE: February 9, 1979 
Mr. · Jastice · Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a State may, 
consistently with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, refuse to employ as elementary and secondary school 
teachers aliens who are eligible for United States citizenship 
but who refuse to seek naturalization. 
I 
New York Education Law~ 3001(3) forbids certification 
as a public school teacher of any person who is not a citizen 
of the United States, unless that person has manifested an 
1 
intention to apply for citizenship. The Commissioner of 
Education is authorized to create exemptions from this 
prohibition, and has done so with respect to aliens who are not 
2 
yet eligible for citizenship. Unless a teacher obtains 
certification, he may not work in a public elementary or 
3 
secondary school in New York. 
Appellee Norwick was born in Scotland and is a subject 
; 
2. 
of Great Britain. She has resided in this country since 1965 
and is married to a United States citizen. Appellee Dachinger 
is a Finnish subject who came to this country in 1966 and also 
is married to a United States citizen. Both Norwick and 
Dachinger currently meet all of the educational requirements 
New York has set for certification as a public school teacher, 
<'." •. ~ ~~~ 
but they consistently have refused to l ~ 6 Itizenship in 
spite of their eligibility to do so. Norwick applied in 1973 
for a teaching certificate covering nursery school through 
sixth grade, and Dachinger sought a certificate covering the 
4 
same grades in 1975. Both applications were denied because of 
appellees' failure to meet the requirements of§ 3001(3). 
Norwick then filed suit in federal district court seeking to 
enjoin the enforcement of§ 3001(3), and Dachinger obtained 
leave to intervene as a plaintiff. 
A three-judge district court was convened pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2281. After briefing and the stipulation of 
certain facts, but before the presentation of evidence, the 
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Applying the 
"close judicial scrutiny" standard of Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 365, 372 (1971), the court held that§ 3001(3) 
discriminated against aliens in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 417 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The 
, .. 
3. 
court believed that the statute was overbroad, because it 
excluded all resident aliens from all teaching jobs regardless 
of the subject sought to be taught, the alien's nationality, 
the nature of the alien's relationship to this country, and the 
alien's willingness to substitute some other sign of loyalty to 
this nation's political values, such as an oath of allegiance. 
Id;, at 921. We noted probable _jurisdiction over the state's 
appeal, 436 U.S. 902 (1978), and now reverse. 
II 
A 
The decisions of this Court regarding the 
permissibility of statutory classifications involving aliens 
have not formed an unwavering line over the years. State 
regulation of the employment of aliens long has been subject to 
constitutional constraints. In Yick · wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. ~-
356 (1886), the Court struck down an ordinance which was ~ 
to prevent aliens from running laundries, and in Truax v. 
Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), a law requiring at least 80% of the 
employees of certain businesses to be citizens was held to be 
an unconstitutional infringement of an alien's "right to work 
for a living in the common occupations of the community •• II 
~, at 41. At the same time, however, the Court also has 
recognized a greater degree of latitude for the States when 
4. 
aliens were sought to be excluded from public employment. At 
the time Truax was decided, the governing doctrine permitted 
States to exclude aliens from various activities when the 
restriction pertained to "the regulation or distribution of the 
public domain, or of the common property or resources of the 
people of the State, .. II Id~, at 39. Hence, as part of a 
larger authority to forbid aliens from owning land, Fr\ck v. 
Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 
(1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace v. ___. 
Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Blythe v. Hinkley, 180 U.S. 333 
(1901); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880), harvesting 
wildlife, Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914); 
Mccready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877), or maintaining an 
inherently dangerous enterprise, Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 
392 (1927), States permissibly could exclude aliens from 
working on public construction projects, Crane v. New · York, 239 
U.S. 195 (1915), and, it appears, from engaging in any form of 
public employment at all, see Truax, at 40. 
Over time, the Court's decisions gradually have 
-=.=-~h~~~~ ~ are free to exclude aliens. 
The first sign that the Court would view with increased 
skepticism discrimination against aliens even in areas affected 
with a "public interest" appeared in Oyama v. California, 332 
5. 
U.S 633 (1948). The Court there held that statutory 
presumptions designed to discourage evasion of California's ban 
on alien landholding discriminated against the aliz ~&" citizen 
t>f~. 
children/\ The same Term, the Court held that the "ownership" a 
State exercises over fish found in its territorial waters "is 
inadequate to justify California in excluding any or all aliens 
who are lawful residents of the State from making a living by 
fishing in the ocean off its shores while permitting all others 
to do so." Takahashi v. Fish · &· Game · Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 421 
~~ 
(1948). This withdrawal from the former doctrine culminated in 
,\ 
Graham · v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), which for the first 
time treated classifications based on alienage as "inherently 
suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny." Id;, at 372. 
Applying Graham, this Court has struck down statutes that 
prevented aliens from entering a State's classified civil 
service, Suqarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), practicing 
law, In · re · Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), working as an 
engineer, Examining · Bd; v. Flores · de ·etero, 426 U.S. 572 
(1976), and receiving state educational benefits, Nyquist v. 
Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). 
Although our more recent decisions have departed 
substantially from the public interest doctrine of Traax's day, 
they have not abandoned the general principle that some state 
6. 
functions are so bound up with the ~ f the State as 
a political entity as to permit the exclusion from those 
functions of all persons who have not become part of the polity 
that comprises the State. In Sugarman, we recognized that a 
State could, "in an appropriately defined class of positions, 
require citizenship as a qualification for office." We went on 
to observe: 
"Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its 
obligation, already noted above, 'to preserve the 
basic conception of a political community.' ••. 
And this power and responsibility of the State 
applies, not only to the qualifications of 
voters, but also to persons holding state 
elective or important nonelective executive, 
legislative, and judicial positions, for officers 
who participate directly in the formulation, 
execution, or review of broad public policy 
perform functions that go to the heart of 
representative government." Id;, at 647 
(citation omitted). 
The exclusion of aliens from such positions would 
demanding scrutiny from this Court. Id;, at 648. See also 
Nyquist v. Mauclet, supra, at 11; Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. 
Supp. 134 (Md. 1974), aff'd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976). 
Applying this standard, we held last Term that New 
York could exclude aliens from the ranks of its police force. 
Foley v. eonnelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). Because the police 
7. 
function fulfilled "a most fundamental obligation of government 
to its constituency" and by necessity cloaked policemen with 
~ 
substantial discretionary powers, we ~ega~e-eQ the police force 
as being one of those appropriately defined classes of 
positions for which a citizenship requirement could be imposed. 
Id;, at 297. Accordingly, the State was required to justify 
its classification only "by a showing of some rational 
relationship between the interest sought to be protected and 
the limiting classification." Id;, at 296. 
The rule for governmental functions, which is an 
exception to the general standard applicable to classifications 
; 
based on alienage, rests on important principles inherent in 
the Constitution. Broad-based classifications that exclude 
aliens from various walks of private life ordinarily serve no 
legitimate state interest, but the distinction between citizens 
~k 
and aliens lies -at.A the heart of the definition of a state and 
its government. The Constitution itself refers to the 
distinction no less than 11 times, see Sugarman, at 651-652 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting), indicating that the status of 
citizenship was meant to have~ significance in the 
structure of our government. The assumption of that status, 
whether by birth or naturalization, denotes an association with 
the polity which, in a democratic republic, exercises the 
8. 
powers of governance. See Foley, at 295. The form of this 
association is important: An oath of allegiance or similar 
ceremony cannot substitute for the unequivocal legal bond 
citizenship represents. It is because of this special 
significance of citizenship that governmental entities) when i.--
~~~~ 
~ 7 ' ~ h f ' f ± ± ' ' ~u~y exerc1s~ t e unctions o government
1
j p.:r:epe~ y-may1m1t ~ 
5 ~~ 
the participation of non-citizens. 
B 
In determining whether teaching in public schools 
~~ .t.e_ ~Id.~~~, 
constitutes a governmental functionA we look to the role of 
-1-o 
public education in our democratic society and the degree of 
I\ 
responsibility and discretion teachers possess in fulfilling 
that role. See id~, at 297. Each of these considerations 
$ 
support the conclusion that public school teachers may be 
~ 
regarded as performing a task "that go[es] to the heart of 
representative government." Sugarman, at 647. 
; 
Public education, like the police function, "fulfills 
a most fundamental obligation of government to its 
constituency." Foley, at 297. The importance of public 
schools in the preparation of indiviouals for participation in 
our democratic society, and in the preservation of the values 
on which this society rests, long has been recognized by our 
decisions: 
"Today, education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local 
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws 
and the great expenditures for education both 
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of 
education to our democratic society. It is 
required in the performance of our most basic 
public responsibilities, even service in the 
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good 
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument 
in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, 
and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment." Brown v. Board ·of · Education, 347 
U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
9. 
See also Keyes v. School ·Dist~ · No~ · 1, 413 U.S. 189, 246 (1973) 
(Powell, J., concurring); San · Antonio · Ind; · School · Dist~ v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 213 (1972); ~, at 238~239 (White, J., concurring); 
Abington · School · Dist; v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) 
(Brennan, J., concurring); Adler v. Board · of · Education, 342 
U.S. 485, 493 (1952); McCollum v. Bo 9rq ·of · Edacation, 333 U.S. 
203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Pierce v. 
Society · of · Sisters, 268 µ.s. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 u~s. 390 (1923); Interstate · Consolidated · Street · R~ · co~ v. 
6 
Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79 (1907). Other authorities have 
perceived public schools as an "assimilative force" by which 
1 0. 
diverse and conflicting elements in our society are brought 
together on a broad but common ground. See, e~g;, J. Dewey, --
Democracy and Education 26 (1929); N. Edwards & H. Richey, The 
School in the American Social Order 623-624 (1963). These 
perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental 
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political 
system have been confirmed by the observations of social 
scientists. See R. Dawson & K. Prewitt, Political 
Socialization 146-167 (1969); R. Hess & J. Torney, The 
Development of Political Attitudes in Children 114, 158-171, 
7 
323-343 (1961). 
Within the public play a 
\_ -""""'f"'W111""~.,..---~ 
critical part in developing :;;.:t~ ~ ~~;;:ei:1:1:a;:ai•E---"d~e~ss.ii~g~oue-'1~ 
w p:r:emott!!. Alone among employees of the system, 
At,J. '4c.., Hw, ~ ~ ;ti..vL;lw."1 
in direct, day-to-day contact with 
-4Jc, <~ i'ci,c .... ~ 
In shaping the to achieve ~e~esin~ goals, 
• 41 ~,., 
teachers by necessity have c0i'1~±:-rle~aele discretion over the way 
"' a ~l!o course material is~!!:";;! tn.. "1;; yQ @R~~ • They are 
responsible for presenting and explaining the subject matter in 
a way that is both comprehensible and inspiring. No amount of 
standardization of teaching mat~rials or lesson plans can 
eliminate the personal qualities a teacher brings to bear in 
11. 
achieving these goals. Further, a teacher serves as a role 
model for his students, exerting a subtle but important 
influence over their perceptions and values. 
certain attitudes as his own, a teacher encourages the 
nt of similar attitudes on the part of his student • 
The discretion and control necessarily exercised b a 
teacher extends to all his classroom functions, including t e 
development of attitudes and values critical to 
,.,_i.c...~ I ' 
in a democratic societ • ~ ,.through both the presentation of 
course materials and the example he sets, a teacher has~~ 
.......... ~-~ -e., ""'~~..... .u;..4-j 
,( sllb~&a1"f~~wer to students' attitudes toward '8ft6 
~~rgg~tiSoRe--e-1: government, the political process, and a 
8 
citizen's social responsibilities. This 
.~~1-o 
influence,~ ...s the 
educational process itself, is crucial to 't:8e forwatsisA ...QE -
~ 
slttlle aA~al~e~ o" whieh the continued good health of a 
9 
democracy, depe~~@. 
Furthermore, it is clear that all public school 
teachers, and not just those responsible for teaching the 
courses most directly related to government, history, and civic 
-Ir,;, • • ..1. ti -
duties, help fulfil the Qriti£a~ soci;;1iJ. 
1 0 
.,,. .. ~ 
function of the school 
" 
system. ~ ~ost teachers, regardless of their specialty, -
may be called upon to teach other subjects, including those 
I 1 1 
expressly dedicated to poltical and social subjects. S@c~Ae..,. 
'\ 
,,,,. ... _ 
1 2. 
~ s /jfore importantly, a State properly may regard all 
- * a., .. ..,t J'4 .. , .. ..,f,....1al1,1~ 
teachers as having an obligation to promote civic virtues ~in 
their classes, regardless of the subject taught. Certainly a 
~ 
State may take account of a teacher's function as a role model, 
I\ 
which exists independently of particular classroom topics. In 
., 
~~ J.L,_,114, u'-" ~ 
light of thea.e considerations, we soli@~e that public school 
~ ~ 
teachers 
~ ..... ~,L,_ W1,,,,l,,J.,~....., r ~ ... ,.~ 
:H:t on:thi1~ the "governmental function"~ e recognized 
in Sugarman and Foley. Accordingly, the Constitution requires 
only that a citizenship requirement applicable to these jobs 
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. 
III 
it seems clear that the restriction embodied in§ 3001(3) and 
the related regulations is constitutional. The restriction is 
carefully tailored to its purpose, as it bars from teaching 
only those aliens who have affirmatively demonstrated their 
12 
unwillingness to obtain United States citizenship. As such 
it represents a judgment by the people of New York that a 
person who has manifested his unwillingness to join the 
political community of which they are part should not 
ordinarily be entrusted with the responsibilities and powers a 
13 
teacher enjoys in the classroom. This decision reflects a 
rational weighing of the alternatives, rejecting the advanta es 
lfp/ss 2/12/79 Rider A, p. 12 (Ambach) 
III 
As the state's interest in furthering the 
educational goals outlined above is undoubted, it 
remains only to consider whether §30001(3) bears a 
rational relationship to this interest. The 
restriction in carefully tailored to the state's 
purpose, as it bars from teaching only those aliens who 
have demonstrated their unwillingness to obtain United 
. . . 12 
States c1t1zensh1p. Appellees, and aliens similarily 
situated, in effect have chosen to classify themselves. 
They prefer to retain citizenship in a foreign country 
with the obligations it entails of primary duty and 
13 
loyalty. They have rejected the open invitation 
extended to qualify for eligibility to teach by 
applying for citizenship in this country. The people 
of New York, acting through their elected 
representatives, have made a judgment that citizenship 
should be a threshold qualification for teaching and 
instructing by example the young of the state, and 
§3001(3) directly furthers ~ that judgment. 
Reversed. 
1 3 • 
a more cosmopolitan and culturally diverse class of teachers 
might provide in favor of the promotion of the patriotic and 
14 
civic values of which citizenship is an affirmation. 
Whatever the wisdom of such a judgment, it is one the State i 




TO: Paul DATE: Feb. 12, 1979 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
76-808 Ambach v. Norwick 
I like your draft of 2/9/79, which I have 
reviewed with some care. In addition to editing, and a 
suggested revision of Part III, I add the following 
comments and suggestions. 
1. The dissent undoubtedly will use In re 
Griffiths against me. I agree that we should deal with 
this after we see exactly what the dissent says. 
2. The dissent also probably will make a "big 
thing" over the fact that §3001(3) applies only to public 
school teachers when a high percentage of New York 
children attend parochial and other private schools. In 
addition to the answer you have in the draft, I suggest -
possibly in the text - relying on the doctrine that a 
state does not have to embrace an entire area or utilize 
the limit of its power in furthering a state interest. 
There are a number of cases on this point. I do not 
recall having made it in any of my decisions, although 
you might take a look at McGinnis v~ Royster which may be 
















· .• ~ 
'• .. -~ 
3. As an old hand as a school board member, I 
have expanded note 13 as a rider to page FN-6. 
4. I also have dictated a none too artful 
footnote that should be a counter-weight against 
inferences in our opinion that appellants' loyalty to the 
United States may not be of the highest order. This is 
marginal, and I would like your independent judgment - as 
usual. 
5. The draft uses the word "he" to refer to 
teachers. It is a bit awkward to use "he or she" 
throughout an opinion, but I do not want to offend the 
female contingency - which no doubt substantially 
outnumbers male teachers in the New York system as 
elsewhere. In this connection, it might be worthwhile to 
ask our library to obtain from the Library of Congress 
the most recent annual report of the Superintendent of 
Education in the State of New York. This should give us 
the total number of public school teachers, and their 
division between the sexes. 
Subject to the foregoing, I suggest that you 











LFP/lab 2/12/79 Rider A, FN-4: 76-808 Ambach · v; · Norwick 
tii,,,.I Appellees argue that the state cannot 
rationally exclude aliens from teaching positions and yet 
permit them to vote for and sit on certain local school 
boards. See App., pp. 27, 29. We note, first, that the 
state's policy as to service on school boards applies only 
in New York City and to aliens who are parents of students 
f'~L,..,.,1 
in the public schools· / t'he argument misconceives the 
distinction between the role and function of teachers and 
school board members. Although board members possess 
substantial responsibility for the administration of the 
schools, they teach no classes, and rarely if ever are known 
or identified by the students. ~ heir influence on students 
i ~ effected indirectly only through textbooks and teachers'J 
'1. \ ,-; ~ ~ ! <CJ .:J 
i  local boards, within limits prescribed by the 
~ islature and regulations of the state board of education, 
/ select or approve textbooks and instruction materials. 
Without minimizing this responsibility, it is one 
necessarily discharged by reliance in major part on 
recommendations from committees of professional educators 
composed of teachers and public school officials. As noted 
above, the textbook - particularly in the social science 
classroom - usually is less influential than how the 









Moreover, the number of teachers in the New York 
public school system for the 19 totalled See 
Annual Report, NY Superintendent of Public Education (??) 




LFP/lab 2/12/79 Rider A, FN- 76-808 Arbach v. Norwick 
As our cases have emphasized (Paul - here cite 
cases including, as I recall, In re Griffith), resident 
aliens pay taxes, serve in the armed forces (?), and have 
made significant contributions to our. country in private and 
public endeavors. No doubt many of them, and we do not 
exclude apoellees, would make excellent public school 
teachers. But the leqislature, having in mind the 
imoortance of education to state and local qovernments, see 
Brown v. Board o~ucation, supra, at 493, may determine 
eliqibility for. the key role in dischar.qinq this function on 
the assumption that generally citizens of the United States 
are better qualified than are citizens of a foreign country. 
We note in this connection that requlations promulgated 
pursuant to Section 3001 (3) do provide for situations where 
a particular alien's special qualifications as a teacher 
outweigh the policy primarily served by the statute. See 8 
NY Code, Rules and Reg., Section 80.2(i)(1). Although one 
may think that in certain disciplines (such as mathematics, 
the physical sciences, and foreiqn lanquages) at the hiqh 
school level, an alien often would bring to the teachinq of 
the subject highly desirable qualifications. The state 
informs us, however, that the a uthority conferred by this 
regulation has not been exercised . Brief for appellant 7 
n.*. 
lfp/ss 2/12/79 Rider A, p. 12 (Ambach) 
III 
As the state's interest in furthering the 
educational goals outlined above is undoubted, it 
remains only to consider whether §30001(3) bears a 
rational relationship to this interest. The 
restriction in carefully tailored to the state's 
purpose, as it bars from teaching only those aliens who 
have demonstrated their unwillingness to obtain United 
. . h. 12 . . . . States c1t1zens 1p. Appellees, and aliens s1m1lar1ly 
situated, in effect have chosen to classify themselves. 
They prefer to retain citizenship in a foreign country 
with the obligations it entails of primary duty and 
13 
loyalty. They have rejected the open invitation 
extended to qualify for eligibility to teach by 
applying for citizenship in this country. The people 
of New York, acting through their elected 
representatives, have made a judgment that citizenship 
should be a threshold qualification for teaching and 
instructing by example the young of the state, and 
14 
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1;. As our cases have emphasized (Paul - here cite 
cases including, as I recall, In re Griffith), resident 
aliens pay taxes, serve in the armed forces (?), and have 
made significant contributions to our country in private and 
public endeavors. No doubt many of them, and we do not 
exclude appellees, would make excellent public school 
teachers. But the legislature, having in mind the 
- -
importance of education to state and local governments, see 
Brown v. Board of Education, supra, at 493, may determine 
eligibility for the key role in discharging this function on 
the assumption that generally citizens of the United States 
are better qualified than are citizens of a foreign country. 
We note in this connection that regulations promulgated 
pursuant to Section 3001 (3) do provide for situations where 
a particular alien's special qualifications as a teacher 
outweigh the policy primarily served by the statute. See 8 
NY Code, Rules and Reg., Section 80. 2 ( i) ( 1). Althotigh ~ ne 
may think that in certain disciplines (such as mathematics, 
the physical sciences, and foreign :\.ang~-ages) at the high 
school leve{ , an alien often ~ uld bring to the teaching of 
the subject highly desirable· qualifications. The state 
informs us, however, that the authority conferred by this 




10. At the primary school level, for which both appellees 
sought certification, teachers are responsible for all of the 
basic curriculum. 
11. All certified teachers, including those in the secondary 
schools, are required to be available for up to five hours of 
teaching a week in subjects outside their specialty. 8 N.Y. 
Code Rules & Reg.§ 80.2(c). 
12. See n. 2 infra. 
made this judgment, as it permits aliens to vote for and sit o 
certain local school boards. See app. 27, 29. But the State' 
~ -1-o ~ 
, 
olicy ~t participation in school boards, which applies on y 
o New York City and extends only to aliens who are parents o 
tudents in the public schools, is not necessarily inconsistent 
ith its restrictions on alien teachers. Members of local 
chool boards, although possessing substantial responsibility 
)fii • a 4£_£1 re 
or the administration of the schools, do not enjoy direct, 
ndividual contact with students. They accordingly do not hav 
the same opportunity immediately to influence students as do 
14. The regulations promulgated pursuant to§ 3001(3) do 
provide for the case where a particular alien's special 
qualifications as a teacher outweigh the policy which the 
FN 7. 
general prohibition serves. See 8 N.Y. Code Rules & Reg. § 
80.2(i) (1). The State informs us, however, that no 
certificates have been issued pursuant to this exception. 
Brief for Appellant 7 n. * 
PBS-2/9/79 
1. The statute provides: 
"No person shall be employed or authorized to 
teach in the public schools of this state who is: 
"3. Not a citizen. The provisions of this 
subdivision shall not apply, however, to an alien 
teacher now or hereafter employed provided such 
teacher shall make due application to become a 
citizen and thereafter within the time prescribed 
by law shall become a citizen. The provisions of 
this subdivision shall not apply after July 
first, nineteen hundred sixty-seven, to an alien 
teacher employed pursuant to regulations adopted 
by the Commissioner of Education permitting such 
employment." N.Y. Educ. Law§ 3001(3). 
The statute contains an exception for persons who are 
ineligible for United States citizenship solely because of an 
oversubscribed quota. Id;,§ 3001-a. Because this statutory 
provision is in all respects narrower that the exception 
provided by regulation, seen. 2, infra, as a practical matter 
it has no effect. 
The State does not certify the qualifications of 
teachers in the private schools, although it does require that 
such teachers be "competent". N.Y. Educ. Law§ 3204(2). 
2. The following regulation governs here: 
FN 2. 
"Citizenship; A teacher who is not a citizen of 
the United States or who has not declared 
intention of becoming a citizen may be issued a 
provisional certificate providing such teacher 
has the appropriate educational qualifications as 
defined in the regulations and (1) possesses 
skills or competencies not readily available 
among teachers holding citizenship, or (2) is 
unable to declare intention of becoming a citizen 
for valid statutory reasons." 8 N.Y. Code of 
Rules and Regulations§ 80.2(i) 
ough § 3001 by its literal terms appears to apply to 
all New York public schools, including colleges and 
Certification by the Commissioner of Education is 
~ 
not required of teachers at state institutions of higher 
education and the citizenship restriction accordingly does not 
apply to them. Brief for Appellants 13 n. * We express no 
view as to the permissibility of a citizenship requirement 
l#./.1...~ 
applicable to the faculty of such~-
" 
4. At the time of her application Norwick had not yet met the 
post-graduate educational requirements for a permanent 
certificate and accordingly applied only for a termporary 
certificate, which also is governed by§ 3001(3). She since 
has obtained the necessary graduate degree for full 
certification. Dachinger previously had obtained a temporary 
certificate, which had lapsed at the time of her 1975 
FN 3. 
application. The record does not indicate whether Dachinger 
previously had declared an intent to obtain citizenship or had 
obtained the temporary certificate because of some exception to 
the citizenship requirement. 
5. That the significance of citizenship has constitutional 
dimensions also has been recognized by several of our 
decisions. In Trop v. Dalles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), a plurality 
of the Court held that the expatriation of an American citizen 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of 
desertion in time of war. In Afroyim v. ~, 387 U.S. 253 
(1967), the Court held that the Constitution forbade Congress 
from involuntarily depriving a person of his citizenship for 
any reason. 
6. As San · Antonio · Ind~ · School · Dist; v. Rodriguez, supra, 
recognized, there is no inconsistency between our recognition 
f h 
~~ . . . . . . 
o t e ~ t significance of public education and our holding 
that access to education does not constitute/ a fundamental 
right for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. We observed 
in Rodriguez that "social importance is not the critical 
determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict 
scrutiny." Id;, at 32. 
7. The curricular requirements of New York public school 
system reflect some of the ways a public school system promotes 
rl,_;;;#' £.(.... ~+<.~~di 
lo i..-k~~1 ~1-ja...,,~ 
H..... ~ n,IAA-<ICA"4L.Jt 
the development of 
Q•~ ms st~~· 
in a democratic~ey. The schools are required to provide 
instruction "to promote a spirit of patriotic and civic service 
and obligation and to foster in the children of the state moral 
and intellectual qualities which are essential in preparing to 
meet the obligations of citizenship in peace or in war, .•• " 
N.Y. Educ. L. § 801(1). Flag and other patriotic exercises 
also are prescribed} Id~,§ 802. In addition, required 
courses includes classes in civics, United States and New York 
history, and principles of American government. Id; § 
3204(3)(a)(1),(2) <:J{ Although private schools also are bound by ; 
~ 
most of these requirements, the State has a stronger interest 
in ensuring that the schools it most directly controls, and for 
which it bears the cost, are as effective as possible in 
al-ti,e11~~Jo+QJJ.1-C.OPG1J..u .. iv._ reinforce the commonsense 
~ 4••-'-" H..f.. ~~ °'( .......... f -( ""'-',# 
#'"~ · t hat a teacher exerts considerable influence over 
" 
the development of fundamental social attitudes in students, 
including those attitudes which in the broadest sense of the 
term may be termed political. See, e;g;, R. Dawson & K. 
Prewitt, Political Socialization 158-167 (1969); R. Hess & J. 
Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children 162-
FN 5. 
163, 217-218 (1967). Cf. Note, Aliens' Right to Teach: 
Political Socialization and the Public Schools, 85 Yale L.J. 
90, 99-104 (1975). 
9. 
~,~ 
Appellees contend that restriction; on aliens freedom to 
I\ A 
' LA.,J 
teach in public schools,.... contrary to principles of diversity 
of thought and academic freedom embodied in the First 
Amendment. See also Note, supra n. 8, at 106-109. We think 
the~ attempt to draw an analogy between choice of citizenship 
and political expression or freedom of association is wide of 
the mark. 1zenship requirement limits classroom 
diversity no more than any 
articular social and civic value Section 3001(3) does not 
School · Dist;, ··· U.S. (1979); ML · Healthy · City 
School Dist~ v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Pickering v. Board 
of · Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Nor are applicants 
discouraged from joining with others to advance particular 
political ends. Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1957). 
~~ ~~ -'-f ~ ~t(. ~ 
The only1 liberty of appe
1
llees wb.iee ~- ~iRf~iR~<id is thec-
i'{ .,,....,. f ~ ~ f 
~ .J<, +4if~~ H..c.,,,-:.i<d<d-114'""'-IIY~ .,. C l, 
£r<iedom -t.o d~1,.4.ce--wieea Sta-~. eit'izeos-hip, e. !'rivH.ege w~ch 
M• 7 ~ ..4,, .. -, A-s-.~ cJ:.c.7' ~~~~~_, 
o.i:mot. he--R\ade -4:.b.g ~£ in" ie 1-otH, e iS"et imi>f\e.td8"R bw.t 
"f ;4~..., ~ . ~ w -4.-c~.LLy 4-' ~ .. ~ 
~.e~ and,~~ PG c0-R.Sti~ei'O"'l1a:t= rnoee~~R -
~ f;,, •• J., . ..., 7us ~•a'•· ~i ~o·e~ ~ ;,.,..-tz,,.«J.._..( 
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SUP1UOfE COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
No. 76-808 
Gordon M. Ambach, Individually 
and as Commissioner of the 
New York State Depart-
ment of Education, 
et al. , Appellants, 
v, 
Susan M . W. Norwick et al. 
On Appeal from the 
United States District 
Court for the Southern 
District of New York. 
[February - , 1979] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a State may, con-
sistently with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, refuse to employ as elementary and secondary 
school teachers aliens who are eligible for . United States 
citizenship but who refuse to seek naturalization. 
I 
New York Education Law§ 3001 (3) forbids certification as 
a public school teacher of any person who is not a citizen of 
the U11ited States, unless that person has manifested an 
intention to apply for citizenship.' The Commissioner of 
1 The statute provides : 
" No person sl111ll be employed or authorized to teach in the public schools 
of this state who is ; 
"B. Not a citizm . The provi~iom; of this subdivision shall not apply, 
howrvn, to an ali en teacher now or hereafter employed provided such 
t•f'acher shall makr due applica.tion to become a citizen and thereafter 
within the time pre:,;cribed by la.w :shall become n eitizen. The provisions 
of t.his subdivision 8hall not apply after July fin;t , nineteen hundred sixty-





AMBACH v. NORWICH 
Education is authorized to create exemptions from this prohi-
bition. and has done so with respect to aliens who are not yet 
eligible for citizenship. 2 Unless a teacher obtains certification, 
he may not work in a public elementary or secondary school 
in New York.3 
Appellee Norwick was born in Scotland and is a subject of 
Great Britaiu. She has resided in this country since 1965 and 
is married to a United States citizen. Appellee Dachinger 
is a Finuish subject who came to this country in 1966 and also 
is married to a United States citizen. Both N orwick and 
Dachinger currently meet all of the educational requirements 
New York has set for certification as a public school teacher, 
but they consistently have refused to seek citizenship in spite 
of their eligibility to do so. Norwick applied in 1973 for a 
the Commissioner of Education permitting such employment." N. Y. 
Educ. Law § 3001 (3) 
The statute C'ontains an exc<'ption for persons who are ineligible for United 
St.MPs ritizen:;hip solrly becausf' of an over::mbscribed quota . Id., § 3001-a. 
BN·ause this statntor~· provi,;ion is in all re:;pccts narrower than the 
exception provided by regulation, ::,'Ce n. 2, infra, as a practical matter it 
ha<1 no effect . 
The State doel:I not certif~· the qualifications of teachers in the private 
schools, alt hough it, doe,-, rHJ11ir<' that ::mch teachers be ·'competent." 
N. Y. Educ. Law § ;3204 (2) (Mr Kinney 1970). Accordingly, we are not 
presented with the que,.,tion of, and express no view as to, the permissi-
bility of a citizenship requirement pertaining to teachers in private schools. 
2 The following regul:1tion governs here: 
"Citizenship . A teacher who is not a citizen of the United States or who 
ha<1 not declared intention of becoming a citizen ma.y be issued a provi-
$ioual certifirate providing snch teacher ha.,; the appropriate educational 
qualifications a,- defined in the regulation,- and (1) pos::;c::;::;e::; skills or 
competencic:i not, readily available among t{'acher::; holding citizenship, 
01· (2) is 11nable to declare intention of becoming a cit.izen for valid 
::;tat11toD· rca::1ons." 8 ~ . Y. Code> of RuleH and Regulations § 80.2 (i) 
a Certifit'atiou by the CommiH,.:iorn,r of Education i::1 not required of 
teacher::; at, state institution" of higher education and the citizenship 
restriction accordingly does nut, appl~· to tlwin. Brief for A1ipellants 
13 n. *. 
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teaching certificate covering nursery school through sixth 
grade, and Dachinger sought a certificate covering the same 
grades in 1975.4 Both applications were denied because of 
appellees' failure to meet the requirements of § 3001 (3). 
Norwick then filed this suit seeking to enjoin the enforcement 
of § 3001 ( 3), and Dachinger obtained leave to intervene as 
a plaintiff. 
A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 
U. S. C. ~ 2281. Applying the "close judicial scrutiny" stand-
ard of Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971), the 
court held that ~ 3001 (3) discriminated against aliens in vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause. 417 F. Supp. 913 
(SDNY 1976). The court believed that the statute was over-
broad, becaurn it excluded all resident aliens from all teaching 
jobs regardless of the subject sought to be taught, the alien's 
nationality, the nature of the alien's relationship to this coun-
try, and the alien's willingness to substitute some other sign 
of loyalty to this Nation's political values, such as an oath 
of allegiance. Id., at 921. We noted probable jurisdiction 
over the State's appeal, 436 U. S. 902 ( 1978), and now reverse. 
II 
A 
The decisions of this Court regarding the permissibility of 
statutory classifications involving aliens have not formed an 
unwa.vering liue over the years. State regulation of the em-
ployment of aliens long has been subject to constitutional 
4 At the time of her application Norwick had not yet met, the post-
grnduato educational rrquiremrnt;; for a permauont certificate aud accord-
ingly applied only for a temporary crrtificntr, which al;;o is governed by 
§ 3001 (3) . She since ha,; obtamed the necr~~ary graduate degree for full 
certification . Dachingn prrv10usly had obtained a temporary certificate, 
which had lapsed at the time of her 1975 application. The record does 
not indirate whether Dachiuger previously had declared an intent to 
obtain citizenship or had obtamed the temporary certificate because of 
somr applicablP Pxcept10n to the r1t1zen~hip requiremrnt. 
·' 
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constraints. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886), 
the Court struck down au ordinance which was applied to 
prevent aliens from running laundries. and in 'l'ruax v. Raich, 
239 U. S. 33 (1915), a law requiring at least 80% of the 
employees of certain businesses to be citizens was held to be 
an unconstitutioual infringement of an alien's "right to work 
for a living in the common occupations of the community .... " 
Id., at 41. At the same time. however, the Court also has 
recognized a greater degree of latitude for the States when 
aliens were sought to be excluded from public employment. 
At the time Truax was decided, the governing doctrine per-
mitted States to exclude aliens from various activities when 
the restriction pertained to "the regulation or distribution of 
the public domain, or of the common property or resources of 
the people of the State, . . ." Id., at 39. Hence, as part 
of a larger authority to forbid aliens from owning land, 
Frick v. Webb , 263 U. S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 
U. S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); 
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Blythe v. Hinkley, 
180 U. S. 333 (1901); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483 
(1880), harvesting wildlife, Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 
U.S. 138 (1914); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877), 
or maintaining an inherently dangerous enterprise, Clarke v. 
Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 (1927) , States permissibly could. 
exclude aliens from working on public construction projects, 
Crane v. New York, 239 U. S. 195 (1915), and, it appears, 
from engaging in any form of public employment at all, see 
Truax, at 40. 
Over time, the Court's decisions gradually have restricted 
the activities from which States are free to exclude aliens. 
The first sign that the Court would view with increased 
skepticism discrimination against aliens even in areas affected 
with a "public interest" appeared in Oyarna v. California, 332 
U. S. 633 (1948). The Court there held that statutory pre-
~umptions designed to discourage evasion of California's bail 
' 
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on alien landholding discriminated against the citizen children 
of aliens. The same Term, the Court held that the "owner-
ship" a State exercises over fish found in its territorial waters 
"is inadequate to justify California in excluding any or all 
aliens who are lawful residents of the State from making a 
living by fishing in the ocean off its shores while permitting 
all others to do so." Takahashi v. F-ish & Game Comm'n, 
334 U. S. 410, 421 (1948). This process of withdrawal from 
the former doctrine culminated in Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U. S. 365 ( 1971), which for the first time treated classifica-
tions based on alienage as "inherently suspect and subject to 
close judicial scrutiny." Id., at 372. Applying Graham, this 
Court has struck down statutes that prevented aliens from 
entering a State's classified civil service, Sugarman v. Dougall, 
413 U. S. 634 (1973). practicing law. In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 
717 (1973) , working as an engineer, Examining Bd. v. Flores 
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), and receiving state educational 
benefits, Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). 
Although our more recent decisions have departed substan-
tially from the public interest doctrine of Truax's day, they 
have not abandoned the general principle that some state 
functions are so bound up with the operation of the State as 
a governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from those 
functions of all persons who have not become part of the 
process of self-government. In Sugarman, we recognized that 
a State could, "in an appropriately defined class of posi-
tions, require citizenship as a qualification for office." We 
went on to observe: 
"Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its obliga-
tion, already noted above, 'to preserve the basic concep-
tion of a political community. ' . . . And this power and 
responsibility of the State applies, not only to the 
qualifications of voters. but also to persons holding state 
elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, 
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in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public 
policy perform functio11s that go to the heart of repre-
sentative government." Id., at 647 (citation omitted). 
The exclusion of aliens from such governmental positions 
would not invite as demanding scrutiny from this Court. 
Id., at 648. See also Nyquist v. Mauclet, supra, at 11; 
Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (Md. 1974), aff'd, 426 
u. s. 913 (1976). 
Applying this standard, we held last Term that New York 
could exclude aliens from the ranks of its police force. Foley 
v. Connelie, 435 U. S. 291 (1978). Because the police func-
tion fulfilled "a most fundamental obligation of government 
to its constituency" and by necessity cloaked policemen with 
substantial discretionary powers, we viewed the police force 
as being one of those appropriately defined classes of positions 
for which a citizeriship requirement could be imposed. Id., 
at 297. Accordingly, the State was required to justify its 
classification only "by a showing of some rationa.1 relationship 
between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting 
classification." Id., at 296. 
The rule for governmental functions, which is an exception 
to the general standard applicable to classifications based on 
alienage, rests on important principles inherent in the Consti-
tution. The distinction between citizens and aliens, though 
ordinarily irrelevant to private activity, is fundamental to the 
definition and government of a State. The Constitution itself 
refers to the distinction no less than 11 times, see Sugarman v. 
Dougall, supra, at 651-652 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), indi-
cating that the status of citizenship was meant to have signifi-
cance in the structure of our government. The assumption 
of that status, whether by birth or naturalization, denotes an 
association with the polity which, in a democratic republic, 
exercises the powers of governance. See Foley v. Connelie, 
supra, at 295. The form of this association is important: an 
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the unequivocal legal bond citizenship represents. It is be-
cause of this special significance of citizenship that govern-
mental entities, when exercising the functions of government, 
have wider latitude in limiting the participation of noncitizens.5 
B 
In determining whether teaching in public schools consti-
tutes a governmental function that may be limited to citizens, 
we look to the role of public education in our democratic 
society and to the degree of responsibility and discretion 
teachers possess in fulfilling that role. See id., at 297. Each 
of these considerations supports the conclusion that public 
school teachers may be regarded as performing a task "that 
go [es] to the heart of represeu tati ve government." Sugar-
man v. Dougall, supra, at 647. 
Public education, like the police function, "fulfills a most 
fundamental obligation of government to its constituency.'' 
Foley, at 297. The importance of public schools in the 
preparation of individuals for participation in our democratic 
society, and in the preservation of the values on which this 
society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions: 
"Today, education is perhaps the most important func-
tion of state and local governments. Compulsory school 
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education 
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of 
education to our democratic society. It is required iu the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, 
even service in the armed forces. It is the very founda-
"That. the significanc(• of citizenship ha;; con~tit.utional dimrn:sions also 
ha:; bPPn rPcognizPd by srveral of our deci~iom;. In Trop v. D'UUes, 356 
U.S. 86 (Hl58), a plmality of tbP Court held that thr expatriation of an 
American citizen constituted rrnPI. and 1111u:;ual punishment for the crime 
of desertion in time of war. In Afruyim v. R'Usk, :387 U. S. 253 (1967), 
the Court. held that the Constit,utiou forbade Congre:ss from depriving a 
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tion of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instru-
ment in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in 
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.'' 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954). 
See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 246 (1973) 
(POWELL, J., concurring); San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. 29-30 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U. S. 205, 213 (1972); id., at 238-239 (WHrrE, J., concur-
ring); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 230 
(1963) (BRENNAN, J .. concurring); Adler v. Board of EdU;ca-
tion, 342 U. S. 485, 493 (1952); McCollum v. Board of 
Education, 333 U. S. 203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Interstate Con-
solidated Street R. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79 (1907). 0 
Other authorities have perceived public schools a.s an "assimi-
lative force" by which diverse and conflicting elements in o~r 
society are brought together on a broad but common ground. 
See, e. g., J. Dewey, Democracy and Education 26 (1929); 
N. Edwards & H. Richey, The School in the American Social 
Order 623-624 (1963). These perceptions of the public 
schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the 
maintenance of a democratic political system have been con .. 
firmed by the observations of social scieptists. See R. Dawson 
& K. Prewitt, Political Socialization 146-167 (1969); R. ij:ess 
& J. Tomey, The Development of Political Attitudes in 
6 A8 San Anton:io ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra, recognized, 
there is no incom;istency between our recognition of the vital significance 
of public education and our holding tha.t. access to education does not 
constitute a fundamental right. for purposrs of the Equal Prot,c>ction 
Clause. We observed in Rodriguez that "social importance i8 not the 
critical determinant for :;ubjerting st1;1te legislation to strict scrutiny.'" 
[,J;.,, at 32.. 
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Children 114, 158-171, 217-220 (1967); V. 0. Key, Public 
Opinion and American Democracy 323-343 (1961).7 
Within the public school system. teachers play a critical 
part in developing students' attitude toward government and 
understanding of the role of citizens in our society. Alone 
among employees of the system, teachers a.re in direct, day-to-
day contact with students both in the classrooms and in the 
other varied activities of a modern school. In shaping the 
students' experience to achieve educational goals. teachers by 
necessity have wide discretion over the way the course ma-
terial is communicated to students. They are responsible for 
presenting and explaining the subject ma.tter in a way that is 
both comprehensible and inspiring. No amount of standard-
ization of teaching materials or lesson plans can eliminate 
the personal qualities a teacher brings to bear in achieving 
these goals. Further, a teacher serves as a role model for his 
students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their 
perceptions and values. Thus. through both the presentation 
of course materials and the example he sets. a teacher has an 
opportunity to influence his students' attitudes toward gov-
ernment, the political process, and a citizen's social responsi-
7 The curricular requirement" of N' ew York public school system reflect 
some of th<' wa)'S a public school :system promotes the development of the 
understanding that i8 prerequisit•e to intelligent. participation in the 
democratic proce88. Th<' school:,; arc required to provide in;:;truction "to 
promote a spirit of patriotic and civir service and obligatjon and to foster 
in the children of the state moral and intellectual qualities which are 
es.~ential in preparing to meet the obligation" of citizenship in peace or in 
war, . .. " N . Y. Educ. L. § 801 (1) (McKinney 1970). Flag and other 
patriotir exercises abo are prl'scribed, as loyalty is a characteristic of 
citizr11<,hip rssential to the preservation of a country. Id.,§ 802. In addi-
tion , requirrd course:; include clas~l's in civic:s, United States and New York 
history, and principles of Aml'rican government. Id.,§ 3204 (:3) (a) (1), (2). 
Although privatl' school:,; also are bound b~· mo:st, of the:se requirements, 
the Statr ha,; a :stronger intere,;t. iu ensuring that the schools it most 
direct]~, controls, :md for whirh i1 l)('ar,.: the cost., are as ~ffective as 
possibk in t.earhini? the,,(• ro1u·.~<1;;;. 
; 
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bilities. 8 This influence~ cial to the continued good 
health of a democracy.0 
Furthermore, it is clear that aU public school teachers, and 
not just those responsible for teaching the courses mos:t 
directly related to government, history, and civic duties, should 
help fulfill the broader function of the public school system.10 
Most teachers, regardless of their specialty, may be called 
upon to teach other subjects, including those expressly dedi-
8 Although the findings of scholars who have written on the subject are 
not conclusive, tlwy generally reinforce the commonsense judgment, and 
the experience of most of us, that a teacher exerts considerable influence 
ov,er the development of fundamenta1 social attitudes in ;;tudent;;, including 
thos0 a.ttitude;; which in the broadest sense of the term may be vic>wed as 
political. See e. g. , R. Dawson & K. Prewitt, Political Socialization 
158-167 (1969); H. Hes,; & J. Torrwy, The Development of Political 
Attitudes in Children 162-163, 217-218 (1967). Cf. Note, Alien,;' Right 
to Teach: Political Socialization a1:d the Public Schools, 85 Yale L. J. 90, 
99-104 (1975) . 
0 Appellees coutcnd that restriction of an alien'::, freedom to tench in 
public :;chools is contrary to principles of divrrsity of thought and 
academic freedom embod:ed in the First Amendment. See also Note, 
supra, n. 8, at 106-109. We think the attempt to draw an analogy 
between choice of citizen~hip and political expre:,;sion or frpedom of 
association is wide of the mark, as the argument would bar any effort by 
thP State to promote particular va.lue,; and attitudes toward governmE'nt. 
Section :3001 (:3) does not inhibit aPiwllers from expressing freely their 
political or ,;ocial views or from a,;sociating with whomever they please. 
Cf. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist, - U. S. -, -
(1979); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle: 429 U. S. 274 (1977~. i-- /4,fl>,rl{...E6' 5 
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (19(i8). Nor are ~ 
~ di:;couraged from joining with other,; to advance particular political 
ends. Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, ;354 U. S. 479 ( 1957). The onl~· atl::erted 
lib::•rty of appellee8 withheld by the New York 8tatute is the opportunity 
to 1ectch in the Statr's school;; 80 long a8 they elect not to become citizens 
of thi;, country. This is not a liberty that i8 accorded con8titutional 
protection . 
10 At the primary ;;chool level, for which both appellec8 sought certifica-
tion, teachers are rc;,pon8ible for all of the hRsic curriculum. 
., 
' ' ; 
" " 
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cated to political and social subjects. 11 More importantly, a 
State properly may regard all teachers as having an obligation. 
to promote civic virtues and understanding in their classes, 
regardless of the subject taught. Certainly a State also may 
take account of a teacher's function as a role model, which 
exists independently of particular classroom subjects. In light 
of the foregoing considerations, we think it clear that public 
school teachers come well within the "governmental function" 
principle recognized in Sugarma:n and Foley. Accordingly, 
the Constitution requires only that a citizenship requirement 
applicable to teaching in the public schools bears a rational 
relationship to a legitimate state interest. 
III 
As the legitimacy of the State's interest in furthering the 
educational goals outlined above is undoubted, it remains only 
to consider whether § 3001 (3) bears a rational relationship 
to this interest. The restriction is carefully tailored to its 
purpose, as it bars from teaching only those aliens who have 
demonstrated their unwillingness to obtain United States citi-
zenship.12 Appellees, and aliens similarly situated, in effect 
have chosen to classify themselves. They prefer to retain 
citizenship in a foreign country with the obligations it entails 
of primary duty and loyalty.1'i They have rejected the open 
11 In New York, for exam pl 0 , all certified teachers, including those in the 
secondary schools, are required to be available for up to five hours of 
teaching a week in subject8 outside their specialty. 8 N. Y. Cede of 
Rules & Regulations §80.2 (c) . 
12 See n. 2, infra. 
rn As our cases hnve emphasized, resident alie11s pay taxes, serve in the 
armed forces , and ha,ve made 8ignificant, contributions to our country in 
private and public endeavors. See In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 722 
(1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 645 (1973); Graham v. 
Richardson, 40:3 U. S. 365, 376 (1971) . No doubt many of thrm, and 
we do not exclude appellres, would make excellent public school teachers. 
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invitation extended to qualify for eligibility to teach by 
applying for citizenship in this country. The people of New 
York, acting through their elected representatives, have made 
a judgment that citizenship should be a qualification for 
teaching the young of the State in the public schools, and 
§ 3001 (3) furthers that judgment.14 
Reversed. 
and local governments, see Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U. S. 483, 
493 (1954), may determine eligibility for the key position in discharging 
that funrtion on the assumption that generally persons who are citizens, 
or who have not declined the opportunity to seek United States citizenship, 
are better qualified than are those who have elected to remain aliens. 
We note in this connection that reguL1tions promulgated ptmuant to 
§ 3001 (3) do provide for situations whPre a particular alien's special 
qualification:,; as a teacher outweigh the policy primarily servied by the 
statutP. See 8 N. Y. Code of Rules & Regulations§ 80.2 (i) (1). The State 
informs us, however, that the authority conferred by this regulation ha.s 
not been exercised. Brief for Appellant 7 n. *. 
14 Appellees argue that the StatP cannot ra.tionally exclude aliens from 
teaching position:; and yet permit them to vote for and sit on certain 
local school boards. See App. 27, 29. We note, firnt, that the State's 
policy as to i:;ervice on school bonrds applie,;; only in New York City and 
only to aliens who also are parents of public school students. Further, 
the argument mi:;ronceives t,he distinction between the role and function 
of teachers and school board members. Although board members possess 
substantial responsibility for the adminiHtration of the schools, they teach 
no classes, and rarely if ever are known or identified by the students. It 
is true that local boards, within limits prescribed by the legislature and 
stato board of education, normally ;;elect or approve textbooks a11d 
instruction materials. Without minimizing this responsibility, it, is one 
nece~s:1rily discharged in large part by reliance on recommendations from 
profe~sional educators, including teachers. And as noted above, the 
textbook-particularly in the social ,-cienoe classroom-usually is less 
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MR. JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Cour~ 
This case presents the question whether a State ~- "' 
sistently with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, refuse to employ as elementary and secondary 
school teach~rs aliens who are eligible for . United States 
citizenship but who refuse to seek naturalization. 
I 
New York Education Law§ 3001 (3) forbids certification as 
a public school teacher of any person who is not a citizen of 
the United States, unless that person has manifested an 
intention to apply for citizenship.' The Commissioner of 
1 The sta.tute provides : 
"No person slrnll be employed or authorized to teach in the pnblic schools 
of this state who is: 
"a. Not a citizen. The provi,,fons of this subdivision sha.11 not apply, 
howevn, t.o an alien teacher now or h0reafter employed provided such 
teaclwr shall make due applica.tion to b0comf' a citizen and thereafter 
within the time prescribed by law shall b0come n citizen. The provisions 
of this subdivision ,;hall not apply after July first, nineteen hundred sixty-
seven, to an alien tea.cher employed pursuant, to rrgnlations adopted by 
' ' 
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Education is authorized to create exemptions from this prohi-
bition, and has done so with respect to aliens who are not yet 
eligible for citizenship. 2 Unless a teacher obta.ins certification, 
he Amay not work in a public elementary or secondary school 
in New York.3 
Appellee N orwick was born in Scotland and is a subject of 
Great Britain. She has resided in this country since 1965 and 
is married to a United States citizen. Appellee Dachinger 
is a Finnish subject who came to this country in 1966 and also 
is married to a United States citizen. Both Norwick and 
Dachinger currently meet all of the educational requirements 
New York has set for certification as a public school teacher, 
but th~y consistently have refused to seek citizenship in spite 
of their eligibility to do so. Norwick applied in 1973 for a 
the Commissioner of Education permitting such employment." N. Y. 
Educ. Law § 3001 (3) . 
The statute contains an exception for persons who are ineligible for United 
St.ates citizenship solely because of an overnubscribed quota.. Id., § 3001-a. 
Brcause this statutory provision is in all respects narrower than the 
exception provided by regulation, see n. 2, infra, as a practical matter it 
has no effect. 
The State does not cert.if.\· the qmLlifications of teachers in the private 
schools, although it does rrquire that such teachers be "competent." 
N. Y. Educ. Law§ 3204 (2) (McKinney 1970). Accordingly, we are not 
presented with the question of, and express no view as to, the permissi-
bility of a citizenship requirement pertaining to teachers in private schools. 
2 The following regulation goV1erns here: 
"Citizenship. A teacher who is not a citizen of the United States or who 
has not declared intention of becoming a citizen may be issued a. provi-
sional certificate providing such teacher hai:; the appropriate educational 
qualifications as defined in the regulations and ( 1) possesses skills or 
competencies not readily available among t,eachers holding citizenship, 
or (2) is unable to declare intention of becoming a citizen for valid 
statutory reasons." 8 N. Y. Code of RuleR and Regulationti § 80.2 (i) 
3 Certification by the Commis::;ioner of Education i::; not required of 
teachers at state institutions of higher education and the citizenship 
restriction a.ccordingly does not apply to them. Brief for Appell.ants 
13 n. *. 
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teaching certificate covering nursery school through sixth 
grade, and Dachinger s'ought a certificate covering the same 
grades in 1975! Both applications were denied because of 
appellees' failure to meet the requirements of § 3001 (3). 
Norwick then filed this suit seeking to enjoin the enforcement 
of§ 3001 (3), and Dachinger obtained leave to intervene as 
a plain tiff. 
A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 
U. S. C. § 2281. Applying the "close judicial scrutiny" stand-
ard of Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971), the 
court held that § 3001 (3) discriminated against aliens in vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause. 417 F. Supp. 913 
(SDNY 1976). The court believed that the statute was over-
broad, becam:e it excluded all resident aliens from all teaching 
jobs regardless of the subject sought to be taught, the alien's 
nationality, the nature of the alien's relationship to this coun-
try, and the alieu's willingness to substitute some other sign 
of loyalty to this Nation's political values, such as an oath 
of allegiance. Id., at 921. We noted probable jurisdiction 
· over the State's appeal, 436 U. S. 902 ( 1978), and now reverse. 
II 
A 
The decisions of this Court regarding the permissibility of 
statutory classifications involving aliens have not formed an 
unwavering line over the years. State regulation of the em-
ployment of aliens long has been subject to constitutional 
4 At the time of her application Norwick had not yet met, the post-
graduate educational requirements for a permanent certificate and accord-
ingly applied only for a temporary certificate, which also is governed by 
§ 3001 (3). She since has obtained t,he nece.s~ary graduate degree for full 
certification . Dachinger prrvioui,;ly had obtained a temporary certificate, 
which had lapsed at the time of her 1975 application. The record does 
not indicate whether Dachinger previously had declared an intent to 
obtain citizenship or had obtamed the temporary certificate because of 
somr applicablr rxcrpt1011 to the c1tizen::-hip requirement . 
4 
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constraints. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886), 
the Court struck down an ordinance which was applied to 
prevent aliens from running laundries. and in Truax v. Raich, 
239 U. S. 33 (1915), a law requiring at least 80% of the 
employees of certain businesses to be citizens was held to be 
an unconstitutional infringement of an a.lien's "right to work 
for a living in the common occupations of the community .... " 
Id., at 41. At the same time. however, the Court also has 
recognized a greater degree of latitude for the States when 
aliens were sought to be excluded from public employment. 
At the time Truax was decided, the governing doctrine per-
mitted States to exclude aliens from various activities when 
the restriction pertained to "the regulation or distribution of 
the public domain, or of the common property or resources of 
the people of the State, ... " Id., at 39. Hence, as part 
of a larger authority to forbid aliens from owning land, 
Frick v. Webb, 263 U. S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 
U. S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); 
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Blythe v. Hinkley, 
180 U. S. 333 (1901); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483 
(1880) , harvesting wildlife , Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 
U.S. 138 (1914); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877), 
or maintaining an inherently dangerous enterprise, Clarke v. 
Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 (1927), States permissibly could. 
exclude aliens from working on public construction projects, 
Crane v. New York, 239 U. S. 195 (1915). and, it appears, 
from engaging in any form of public employment at all, see 
Truax, at 40. 
Over time, the Court's decisions gradually have restricted 
the activities from which States are free to exclude aliens. 
The first sign that the Court would view with increased 
skepticism discrimination against a.liens even in areas affected 
with a "public interest" appeared in 'Oyama v. California, 332 
U. S. 633 (1948). The Court there held that statutory pre-
·s.umptions designed to discourage evasion of California's ban 
: ; 
.,. 
' , .. 
'· 
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on alien landholding discriminated against the citizen children 
of aliens. The same Term, the Court held that the "owner-
ship" a State exercises over fish found in its territorial waters 
"is inadequate to justify California in excluding a.ny or all 
aliens who are lawful residents of the State from making a 
living by fishing in the ocean off its shores while permitting 
all others to do so." Takahashi v. Fi.sh & Game Comm'n, 
334 U.S. 410, 421 (1948). This process of withdrawal from 
the former doctrine culminated in Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U. S. 365 ( 1971) , which for the first time treated classifica-
tions based on alienage as "inherently suspect and subject to 
close judicial scrutiny." Id., at 372. Applying Graham, this 
Court has struck down statutes that prevented aliens from 
entering a State's classified civil service, Sugarman v. Dougall, 
413 U. S. 634 (1973), practicing law, In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 
717 ( 1973) , working as an engineer, Examining Bd. v. Flores 
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), and receiving state educational 
benefits, Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). 
Although our more recent decisions have departed substan-
tially from the public interest doctrine of Truax's day, they 
have not abandoned the general principle that some state 
functions are so bound up with the operation of the State as 
a governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from those 
functions of all persons who have not become part of the 
process of self-government. In Sugarman, we recognized that 
a State could, "in an appropriately defined class of posi-
tions, require citizenship as a qualification for office." We 
went on to observe: 
"Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its obliga-
tion , already noted above, 'to preserve the basic concep-
tion of a political community. ' . . . And this power and 
responsibility of the State applies, not only to the 
qualifications of voters, but also to persons holding state· 
elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, 
and judicial positions, for officers who participate directly 
6 
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in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public 
policy perform functions that go to the heart of repre-
sentative government." Id., at 647 (citation omitted). 
The exclusion of aliens from such governmental positions 
would not invite as demanding scrutiny from this Court. 
Id., at 648. S-ee also -Nyquist v. Mauclet, supra, at 11; 
Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (Md. 1974), aff'd, 426 
u. s. 913 (1976) ~. --:--=-----~----.-.:-:---::-:--1 _,_ · _ d 
Applying-tm"S standard, we eld last Term that New York ~H,_t_ ~~
could exclude aliens from the ranks of its police force. Foley  
v. Connelie, 435 U. S. 291 (1978). Because the police func-
tion fulfilled "a most fundamental obligation of government 
to its constituency" and by necessity cloaked policemen with 
substantial discretionary powers, we viewed the police force 
as being one of those appropriately defined classes of positions 
for which a citize1iship requirement could be imposed. Id., 
at 297. Accordingly, the State was required to justify its 
classification only "by a showing of some rational relationship 
between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting 
classification." Id., at 296. 
The rule for governmental functions, which is an exception 
to the general standard applicable to classifications based on 
alienage, rests on important principles inherent in the Consti-
tution. The distinction between citizens and aliens, though 
ordinarily irrelevant to private activity, is fundamental to the 
definition and government of a State. The Constitution itself 
refers to the distinction no less than 11 times, see Sugarman v. 
Dougall, supra, at 651-652 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), indi-
cating that the status of citizenship was meant to have signifi-
cance in the structure of our government. The assumption 
of that status, whether by birth or naturalization, denotes an 
association with the polity which, in a democratic republic, 
exercises the powers of governance. See Foley v. Connelie, 
supra, at 295. The form of this association is important: an 
{)ath of allegiance or similar ceremony cannot substitute for 
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the unequivocal legal bond citizenship represents. It is be-
cause of this special significance of citizenship that govern-
mental entities, when exercising the functions of government, 
have wider latitude in limiting the participation of noncitizens.5 
B 
In determining whether teaching in public schools consti-
tutes a governmental functionc.that..may ..he limited to citizen . 
we look to the role of public education in our democratic 
society and to the degree of responsibility and discretion 
teachers possess in fulfilling that role. See id., at 297. Each 
of these considerations supports the conclusion that public 
school teachers may be regarded as performing a task "that 
go [ es] to the heart of representative government." Sugar-
man v. Dougall, supra, at 647. 
Public education, like the police function, "fulfills a most 
fundamental obligation of government to its constituency.'; 
Foley, at 297. The importance of public schools in the 
preparation of individuals for participation in our democratic 
society, and in the preservation of the values on which this 
society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions: 
"Today, education is perhaps the most important func-
tion of state and local governments. Compulsory school 
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education 
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of 
education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, 
even service in the armed forces. It is the very founda-
"That the significance of citizen~hip has con~tit.utional dimensions also 
has been recognized by several of our clecisiom,. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86 (1958), a plurality of the Court held that. the expatriation of an 
American citizen constitut,ed rruf'l and unu;;ual punishment for the crime 
of desertion in time of war. In Afruyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), 
the Court. held that thf' Con,,tit.ution forbade Congre::;s from depriving ti 
pen;on of his citizfn:,;hip against his will for a.ny rt>ason. 
8 
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tion of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instru-
ment in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in 
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.'' 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 246 (1973) 
(POWELL, J., concurring); San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. 29-30 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U. S. 205, 213 (1972); id., at 238-239 (WHITE, J., concur-
ring); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 230 
(1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Adler v. Board of Edt(,ca-
tion, 342 U. S. 485, 493 (1952); McCollum v. Board of 
Education, 333 U. S. 203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J .. con-
curring); Pierce v. SoC'iety of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Interstate Con-
solidated Street R. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79 (1907).0 
Other authorities have perceived public schools as an "assimi-
lative force" by which diverse and conflicting elements in our 
society are brought together on a broad but common ground. 
See, e. g., J. Dewey, Democracy and Education 26 (1929); 
N. Edwards & H. Richey, The School in the American Social 
Order 623-624 ( 1963). These perceptions of the public 
schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the 
maintenance of a "democratic political system have been con .. 
firmed by the observations of social scieµtists. See R. Dawson 
& K. Prewitt, Political Socialization 146-167 (1969); R. Hess 
& J. Tomey, The Development of Political Attitudes in 
6 As San Anton-io Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra, recognized, 
there is no inconsi;;tency betwren our rrcognition of the vital significance 
of public education and our holding that. access to education does not 
constitute a fundamrntal right for purposes of the Equal ProtPction 
Clause. We observed in Rodriguez that "social importance is not the 
critical dctenninant, for subjerting state legisla,tion to strict scrutiny~•• 
fr//.,. at 32. 
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Children 114, 158-171, 217-220 ( 1967); V. 0. Key, Public 
Opinion and American Democracy 323-343 ( 1961) .7 
Within the public school system. teachers play a critical 
part in developing students' attitude toward government and 
understanding of the role of citizens in our society. Alone 
among employees of the system, teachers are in direct, day-to-
day contact with students both in the classrooms and in the 
other varied activities of a modern school. In shaping the 
students' experience to achieve educational goals, teachers by 
necessity have wide discretion over the way the course ma-
terial is communicated to students. They are responsible for 
presenting and explaining the subject ma.tter in a way that is 
both comprehensible and inspiring. No amount of standard-
ization of teaching materials or lesson plans can eliminate 
the personal qualities a teacher brings to bear in achieving 
these goals. Further, a teacher serves as a role model for his 
students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their 
perceptions and values. Thus. through both the presentation 
of course materials and the example he se s. a teac er as an 
opportunity to m uen · @tsw~etits' attitudes w gov-
ernment, the political process, and a citizen's social responsi-
7 The curricular rrquirrment::; of , ew York public school system reflect 
some of the ways a public :,;chool system promote::; the development of the 
understanding that is prerequisite to intelligent, participation in the 
democratic procc,-i:;. The schools arc required to provide instruction "to 
promote a spirit of patriotic and civic service and obligatjon and to foster 
in t.!1e children of thr statr moral and intellectual qualities which are 
essential in preparing to meet the obligations of citizenship in peace or in 
war, ... " N. Y. Educ. L. § 801 (1) (:\,fr Kinney 1970). Flag and other 
pat riotir cxerciHPS niHo are pre:;cribcd, as loyalty is a characteri:;tic of 
citizen"hip Msentml to the pre:servation of a country. Id., § 802. In addi-
tion , required coursr:s include clas:;e~ in civics, United States and New York 
history, and principle;; of Ammcan government. Id., § 3204 (8) (a) (1), (2). 
Although private srhoob also are bound by most, of the,;c• requirements, 
the State hm, n. ,-tronger intrre~t, iu en:suring th,it the schools it most 
directl~· cont rob, and for wl11rh it hear~ the cost., are a~ effectjve as 
possihlr m tRnrhini:t the~e rour.~,1~. 
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bilities. 8 This influence, is crucial to the continued good 
health of a democracy.9 o--
Furthermore, it is clear that aU public school teachers, and 
not just those responsible for teaching the courses most 
directly related to government, history, and civic duties, should 
help fulfill the broader function of the public school system.10 
Most teachers, regardless of their specialty, may be ca.lled 
upon to teach other subjects, inchiding those expressly dedi-
8 Although the finding,; of ::;cholars who have written on the subject are 
not, conclusive, th<>y generally reinforce the commonsense judgment, and 
the experience of mo::;t of us, that a teacher exerts considerable influence 
ovier the development of fundamental social attitudes in student;;, including 
those attitudes which in the broadest sense of the term may be viewed as 
political. See e. g., R. Dawson & K. Prewitt, Political Socialization 
158--167 (1969); H. Hess & J. Torney, The Development of Political 
Attit11des in Children Hi2-163, 217-218 (1967). Cf. Note, Aliens' Right 
tu Teach: Political Socialization and the Public Schools, 85 Yale L. J. 90, 
. 99-104 (1975) . 
0 Appellees contend that re::;triction of an alien's freedom to teach in 
public ::;chool::, h, contrary to principle:s of diversity of thought and 
academic freedom embud:ecl in the First Amendment.. Sre also Note, 
supra, n . 8, at 106-109. We think the attrmpt to draw an analogy 
bet.ween choice of citizentihip and political expre:ssion or frredom of 
association is wide of the mark, as the argument would bar any effort by 
thP State to promote particular value:s and attitudes toward governmen . 
Section 3001 (3) does not inhibit appellee::; from expressing freely their 
political or ::;ocial views or from a:ssociating with whomever they please. 
Cf. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist, - U. S. -, -
(1979); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977); 
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 5(13 (1968). Nor are ~ 
sa~ di:scouraged from joining with other:s to advance particular political -:)--
ends. Cf. Shelton v. 'Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 ( 1957). The only as2erted 
lib::,rty of appellee:s withheld by the New York 8tatute is the opportunity 
to teach in the State's school::; so Jong as they elect not to become citizens 
of this country. This is uut a liberty that is accorded con::;titutional 
protection. 
10 At thr primary ::;chool level, for which both appellees sought certifica-
tion, teacher:; are responsib\,e for all of thr basic curriculum. 
... . , 
.,-J 
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cated to political and social subjects.11 More importantly, a 
State properly may rega.rd all teachers as having an obligation, 
to promote civic virtues and understanding in their classes, 
regardless of the subject taught. Certainly a State also may 
take account of a teacher's function as a role model, which 
exists independently of particular classroom subjects. In light 
of the foregoing considerations, we think it clear that pubUc 
school teachers come well within the "governmental function" 
principle recognized in Sugarman and Foley. Accordingly, 
the Constitution requires only that a citizenship requirement 
applicable to teaching in the public schools bears a rational 
relationship to a legitimate state iHterest. - ---------
III 
As the legitimacy of the State's interest in furthering the 
educational goals outlined above is undoubted, it remains only 
to consider whether § 3001 (3) bears a rational relationship 
to this interest. The restriction is carefully 4:ailgred;tM its 
purpose, as it bars from teaching only those aliens who have 
demonstrated their unwillingness to obtain United States citi-
zenship.12 Appellees, and alieus similarly situated, in effect 
have chosen to classify themselves. They prefer to retain 
citizenship in a foreign country with the obligations it entails 
of primary duty and loya]ty.1:i They have rejected the open 
11 In New York, for example, all certified teachers, including those in the 
secondary schools, are required to be available for up to five hours of 
teaching a week in subjects outside their specialty. 8 N. Y. Code of 
Ruleoi & Regulations § 80.2 (c) . 
12 See n. 2, infra. 
1 " As our case::; lmve emphasized, resident aliens pay taxes, serve in the 
armed forces, and have made significant, contributions to our country in 
private and publir endeavors. See In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 722 
(1973); Sugarman v. DougaU, 413 U. S. 634, 645 (1973); Graham v. 
Richardson, 40:3 U. S. 365, 376 (19il). No doubt many of them, and 
we do not exclude appellees, would makr excellent public school teachers. 
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invitation extended to qualify for eligibility to teach by 
applying for citizenship in this country. The people of New 
York, acting through their elected representatives, have made 
a judgment that citizenship should be a qualification for 
teaching the young of the State iu the public schools, and 
§ 3001 (3) furthers that judgment.14 
Reversed. 
and local governments, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 
493 (1954), may detit>rmine eligibility for the key position in discharging 
that function on the assumption that generally persons who are citizens, 
or who have not declined the opportunity to seek United States citizenship, 
are better qualified than are those who have elected to remain aliens. 
We note in this connection that regulations promulgated pursuant to 
§ 3001 (3) do provide for situations where a particular alien's special 
qualifications as a tt>acher outweigh the policy primarily served by the 
statute. See 8 N. Y. Code of Rules & Regulations§ 80.2 (i) (1). The State 
informs us, however, that the authority conferred by this regulation has 
not been exercised. Brief for Appellant 7 11. *. 
14 Appellees argue that the State cannot rationally exclude aliens from 
teaching positions and yet permit them to vote for and sit on certain 
local school boards. See App. 27, 29. We note, first, that the State's 
policy as to service on school boards applies only in New York City and 
only to aliens who also are parents of public school students. Further, 
the argument misconceives the distinction between the role and function 
of teachers and school poard members. Although boa.rd rµembers possess 
substantial responsibility for the administration of the schools, they teach 
no classes, and rarely if ever are known or identified by the students. It 
is true that local boards, within limits prescribed by the legislature and 
state board of education, normally select or approve textbooks and 
instruction materials. Without minimizing this responsibility, it is one 
necess:trily discharged in large part by reliance on recommendations from 
professional educators, including teachers. And as noted above, the 
textbook-particularly in the social science cla8Sroom-usually is less 
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SUPIKMK COURT OF THE UNITED STATffi 
No. 76-808 
Gordon M. Ambach, Individually 
nml as C'-0rnmissioner of the 
New York State Depart-
ment of Education. 
et al., Appellants, 
v. 
On Appeal from the 
United States District 
Court for the Southern 
District of New York. 
Susan M . W. Norwick et al. 
[February -, 1979] 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a State, consist-
ently with thf' Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. may refusf' to employ as elementary and secoud-
ary school teachers aliens who are eligible for United States 
citizenship but who refuse to seek naturalization. 
I 
New York Education Law~ 3001 (3) forbids certification as 
a public school teacher of any person who is not a citizen of 
the United States, unless that person has manifested an 
intention to apply for citizenship.1 The Commissioner of 
1 The statute proYides: 
"No pcr~on :;hall be employed or authorized to teach in the public schools 
of thi:-: state who is: 
"3. Not a cit izm. The provi,:ioub of thb subdivision shall not apply, 
however, to an alien teacher uow or hereafter employed provided such 
tt>achcr ;,hall make due application to become a citizen and thereafter 
within the time prescribed by la.w :;hall brcome a, citizen. The provisions 
of this subdivision shall not aJJply after July fir:;t, nineteen hundred sixty-
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Education is authorized to create exemptions from this prohi-
bition, and has done so ,vith respect to aliens who are not yet 
eligible for citiienship.1 Unless a teacher obtains certification, 
he may not work in a public elementary or secondary school 
in New York.3 
Appellee Norwick was born in Scotland and is a subject of 
Great Britain. She has resided in this country since 1965 and 
is married to a United States citizen. Appellee Dachinger 
is a Finnish subject who came to this country in 1966 and also 
is married to a, United States citizen. Both Norwick and 
Dachi11ger currently meet all of the educational requirements 
New York has set for certification as a public school teacher, 
but they consistently have refused to seek citizenship iii spite 
of their eligibility to do so. Norwick applied in 1973 for a 
the Commi,.;,;ioncr of :E:duca tion 1wrmitting such employment ." N. Y. 
Educ. Law §3001 (3). 
The sta.tute contain" an f'Xcrption for per~om, who arf' ineligible for United 
Stat.e" citizt>n,;hip solely beC'attS<" of an ovC'r~11bt:icribed quota.. Id., § 3001-a.. 
H~wa.u,ie t.l1is /:, ta tutory provi,;ion .is ill all re::,pect::; narrower than the 
exception provided by regulation , :,;ee 11. 2, infra, as a practical ma.tter it 
has no effect. 
The State doe,; not certify the qualification,; of teacher::; in the private 
schools, although it, r!Of':'l requirf' tlrnt "ueh tearlwr,; be ·'<'ompeteut." 
N. Y. Educ. Law§ 3204 (2) (.McKinney 1970) . Accordingly, we are not 
presf'nted with the qm'stion of, and expres,; no view a,; to, the p<•rmissi-
bility of a citizenship requirf'ment pertaining to teachers in private i,chools. 
2 The following regulation gov,ern,; herf' : 
"Citizenship. A teacher who is not a citizen of the United States or who 
has not declared iutPntion of becoming a citizen ma.y be i8.':ittf'd a. provi-
sional certificate providing such teacher ha.~ the appropriatf' educational 
qualifications a;; defirwd in the rPgulntion:< and (1) posses;,e::; ,,kill,, or 
comprteucies not readily av,Lila ble among t,eacher;, holding citizeuship, 
or (2) i;, unable to declare intmtiou of becoming a, citizen for valid 
:Sta.tutor~· rc•aso11s." R N. Y. Code of Hules. and HegulH tion;, § 80.2 (i) 
3 CPrtification br the Commis,;ioner of Education is not reqt1ired of 
teachn:,; at. state inst,itution:,; of higllf'r t'<l11cation and the citizenship 
rest riction accordingly does not apply to them. Brief for Appellants.. 
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teaching certificate covering nursery school through sixth 
grade, and Dachinger sought a certificate covering the same 
grades in 1975." Both applications were denied because of 
appellees' failure to meet the requirements of § 3001 (3). 
Norwick then filed this suit seeking to enjoin the enforcement 
of § 3001 (3), and Dachinger obtained leave to intervene a,s 
a plaintiff. 
A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 
U. S. C. ~ 2281. Applying the "close judicial scrutiny" stand-
ard of Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 ( 1971), the 
court held that ~ 3001 (3) discriminated against aliens in vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause. 417 F. Supp. 913 
(SDNY 1976). The court believed that the statute was over-
broad, because it excluded all resident aliens from all teaching 
jobs regardless of the subject sought to be taught, the alien's 
nationality, the nature of the alien's relationship to this coun-
try, and the alien's willingness to substitute some other sign 
of loyalty to this Nation's political values, such as an oath 
of allegiance. Id., at 921. We noted probable jurisdiction 
over the State's appeal, 436 U.S. 902 (1978), and now reverse. 
II 
A 
The decisions of this Court regarding the permissibility of 
statutory classifications involving aliens have not formed an 
unwavering line over the years. State regulation of the em-
ployment of aliens long has been subject to constitutional 
'1 At the time oi her application Norwick had not yet met, the post-
graduat.e educational requirement:; for a permanent certificate and accord-
ingly applied only for a temporary certificate, which abo i::: govemed by 
§ 3001 (a). She since has obtained the necc:::sary graduate degree for full 
certification . DachingPr previously had obtained a. temporary certificatl', 
which had lapsed Ht the time of her 1975 application. Tim n'cord does 
not, indicate whet her DachingPr previously had declared an intent to 
obtain citizenship or had obtained the temporary certificate becnu~e of 
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constraints. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886), 
the Court struck down an ordinance which was applied to 
prevent aliens from running laundries. aml in Truax v. Raich, 
239 U. S. 33 (1915), a law requiring at least 80% of the 
employees of certain businesses to be citizens was held to be 
an unconstitutional infringement of an alien's "right to work 
for a living in the common occupations of the community .... " 
Id., at 41. At the same time, however. the Court also has 
recognized a greater degree of latitude for the States when 
aliens were sought to be excluded from public employment. 
At the time Truax was decided, the governing doctrine per-
mitted States to exclude aliens from various activities when 
the restriction pertained to "the regulatio11 or distribution of 
the public domain , or of the common property or resources of 
the people of the State, . . . " Id., at 39. Hence, as part 
of a larger authority to forbid aliens from owning land, 
Frick v. Webb, 263 U. S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 
U. S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); 
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 ( 1923); Blythe v. Hinkley, 
180 F. S. 333 (1901); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483 
(1880), harvesting wildlife, Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 
U.S. 138 (1914); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877), . 
or maintainiug an inherently dangerous enterprise. Clarke v. 
Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 (1927). States permissibly could 
exclude aliens from working on public construction projects, 
Crane v. New York, 239 U. S. 195 (1915), and, it appears, 
from engaging in any form of public employment at all, see 
Truax, at 40. 
Over time, the Court's decisions gradually have restricted 
the activities from which States are free to exclude aliens. 
The first sign that the Court would question the co11stitu-
tio11ality of discri111iuatio11 agia11st aliens even in areas affected 
with a "public interest" appeared in Oyarna v. California, 332 
U. S. 633 (1948). The Court there held that statutory pre-
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on alien landholding discriminated against the citizen children 
of aliens. The same Term, the Court held that the "owner-
ship" a State exercises over fish found in its territorial waters 
"is inadequate to justify California in excluding any or all 
aliens who are la.wful residents of the State from making a 
living by fishing in the ocean off its shores while permitting 
all others to do so." 'l'akahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 
334 U. S. 410, 421 (1948). This process of withdrawal from 
the former doctrine culminated in Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U. S. 365 ( 1971), which for the first time treated classifica-
tions based on alienage as "inherently suspect and subject to 
close judicial scrutiny." Id., at 372. Applying Graham, this 
Court has held in valid statutes that preveutcd aliens from 
entering a State's classified civil service, Sugarman v. Dougall, 
413 l1. S. 634 (1973), practicing law, In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 
717 (1973). working as an engineer, Examining Bd. v. Flores 
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), and receiving state educational 
benefits, Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). 
Although our more recent decisions have departed substan-
tially from the public interest doctrine of Truax's day, they 
have not abandoned the general principle that some state 
functions are so bound up with the operation of the State as 
a governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from those 
fuuctions of all persons who have not become part of the 
process of self-government. In Sugarman, we recognized that 
2. State could, "in an appropriately defined class of posi-
ti011s. require citizenship as a qualification for office." We 
went on to observe : 
"Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its obliga.-
t10n, already noted above, 'to preserve the basic concep-
tion of a political community.' . . . And this power and 
responsibility of the State applies. not only to the 
qualifications of voters, but also to persons holding sta.te 
elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, 
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in the formulation. execution, or review of broad public 
policy perform functions that go to the heart of repre-
sentative goV('rnment." Id., at 647 (citation omitted). 
The Pxclusion of aliens from such governmental positions 
· would not invite as demanding scrutiny from this Court. 
Id., at 648. See also Nyquist v. Mauclet, supra, at 11; 
Perkins v. S'/11,ith , 370 F. Supp. 134 (Md. 1974), aff'd, 426 
u. s. 913 (1976) . 
Applyi11g tlw rational basis standard. WP lwld last TPrm that 
Kew York could C'xcl ude aliPns from the' ranks of its police 
forcC' . Foley\' . ('01111elie, 43.'i C ~. 291 ( Hl78). Bc,cause the 
polic<' function fulfill<'<! "a most fundarnpntal obligatiou of 
gov<'r1111w11t to its constitue11cy'' and by nPcPssity cloaked 
police111c•n with substantial discretionary powns. we viewed 
the police fore<' as b<•ing on<· of thos<:' appropriately defined 
classes of positions for which a citizellship requirement could 
he imposPd. Id., at 2\.)7. .\ccordingly, thl' State was required 
to .i ustify its classification only "by a showing of some ratio11al 
relationship lwtw('C'n thP i11tcrest sought to b1' protf'cted and 
the limiti 11g classificatio11. ., Id .. at 296. 
The rule for governmental functions , which is an exception 
to the gf'neral standard applicablf' to classifications based on 
alic11age, rests on important priuciples inherent in the Consti-
tution. Tlw distinction bf'tweell citizens and aliens, though 
ordinarily irrelevant to private activity, is fundamental to the 
definition and government of a State. The C'oustitution itself 
refers to the distinction no less than 11 times, see Sugarman v. 
Dougall, s-upra, at 651- 652 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). indi-
cating that the status of citizenship was meant to have signifi-
cance in thr structure of our government. The assumption 
of that status. whether by birth or naturalizatiou, denotes an 
association with thf' polity which , in a democratic republic, 
exercises the powers of govPrnancr. See Foley v. Connelie, 
supra, at 295. The form of this association is important: an 
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the uuequivocal legal bond citizenship represents. It is be-
cause of this special significance of citizenship that govern-
mental entities, when exercising the functions of government, 
have wider latitude in limiting the participation of noncitizens.5 
B 
In deterrniniug whether, for purposes of equal protection 
analysis, teaching in public schools constitutes a governmental 
fuuctio,i. we look to the role of public education and to the 
degree of responsibility and discretion teachers possess in ful-
filling that role. See id., at 297. Each of these considerations 
supports the' conelusio11 that public school teachers may be 
regarded as p('rfonning a task "that goles] to the heart of 
represC'utative government." Sugarman v. Douyall, supra,, 
at 647. 
Public education, like the police function, "fulfills a most 
fmidamental obligation of government to its constituency." 
Foley, at 297. The importance of public schools in the 
preparatioll of individuals for participation as citizens, and 
in the preservation of tht• values on which our soci<"ty rests, 
long has beell recognized by our decisions: 
"Today, education is p<"rhaps the most important func-
tion of state and local governments. Compulsory school 
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education 
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of 
education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, 
even service in the armed forces. It is the very founda-
" That the significance of citizen:,;hlp has con~tit.utional dimensions also 
has been recognized by several of our decisions. In 'Prop v. D'Ulles, 356 
U. S. 86 (1958), a, plurality of the Court held thai the expatriation of a11 
American citizen const1tut,ed cruel and unusual punishment for the crime 
of desert10n in time of war. In Afroyim v. R'U,Sk, 387 lT . S. 253 (1967), 
the Court, held tha1, the Constit,ul10n forbade Congre8s from depriving a 
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tion of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instru-
ment in awakening the child to cultural values. in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in 
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.'' 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483. 493 (1954). 
See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189,246 (1973) 
(POWELL, J., concurring); Sa:n Antonio Ind. School D·ist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1_, 29-30 (H)73); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U. S. 205, 213 (1972); id., at 238-239 (WHITE, J., concur-
ring); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 230 
(1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Adler v. Board of Educa-
tion, 342 U. S. 485, 493 (1952); McCollurn v. Board of 
Education, 333 U. S. 203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); 
Meyer v. 1\'ebraska, 262 U. S. 390 ( 1923); Interstate Con-
solidated Street R. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79 (1907).0 
Other authorities have perceived public schools as an "assimi-
lative force" by which diverse and conflicting elements in our 
society a.re brought together Oll a broad but common ground. 
See. e. y., J. Dewey, Democracy and Education 26 (1929); 
N. Edwards & H. Richey, The School in the American Social 
Order 623- 624 ( 1963). These perceptions of the public 
schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the 
maintenance of a democratic political system have bee11 con-
firmed by the observations of social scientists. See R. Dawson 
& K. Prewitt, Political Socialization 146-167 (1969); R. Hess 
& J. Tomey, The Development of Political Attitudes in 
Children 114, 158-171, 217-220 (1967); V. 0. Key, Public 
Opinion and American Democracy 323-343 (1961).7 
n A,, San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez. supra, recognized, 
there is no incon~istency between our rPcognition of the vital :;ignificance 
of public C'd11ent1011 and om holdiug that ac·res;; to <·clurnt10n j,.; 1101 g11arnn-
t<'<'<l IJ.,· thr Con:;tit11t1011. Id., ,it :30-:35. 
7 The c11nic11lar n'quirement:; of New York public school sy8tem reflect 
some of the ways a public r;,chool ,y:;t('m promoteB the development of the 
. ..... ,,. 
' :i.,. 
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Within the public school system, teachers play a critical 
part in developing students' attitude toward government and 
understanding of the role of citizens in our society. Alone 
among employees of the system, teachers are in direct, day-to-
day contact with students both in the classrooms and in the 
other varied activities of a modern school. In shaping the 
students' experience to achieve educational goals. teachers by 
necessity have wide discretion over the way the course ma-
terial is communicated to students. They are responsible for 
presenting and explaining the subject matter in a way that is 
both comprehensible a11d iuspiring. No amouut of standard-
ization of teaching materials or lesson plans can eliminate 
the personal qualities a teacher brings to bear in achieving 
these goals. Further, a teacher serves as a role model for his 
students. exerting a subtle but important influence over their 
perceptions and values. Thus. through both the presentation 
of course materials and the example he sets, a teacher has an 
opportunity to influ{'11ce th{' attitudes of students toward gov-
ernment. the political process, and a citizen's social responsi-
bilit1es.k This infiue11c(' is erucial to the continued good 
health of a democracy.') 
uncler~tandmg that id prerrquis1t,e to intelligent. part1c1pat10n in the 
democratic. procr,;s. The ::<C'hoob are rrq11ired to provide 1rn,trnction "to 
promote a SJ)ll'it, of patriotit and C'ivic· 8erv1ce and obligatjon and to fo8ter 
m thr eluldrC'n of tlw ~late moral and intellrrtual qunlitm, which are 
p,;"ential in pn•parmg to mPPt thC' obligation" of citizenship in pC'aCP or in 
war, . . .' X. Y. Educ. L. § 801 (1) (:\,fcKinnp~· 1!1i0). Flag aml other 
pat notic C'X<'l'CI><rs a],;o arC' prr,;cribed. a;-; loyalty is a ehararteri;-;tie of 
e1t1zpn,;l11p r,;8entrnl to tlH' Jll'PHPrvation of a count r~·. Id .. § 802. In addi-
tion. n•q1111·pd cour,;e,; 111cl11d(• C'la""l'" in e1vic:,;, United Statr~ and X<·w York 
h1"tury. and prmciple,; of AmPnc·an government. Id .. § :{20-! (3) (a) ( 1), (2). 
Although privatP ,.;('boo],; also are bound hy most, of the,;t' n•quin'ments, 
tho StatC' ha" a ,;1ronger 111lC're,;l in Pll><Uring that th<' Hl'hools it mo"t 
dm·etl~· eoutro],;, nml for whid1 1t bear,- the rosl, arc ai,; efkctive HS 
po,;s1blC' 111 lPaehmg the"C' c•our,.;(•:-
~ Although the find111!!:·' or ,.;cholars who havt> wnlten on thr suh.Jl'<"t arts 
I Pool 110/ t' .'J ,s 011 Ji 1(1 J 
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Furthermore, it is clear that all public school teachers, and 
not just those responsible for teaching the courses most 
directly related to government. history. an<l civic duties, shoul<l 
help fulfill the broader function of the public school system.10 
Teachers, regar<lless of their specialty. may be calle<l upou 
to teach other subjects, inclu<liug those expressly dedicate<l 
to political and social subJects. 11 More importantly, a State 
not conclu,;ivP, 11wr grnrrnlly reinforce the commonsen::;e judgmen1, an<l 
the cxprriC'nce of most of us, that a teacher exert:; com;iclerablr influencr 
ovier the ck•velopmrnt. of fm•damental ::;orial attitudr:,; in ;,tudent::;, including 
tho:,;r attitude•,; which m the broadrft ::;rn:;(' of the trrm may be viewPd a,-
political. Sc•c e. (I. , H. Dnw~on & K. l'rrwitt. Politicnl Socialization 
158-Hii (Hlti!l); H. He·~,, c\: .J. Torn<•y. Tlw DPvc•lo1rn1ent of l'ohtical 
Attitude:,, in Children 162-163, 217-218 (1967). Cf. Xotc, Aliens' Hight 
to Teaeh : Poli1ic-al Soctahzation and the Public Schoob, 85 Yalr L. J . 90, 
91J-104 ( 197,5) 
0 Appellrp::; eo1itend that re,;tndwn of an alien's freeclcm to teach m 
publie :,;ehool::; i,; eo11trary to principle•;, of divPr::;ity of thought and 
ncadrmic frc•Pdom embod:e<l m t hr First AmendmPnt. See also Note, 
su71ra, 11. 8, at lOG-109. WP thi11k the Httempt to draw an a11alogy 
betwern choiro of citizen:;hip and political expre::,sion or frredom of 
a:;sociation i~ widP of the mark, a:; tlw argument would bar any effort by 
thP State to promote particular valur;:; and attitudes toward gowrnnwnt. 
Sect10n ::!001 (:3) clors 11ot inhibit appellre:; from rxpn->:;:;ing frrely their 
politiC"al or .,oc ial virws or from associating with whonwver they plea~e. 
Cf. Givhan ,·. Westem Li11e Consol. School Dist, - U. S. -, -
(HJ79); Mt. Ilea/thy City 8clwol Dist. \'. Doyle. 4:29 l 1. S. :274 (1977); 
Pirkeri11r, ,·. Board of Education , ;391 l 1. S. 5(i:{ (19{iH). '.\or arC' apprl-
lPe;:; di:-;eouraged from joining with other::; to adv1111ee particular political 
Pnds. C'f'. Shelton ,·. 'l'urker. :3f-i4 F. S. 479 (1957). ThP only a,;: crted 
librrt~· of appPJlC'e:,; withheld b~: tlw Nrw York :,;tatute ii:; the opportumty 
to t('arh in the State's :,;choob so long a~ the~· Pleet not to brcomr citizen::, 
of thi,; eountry. Thi,; i:,; not a liberty that i:,; accorded con,;titutional 
protc•dio11 
1" At, thP primary ,:chool levrl, for which both appellee:; sought certifica-
tion, teaclwr,; arp n•:-pon:,;ible for all of the hasie curriculum. 
11 ln ;\'rw York, for Pxample, all crrtifird teacher::;, including tho::;e in the 
sc•coudar~· srhool,;, an• required to be• availablc' for up to fiv(' hours of 
tearhing a wc•(•k m ;,ub.i<'ct,; out,;idr their specialty 8 K .. Y. Cede of 
Hu]p,; & He,i;ulation" § X0.:2 (c) 
' I 
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properly may regard all teachers as having an obligatioH 
to promote civic virtues and understanding in their classes, 
regardless of the subject taught. Certainly a State also may 
take account of a teacher's function as an example for stu-
dents, which exists independeutly of particular classroom sub-
jects. lu light of the foregoing collsiderations. we think it 
clear that public school teachers come well within the "govern-
mental function'' principle recognized in Sugarman and Foley. 
Accordingly, the Constitution requires ouly that a citizellship 
requireme11t applicable to teaching in the public schools bears 
a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. See 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 
314 (1976). 
Ill 
As the legitimacy of the State's interest in furthering the 
educational goals outlined above is undoubted, it remains only 
to consider whether § 3001 (3) bears a rational relationship 
to this in tcrest. The restriction is carefully framed to serve its 
purpose, as it bars from teaching only those aliens who have 
demonstrated their unwillingness to obtain United States citi-
zensh:p.12 Appellees, and aliens similarly situated, in effect 
have chosen to classify themselves. They prefer to retain 
citizenship in a foreign country with the obligations it entails 
of primary duty and loyalty.1a They have rejected the open 
1.~ Seen. 2, infra. 
13 As our cases have emphasized, resident aliers pay taxes, servr in the 
'/urned forces. and have made :;ignificant, contributions to our country in 
private and public endea.vorn. See In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 722 
(1973); Sugarman v. Dougal,{, 413 U. S. 634, 645 (1973); Graharn v. 
Richardson, -10;3 U. S. 365, :376 ( 1!:)71). No doubt many of them, and 
we do not exclude appellee:;, would make excellent public school teachern. 
But the leg1~Iaturc, having in mind the importance of eduration to state 
and local government~, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 
493 (1954), may clrt,ermine eligibility for the key position iu discharging 
·that function on the a8sumpt1011 that generally person~ who are citizens, 
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invitation extended to qualify for eligibility to teach by 
applying for citizenship in this country. The people of New 
York, acting through their elected representatives, have made 
a judgment that citizenship should be a qualification for 
teaching the young of the State in the public schools, and 
§ 3001 (3) furthers that judgment.1 '1 
Reversed. 
are better qualified than are those who have elected to remain aliens. 
We note in this connection that regulations promulgated pursuant to 
§ 3001 (3) do provide for Hituations where a particular alien's special 
qualificaticns as a teacher outweigh the policy primarily served by the 
statutP. See 8 N. Y. Code of RuleH & Regulations§ 80.:.! (i) ( 1). The State 
informs us, however, that the authority conferred by this regulation has 
not been exercised. Brief for Appellant 7 n . *. 
14 Appellees argue that the State eannot rationally exclude aliens from 
teaching position.· and yet prrmit them to vote for and sit on certain 
local school boards. Sec App. 27, 29. We note, first, that the State's 
policy as to service on school boards applies only in New York City and 
only to aliens who ali;-o are parents of public school students . Further, 
the argument misconceives the distinction between the role and function 
of teacher,; and school board members. Although board members possess 
substantial responsibility for the administration of the schools, they teach 
no classes, and ra.rely if ever are known or identified by the students. It 
j;; true that in many jurisdietion~ local board:,;, within limits prn;cribrd b~· 
the legislature and stat<' board of rducation, arr involved in the selrction 
or :ipprornl of trxtbookH and instruction matNiab. Without minimizing 
thi,, rrsponsibility, it is onr oftrn di"rharged iu large part by r('liance Oil 
recommendation::, from profr:s,;ional educator:s, i11cl11diug teachrrs. And a:s 
notrd abov<', it i~ not irrational for N'Pw York to ronrluclr that trxtbooh-
JH1rticularl)· ill thr ~ocial ~cirncr cla::l8room-may be le:ss influe11tial than 
how th(' m_atrrial therrin i:,; taught and intrrprrted by the teaeh('r . 
... 
Chief: 
Thank you for your letter commenting on fn 14 
my opinion. 
As Harry is writing a dissent, and probably will 
address the school board argument (relied upon by 
appellees), I will await his circulation before making any 
change in my note. 










To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Kr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
M~. Ju~tice Stevens 
From: Mr. Justice Black.mun 
No. 76-808 - Ambach v. Norwick 
MR. JUST ICE BLACKMUN, dissenting. 
c1roulated:~-7~_M_AR~~1S~Z-S_ 
Recirculated:~~~~~-
Once again the Court is asked to rule upon the constitu-
tionality of one of New Yor}.c's many statutes that impose a requ~re-
ment of citizenship upon a person before that person may earn 
Jj 
his living in a specified occupation. These New York statutes, 
for the most part, have their origin in the frantic and overreactive 
days of the first World War when attitudes of parochialism and 
fear of the foreigner were the order of the day. This time we 
are concerned with the right to teach in the public schools of the 
Slate, at the elc1ncntary and secondary le ve ls, and with the citizen-
ship requirement that N. Y. Educ. Law § 3001. 3 (Mc Kinney), 
'!:_I 
quoted by the Court, at 1, n. 1, imposes. 
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As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 3, its decisions 
regarding the permissibility of statutory classifications concerning 
ll 
aliens "have not formed an unwavering line over the years. 11 
Thus, just last Term, in Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978), 
the Court upheld against equal protection challenge the New York 
statute limiting appointment of members of the state police force 
to citizens of the United States. The touchstone, the Court indi-
cated, was that citizenship may be a relevant qualification for ful-
filling "'important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial 
positions' held by 'officers who participate directly in the formula-
tion, execution, or review of broad public policy."' Id. , at 296, quoting 
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). For such positions, 










interest sought to be protected and the limiting classification. 
Police, it then was felt, were clothed with authority to exercise 
an almost infinite variety of discretionary powers that could 
seriously affect members of the public. 435 U.S., at 297. 
They thus fell within the category of important officers who part-
icipate directly in the execution of '.'broad public policy." The 
Court was persuaded that citizenship bore a 'rational relationship 
to the special demands of police positions, and that a State there-
fore could constitutionally confine that public responsibility to 
citizens of the United States. Id., at 300. The propriety of 
making citizenship a qualification for a narrowly defined class 
of positions was also recognized, in passing, in Sugarman v. 




On the other hand, the Court frequently has invalidated 
a state provision that denies a resident alien the right to engage 
in specified occupational activity! Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S, 
356 (1886) (ordinance applied so as to prevent Chinese subjects 
from engaging in the laundry business); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S, 
33 (1915) (statute requiring an employer's work force to be composed 
of not less than 80% "qualified electors or native born-citiz<!ns"); 
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm 'n, 334 U.S. 410 ( 1948) ( limitation 
of commercial fishing licenses to persons not "ineligible to 
citizenship''); Sugarman v. Dougall, supra, (New York statute ; 
relating to permanent positions in the "competitive clas s"of the 
state civil service); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (the practice 
of law); Nelson v. Miranda, 413 U, S. 902 (1973), summarily 
affirming 3 51 F. Supp. 73 5 (Ariz. 1972) (social service worker and 
No. 76-808 
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teacher); Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) 
(the practice of civil engineering). See also Nyquist v. Mauclet, 
supra, (New York statute barring certain resident aliens from state 
financial assistance for higher education). 
Indeed, the Court has held more than once that state 
classifications based on alienage are "inherently suspect and 
subject to close judicial scrutiny." Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 365, 372 (1971). See Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 
426 U.S., at 601-602; In re Griffiths, 413 U.S., at 721; Sugarman 
v. Dougall, 413 U.S., at 642; Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S., at 
7. And "[a]lienage classifications by a State that do not withstand 




There is thus a line, most recently 
recognized in F0ley v. Connelie, between those employments 
that a State in its wisdom constitutionally may restrict to United 
States citizens, on the one hand, and those employments, on the 
other, that the State may not deny to resident aliens. For me, 
the present case falls on the Sugarman - Griffiths - Flores de 
Otero - Mauclet side of that line, rather than on the narrowly 
isolated Foley side. 
We are concerned here with elementary and secondary 
education in the public schools of New York State. We are not 
concerned with teaching at the college or graduate levels. 
It seems constitutionally absurd, to say the least, 








not teach French or, indeed, an Englishwoman may not teach 
the grammar of the English language. The appellees, to be sure, 
are resident "aliens II in the technical sense, but there is not a 
word in the record that either appellee does not have roots in 
this country or is unqualified in any way, other than the imposed 
requirement of citizenship, to teach. Both appellee Norwick and 
appellee Dachinger have been in this country for over 12 years. 
Each is married to a United States citizen. Each currently meets 
all the requirements, other than citizenship, that New York has 
specified for certification as a public school teacher. Tr. of Oral 
4/ 
Arg. 4. Each is willing, if required, to subscribe to an oath to 
5/ 
support the Constitutions of the United States and of New York. 
Each lives in an American community, must obey its laws~ and must pay 




have hesitated to give up their respective British and Finnish 
lawyer 
citizenships, just as Fre Le Poole Griffiths, the subject of In re 
Griffiths, supra, hestiated to renounce her Netherlands citizenship, 
although married to a citizen of the United States and a resident of 
Connecticut. 
But the Court, to the disadvantage of appellees, crosses 
the line from Griffiths to Foley by saying, ante, at 6, that the 
"distinction between citizens and aliens, though ordinarily irrelevant 
to private activity, is fundamental to the definition and government 
of a State. 11 It then concludes that public school teaching "constitutes 
a governmental function, 11 ante, at 7, and that public school teachers 
may be regarded as performing a task that goes ''to the heart of 
representative government." Ibid. The Court speaks of the importance 
of public schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as 
No. 76-808 
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citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our society 
rests. (One, of course, can agree with this observation. One may con-
cede, also, that public schools are an 11•assimilative force' by 
l . 
which diverse and conflicting elements in our society are brought 
together on a broad but common ground," ante, at 8, and that the 
inculcation of fundamental values by our public schools is necessary 
to the maintenance of a democratic political system.) After then 
observing that teachers play a critical part in all this, the Court 
holds that New York's citizenship requirement is constitutional 
because it bears a rational relationship to the State's interest in 
furthering these educational goals. 
I perceive a number of difficulties along the easy road the 





First, the New York statutory structure itself refutes the 
argument. Section 3001. 3, the very statute at issue here, pro-
vides for exceptions with respect to alien teachers "employed 
pursuant to regulations adopted by the commissioner of education 
permitting such employment. 11 Section 3001-a provides another 
exception for persons ineligible for United States citizenship be-
cause of over- subscribed quotas. Also, New York is unconcerned 
with any citizenship qualification for teachers in the private schools 
of the State, even though the record indicates that about 18% of the 
pupils at the elementary and secondary levels attend private schools. 
The education of those pupils seems not to be inculcated with some-
thing less than what is desirable for citizenship and what the Court 
calls an influence "crucial to the continued good health of a democracy." 







to employ an alien teacher while he waits to attain citizenship, 
even though he may fail ever to attain it. And the stark fact that 
the State permits some aliens to sit on certain local school boards, 
N. Y. Educ. Law § 2590-c. 4 (McKinney) (Supp. 1978-1979), reveals 
how shallow and indistinct is New York's line of demarcation be-
tween citizenship and noncitizenship. The Court's attempted 
rationalization of this fact, ante, at 12, n. 14, hardly extinguishes 
the influence school board members, including these otherwise 
"disqualified" resident aliens, possess in school administration, 
in the selection of faculty, and in the approval of textbooks and 
instructional materials. 
Second, the New York statute is all-inclusive in its dis-
qualifying provisions: "No person shall be employed or authorized 




It sweeps indiscriminately. It is "neither narrowly confined nor 
precise in its application, 11 nor limited to the accomplishment 
of substantial state interests. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U, S., 
at 643. See Note, Aliens I Right to Teach: Political Socialization 
and the Public Schools, 85 Yale L. J. 90, 109-111 (1975). 
Third, the New York classification is irrational. 
Is it better to employ a poor citizen-teacher than an excellent 
resident alien teacher? Is it to be preferable to have a citizen 
who has never seen Spain or a Latin American country teach 
Spanish to eighth graders and to deny that opportunity to a 
resident alien who may have lived for 20 years in the culture 
of Spain or Latin America? The State will know how to select 
its teachers responsibly, wholly apart from citizenship, 
~/ 
and can do so selectively and intelligently. That is the 
way to accomplish the desired result. An artificial citizenship 
No. 76-808 
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bar is not a rational way. It is, instead, a stultifying provision. 
The route to "diverse and conflicting elements" and their being 
''brought together on a broad but common ground, " which the 
Court so emphasizes, ante, at 8, is hardly to be achieved by 
disregarding some of the diverse elements that are available, 
competent, and contributory to the richness of our society and 
of the education it could provide. 
Fourth, it is logically impossible to differentiate between 
this case concerning teachers and In re Griffiths concerning attorneys. 
If a resident alien may not constitutionally be barred from taking a 
state bar examination and thereby becoming qualified to practice law 
in the courts of a State, how is one to comprehend why a resident 
alien may constitutionally be barred from teaching in the elementary 
and secondary levels of a State's public schools? One may speak 
No. 76-808 
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proudly of the role model of the teacher, of his ability to mold 
young minds, of his inculcating force as to national ideals, and 
of his profound influence in the impartation of our society's values~ 
Are the attributes of an attorney any the less? He represents us 
in our critical courtroom controversies even when citizenship and 
loyalty may be questioned. He stands as an officer of every court 
in which he practices. He is responsible for strict adherence to 
the announced and implied standards of professional conduct, to 
the requirements of evolving ethical codes, and to honesty and 
integrity in his professional and personal life. Despite the almost 
continuous criticism leveled at the legal profession, he, too, is 
an influence in legislation, in the community, and in the role model 
figure that the professional person enjoys. The Court specifically 
No. 76-808 
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recognized this in In re Griffiths: 
"Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions 
of responsibility and influence that impose on them 
duties correlative with their vital right of access to 
the courts. Moreover, by virtue of their professional 
aptitudes and natural interests, lawyers have been 
leaders in government throughout the history of our 
7/ 
country." 413 U.S. ·, at 729.-
If an attorney has a constitutional right to take a bar examina-
and practice law, 
tion despite his being a resident alien, it is impossible for me to see 
why a resident alien, otherwise completely competent and qualified, as 
these appellee s concededly are, is constitutionally disqualified from 
teaching in the public schools of the great State of New York. The 
District Court expressed it well and forcefully when it observed that 
New York's exclusion "seems repugnant to the very heritage the State 
is seeking to inculcate." 417 F. Supp. 913, 922 (SDNY 1976). 
I respectfully dissent. 
No. 76-868 
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One of the appellees in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U. S, 1 
( 1977), submitted a list of the New York statutes tla t required 
citizenship, or a declaration of intent to become a citizen, for 
no fewer than 37 occupations. Brief for Appellee Mauclet, 0. T 
1976, No. 76-208, pp. 19-22, nn. 8-44, inclusive. Some of 
those statutes have been legislatively repealed or modified, or 
judicially invalidated. Others are still in effect. Among the 
latter are those relating to the occupations of inspector, certified 
shorthand reporter, funeral director, masseur, physical therapist, 
and animal technician. 
... 
. ,,\ 








This particular citizenship requirement had its origin 
in 1918 N. Y. Laws, ch. 158, effective Apr. 4, 1918. 
'. 
No. 76-808 
"To be sure, the course of decisions protecting the 
employment rights of resident aliens has not been an unswerving 





Appellee Norwick is a summa cum laude graduate of a 
Massachusetts college and received an A average in full-time 
graduate work in the State University of New York at Albany. She 
' ji~ 
has taught both in this country and~eat Britain. 
Appellee Dachinger is a~ laude graduate, with a major 
in German, of Lehman College, a unit of the City University of 
New York, and possesses a Master's degree in Early Childhood 
Education from that institution • . She has taught at a day care center 
in the Bronx. 
Each appellee, thus, has received and excelled in educational 
training the State of New York itself offers. 
No. 76-808 
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See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S., at 726, n. 18. 
No. 76-808 
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In In re Griffiths the Court significantly has observed: 
"Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge on a case- by 
case basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law. 
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training 
and familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such 
tests of competence, it requires a new lawyer to take both 
an 'attorney's oath ' to perform his functions faithfully 
and honestly and a 'commi.ssioner's oath' to 'support 
the constitution of the United States, and the constitution 
of the state of Connecticut. ' Appellant has indicated her 
willingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of 
both oaths, and Connecticut may quite properly conduct 
a character investigation to insure in any given case 
'that an applicant is not one who ''swears to an oath pro 
~~ while declaring or manifesting his disagreement 
with or indifference to the oath." Bond v. Floyd, 385 
U, S, 116, 132. ' Law Students Re search Council v. 
Wadmond, 401 U.S,;at 164. Moreover, once admitted to 
the bar, lawyers are subject to continuing scrutiny by the 
organized bar and the courts. In addition to discipline 




(footnote 6 cont'd) 
sanctions extends from judgments for contempt to criminal 
prosecutions and disbarment. In swn, the Committee 
simply has not established that it must exclude all aliens 
from the practice of law in order to vindicate its undoubted 
interest in high professional standards." 413 U, S., at 725-





In order to keep attorneys on the nongovernmental side 
of the classification line, the Court continued: 
"Yet, they are not officials of governrr.ent by virtue 
of being lawyers ·. Nor does the status of holding a 
license to practice law place one so close to the 
core of the political process as to make him a formu-
lator of government policy. 11 413 U.S., at 719. 
See also Stockton v. Ford, 11 How. 232, 247 (1851); Hickman v. 
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 514-515 (1947) (~oncurring opinion); Schware 
v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (concurring 
opinion); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 668 (1959) (dissenting opinion); 
J. Story, Miscellaneous Writings, Value and Importance of Legal 
Studies, 503-549 (W. Story ed., 1972 ); H. Stone, The Public Influence 
of the Bar, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1934); W. Brennan, Jr., The 
Responsibilities of the Legal Profession (1967); A. de Tocqueville, 
Democracy in America 321-331 (Schocken ed. 1961); J. Rogers, The 
Lawyer in American Public Life, in Morrison Foundation Lectures 40, 
61 (1940). 
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Gordon M. Ambach, Individually 
and as Commissioner of the 
New York State Depart-
ment of Education, 
et al., Appellants, 
v. 
Susan M. W. Norwick et aL 
On Appeal from the 
United States District 
Court for the Southern 
District of New York. 
[February - , 1979] 
MR. JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case prese11ts the question whether a State. consist-
ently with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, may refuse to employ as elementary and second-
ary school teachers aliens who are eligible for United States 
citizenship but who refuse to seek naturalization. 
I 
New York Education Law§ 3001 (3) forbids certification as 
a public school teacher of any person who is not a citizen of 
the United States, unless that person has manifested an 
intention to apply for citizenship.1 The Commissioner of 
'The sta.tute provide~ : 
"No per1:,on 1:,hall bP rmployed or authorized to tea.ch in the public schools 
of thii; :;fate wlw 1s : 
"a. Not a citizPn. Thn provi1:,iom, of thitl 1Subdivision shall not apply, 
however, to a11 alien teachrr now or herca.fter employed provided such 
teacher ~hall make due npplication to become a citizrn and thereafter 
wi1,hin the time prrscribed by la,w 1sha,ll become a cit.izf'n. The provisions 
of this :;uhdivi8ion tlhall not apply after July fir8t, nineteen hundred sixty-
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Education is authorized to create exemptions from this prohi-
bition, and has done so with respect to aliens who are not yet 
eligible for citizenship. 2 Unless a teacher obtains certification, 
he may not work in a public elementary or secondary school 
in New York.8 
Appellee Norwick was born in Scotland and is a subject of 
Great Britain. She has resided in this country since 1965 and 
is married to a United States citizen. Appellee Dachinger 
is a Finnish subject who came to this country in 1966 and also 
is married to a United States citizen. Both Norwick and 
Dachinger currently meet all of the educational requirements 
New York has set for certification as a public school teacher, 
but they consistently have refused to seek citizenship in spite 
of their eligibility to do so. Norwick applied in 1973 for a 
the Commissioner of Education permitting such employment." N. Y. 
Educ. Law § 3001 (3) . 
The statute contains an exception for persons who are ineligible for United 
States citizenship solely because of an oversubscribed quota. Id., § 3001-a. 
Because this statutory provision is in all respects narrower than the 
exception provided by regulation, see n. 2, infra, as a practical matter it 
has no effect. 
The State does not certify the qualifications of teacherl:I in the private 
schools, although it does require that such teachers be "competent." 
N. Y. Educ. Law§ 3204 (2) (McKinney 1970). Accordingly, we are not 
presented with the question of, and express no view as to, the permissi-
bility of a citizenship requirement pertaining to teachers in private schools. 
2 The following regulation gov:erns here : 
"Citizenship . A teacher who is not a citizen of the United States or who 
has not declared intention of becoming a citizen may be issued a provi-
sional certificate providing such teacher has the appropriate educational 
qualifications as defined in the regulations and (1) possesses skills or 
competencies not readily available among t€achers holding citizenship, 
or (2) is unable to declare intention of becoming a citizen for valid 
statutory reasons." 8 N. Y. Code of Rules. and Regulations § 80.2 (i) 
8 Certification by the Commissioner of Education is not required of 
teachers at state inst.itutions of higher education and the citizenship 
restriction accordingly does not, apply to them, Brief for Appellants 
13 ll , *. 
,. 
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teaching certificate covering nursery school through sixth 
grade, and Dachinger sought a certificate covering the same 
grades in 1975.4 Both applications were denied because of 
appellees' failure to meet the requirements of § 3001 (3). 
Norwick then filed this suit seeking to enjoin the enforcement 
of § 3001 (3), and Dachinger obtained leave to intervene as 
a plaintiff. 
A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 
U.S. C. § 2281. Applying the "close judicial scrutiny" stand-
ard of Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971), the 
court held that § 3001 (3) discriminated against aliens in vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause. 417 F. Supp. 913 
(SDNY 1976). The court believed that the statute was over-
broad, because it excluded all resident aliens from all tea.ching 
jobs regardless of the subject sought to be taught, the alien's 
nationality, the nature of the alien's relationship to this coun-
try, and the alien's willingness to substitute some other sign 
of loyalty to this Nation's political values, such as an oath 
of allegiance. Id., at 921. We noted probable jurisdiction 
over the State's appeal, 436 U. S. 902 (1978), and now reverse. 
II 
A 
The decisions of this Court regarding the permissibility of 
statutory classifications involving aliens have not formed an 
unwavering line over the years. State regulation of the em-
ployment of aliens long has been subject to constitutional 
4 At the time of her application Norwick had not yet met, the post-
graduate educational requirements for a permanent certificate and accord-
ingly applied only for a temporary certificate, which also is governed by 
§ 3001 (3). She since has obtained the necessary graduate degree for full 
certification. Dachinger previously had obtained a temporary certificate, 
which had lapsed at the time of her 1975 application. The record does 
not indicate whether Dachinger previously had declared an intent to 
obtain citizenship or had obtained the temporary certificate because of 
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constraints. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886), 
the Court struck down an ordinance which was applied to 
prevent aliens from running laundries, and in 'Pruax v. Raich, 
239 U. S. 33 (1915), a law requiring at least 80% of the 
employees of certain businesses to be citizens was held to be 
an unconstitutional infringement of an alien's "right to work 
for a living in the common occupations of the community .. .. '' 
Id., at 41. At the same time, however, the Court also has 
recognized a greater degree of latitude for the States when 
aliens were sought to be excluded from public employment. 
At the time Truax was decided, the governing doctrine per-
mitted States to exclude aliens from various activities when 
the restriction pertained to "the regulation or distribution of 
the public domain, or of the common property or resources of 
the people of the State. . . ." Id., at 39. Hence, as part 
of a larger authority to forbid aliens from owning land, 
Frick v. Webb, 263 U. S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 
U.S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); 
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Blythe v. Hinkley, 
180 U. S. 333 (1901); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483 
(1880), harvesting wildlife, Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 
U.S. 138 (1914); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877),. 
or maintaining an inherently d;:u1gerous enterprise, Clarke v. 
Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 (1927), States permissibly could 
exclude aliens from working on public construction projects, 
Crane v. New York , 239 U. S. 195 (1915), and, it appears, 
from engaging in any form of public employment at all, see 
Truax, at 40. 
Over time, the Court's decisions gradually have restricted 
the activities from which States are free to exclude aliens, 
The first sign that the Court would question the constitu-
tionality of discrimination agianst aliens even in areas affected 
with a "public interest" appeared in Oyama v. California, 332 
U. S. 633 (1948) . The Court there held that statutory pre-
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on alien landholding discriminated against the citizen childrel\ 
of aliens. The same Term, the Court held that the "owner-
ship" a State exercises over fish found in its territorial waters 
"is inadequate to justify California in excluding any or all 
aliens who are lawful residents of the State from making a 
living by fishing in the ocean off its shores while permitting 
all others to do so." Takahashi v. F-ish & Game Comm'n, 
334 U. S. 410, 421 (1948). This process of withdrawal from 
the former doctrine culminated in Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U. S. 365 ( 1971), which for the first time treated classifica-
tions based on alienage as "inherently suspect and subject to 
close judicial scrutiny." Id., at 372. Applying Graham, this 
Court has held invalid statutes that prevented aliens from 
entering a State's classified civil service, Sugarman v. Dougall, 
413 U. S. 634 (1973), practicing law, In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 
717 (1973), working as an engineer, Examining Bd. v. Flores 
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), and receiving state educational 
benefits, Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). 
Although our more recent decisions have departed substan-
tially from the public interest doctrine of Truax's day, they 
have not abandoned the general principle that some state 
functions are so bound up with the operation of the State as 
a governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from those 
functions of all persons who have not become part of the 
process of self-government. In Sugarman, we recognized that 
2, State could, "in an appropriately defined class of posi-
tions, require citizenship as a qualification for office." · We 
went on to observe : 
"Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its obliga-
tion, already noted above, 'to preserve the basic concep-
tion of a political community.'. . . And this power and 
responsibility of the State applies, not only to the 
qualifications of voters, but a.Isa to persons holding state 
elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, 
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in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public 
policy perform functions that go to the heart of repre-
sentative government." Id., at 647 (citation omitted). 
The exclusion of aliens from such governmental positions 
would not invite as demanding scrutiny from this Court. 
Id., at 648. See also Nyquist v. Mauclet, supra, at 11; 
Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (Md. 1974), aff'd, 126 
u. s. 913 (1976) . 
Applying the rational basis standard, we held last Term thllt 
New York could exclude aliens from the ranks of its .police 
force. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). Because the 
police function fulfilled "a most fundamental obligation of 
government to its constituency" and by necessity cloaked 
policemen with substantial discretionary powers, we viewed 
the police force as being one of those appropriately defined 
classes of positions for which a citizenship requirement could 
be imposed. Id., at 297. Accordingly, the State was required 
to justify its classification only "by a showing of some rational 
relationship between the interest sought to be protected and 
the limiting classification." Id. , at 296. 
The rule for governmental functions, which is an exception 
to the general standard applicable to classifications based on 
alienage, rests on important principles inherent in the Consti-
tution. The distinction between citizens and aliens, though 
ordinarily irrelevant to private activity, is fundamental to the 
definition and government of a State. The Constitution itself 
refers to the distinction no less than 11 times, see Sugarman v. 
Dougall, supra, at 651-652 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), indi-
. eating that the status of citizenship was meant to have signifi-
cance in the structure of our government. The assumption 
of that status, whether by birth or naturalization, denotes an 
association with the polity which, in a democratic republic, 
exercises the powers of governance. See Foley v. Connel-ie, 
supra, at 295. The form of this association is important: an 
oath of allegiance or similar ceremony cannot substitut~ for 
76-808-0PINION 
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the unequivocal legal bond citizenship represents. It is be-
cause of this special significance of citizenship that govern-
mental entities, when exercising the functions of government, 
have wider latitude in limiting the participation of noncitizens.5 
B 
In determining whether, for purposes of equal protection 
analysis, teaching in public schools constitutes a governmental 
function, we look to the role of public education and to the 
degree of responsibility and discretion teachers possess in ful-
filling that role. See id., at 297. Each of these considerations 
supports the conclusion that public school teachers may be 
regarded as performing a task "that go[es] to the heart of 
representative government." Sugarman v. Dougall, supra, 
at 647.6 
5 That the significance of citizenship has com\titutional dimensions also 
has been recognized by several of our decisions. In 1'rop v. Dul,les, 356 
U. S. 86 ( 1958), a plurality of the Court held that the expatriation of an 
American citizen constituted cruel and unusual punishment for the crime 
of desertion in time of war. In Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U. S. 253 (1967), 
the Court held that, the Constitution forbade Congress from depriving a 
person of his citizenship against his will for any reason. 
u The dissenting opinion of ~IR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, in reaching an oppo-
site conclusion, appears to apply a different analysis from tha,t employed 
in our prior de<"ision~. Rather than consider whether public school 
teachl'rs perform a significant government, function, the inquiry mandated 
by Foley v. Connelte. 435 U. S. 291 (1978), and Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 
U. S. (i34 (1973), the dissent focuses instead on the general societal 
importance of primary and secondary school teachersh both public and 
private. Thus on the one hand 1t depreciates the importance of New 
York's c>itizenship requirement because 1t i8 not applied to private school 
teacher:;, and on the other hand it argues that the role teacher::; perform 
in our :society is no morr ;;ignificant than that filled by attorney,; . This 
misHes the point of Foley and Sugarman. New York ',, citizenship require-
ment is limited to a governmental fundion becau,;e it applies only to 
teacher::; employed by and acting a::; agents of the State. The Connecticut 
s1atu1e held uncon::;t1tutio11al in In re Griffiths, -!13 U. S. 717 (1973), by 
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Public education, like the police function, "fulfills a most 
fundamental obligation of government to its constituency." 
Foley, at 297. The importance of public schools in the 
preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and 
in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, 
long has been recognized by our decisions: · 
"Today, education is perhaps the most important func-
tion of state and local governments. Compulsory school 
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education 
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of 
education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, 
even service in the armed forces. It is the very founda-
tion of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instru-
ment in awakening the child to cultura.I va.Iues, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in 
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.'' 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954). 
See also Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189,246 (.1973) 
(POWELL, J., concurring); San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U. S. 205, 213 (1972); id., a.t 238-239 (WHITE, J., concur-
ring); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 230 
(1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Adler v. Board of Educa-
tion, 342 U. S. 485, 493 (1952); McCollurn v. Board of 
government. Tlw rxclusion of alwn from access to the bar i~ated 
the nght to pur:;ue a chosen occupation, not acce:;:; to public employment. 
Cf. Nyq'Uist v. Ma'Uc/et, 4:32 U. S. 1, 15-16, n. * {1977) (POWELL, .T., di8-
seutmg). Thr distinct10n between a private occupation and a govern- !. 
ment function was note!.expre:;8ly m Griffiths : ,. ,. 
" Lawyer:; do indeed occupy prof'es:;ional positions of responsibility and 
influence that 1mposr on them duties correlative with their vital right of 
acce:;s to the court;;. Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes 
and natural mterests, lawyer:; have been leader8 in government throughout 
the hu;tory of our country Yet, they nre not officials of government by 
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Education, 333 U. S. 203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Interstate Con-
solidated Street R. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U. S. 79 ( 1907) .7 
Other authorities have perceived public schools as an "assimi-
lative force" by which diverse and conflicting elements in our 
society are brought together on a broad but common ground. 
See, e. g., J. Dewey, Democracy and Education 26 (1929); 
N. Edwards & H. Richey, The School in the American Social 
Order 623-624 (1963). These perceptions of the public 
schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the 
maintenance of a democratic political system have been con-
firmed by the observations of social scientists. See R. Dawson 
& K. Prewitt, Political Socialization 146-167 (1969); R. Hess 
& J. Tomey, The Development of Political Attitudes in 
Children 114, 158-171, 217-220 (1967); V. 0. Key, Public 
Opinion and American Democracy 323-343 ( 1961). 8 
Within the public school system, teachers play a critical 
7 As San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra, recognized, 
there is no inconsistency between our recognition of the vital significance 
of public education and our holding that access to education is not guaran-
teed by the Constitution. Id., at. 30-35. 
8 The curricular requirements of New York; public school system reflect 
some of the ways a public school system promotes the development of the 
understanding that is prerequisite to intelligent participation in the 
democratic process. The schools are required to provide instruction "to 
promote a spirit of patriotic and civic service and obligatjon and to foster 
in the children of the state moral and intellectual qualities which are 
essential in preparing to meet the obligations of citizenship in peace or in 
war, ... " N. Y. Educ. L. § 801 (1) (McKinney 1970). Flag and other 
patriotic exercbes also are prescribed, as loyalty is a characteristic of 
citizenship essential to the preservation of a country. Id., § 802. In addi-
tion, required courses include classes in civics, United States and New York 
history , and principles of American government. Id ., § 3204 (3) (a) (1), (2) . 
Although private schools also are bound by most, of these requirements, 
the State has a &tronger interest. in ensuring that the schools it most 
directly controls, and for which 1t bei.Lrs the cost, are as effectjve as 
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part in developing students' attitude toward government and 
understanding of the role of citizens in our society. Alone 
among employees of the system, teachers are in direct, day-to-
day contact with students both in the classrooms and in the 
other varied activities of a modern school. In shaping the 
students' experience to achieve educational goals, teachers by 
necessity have wide discretion over the way ' the course ma-
terial is communicated to students. They are responsible for 
presenting and explaining the subject matter in a way that is 
both comprehensible and inspiring. No amount of standard-
ization of teaching materials or lesson plans can eliminate 
the personal qualities a teacher brings to bear in achieving 
these goals. Further, a teacher serves as a role model for his 
students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their 
perceptions and values. Thus, through both the presentation 
of course materials and the example he sets, a teacher has an 
opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward gov-
ernment, the political process, and a citizen's social responsi-
bilities.0 This influence is crucial to the continued good 
health of a democracy.10 
v Although the findings of scholars who have written on the subject are 
not conclusive, they generally reinforce the commonsense judgment, and 
the experience of most of us, that a teacher exerts considerable influence 
oy,er the development of fundamental social attitudes in students, including 
those attitudes which in the broadest sense of the term may be viewed as 
political. See e. g., R. Dawson & K. Prewitt, Political Socialization 
158--167 (1969); R. Hess & J. Torney, The Development of Political 
AttitudPs in Children 162-163, 2ff-218 (1967). Cf. Note, Aliens' Right 
to Teach: Political Socialization and the Public Schools, 85 Yale L. J. 90, 
99-104 (1975) . 
10 Appe!lees contend that re~triction of an alien's freedom to teach in 
public schools is contrary to principles of diversity of thought and 
academic freedom embodied in the First Amendment. See also Note, 
supra, n. 8, at 106-109. We think the attempt to draw an analogy 
between choice of citizenflhip and political expression or freedom of 
association is wide of the mark, as the argument would bar any effort by 
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Furthermore, it is clear that all public school teachers, and 
not just those responsible for teaching the courses most 
directly related to government, history, and civic duties, should 
help fulfill the broader function of the public school system.11 
Teachers, regardless of their specialty, may be called upon 
to teach other subjects, including those expressly dedicated 
to political and social subjects.12 More importantly, a State 
properly may regard all teachers as having an obligation 
to promote civic virtues and understanding in their classes, 
regardless of the subject taught. Certainly a State also may 
take account of a teacher's function as an example for stu-
dents, which exists independently of particular classroom sub-
jects. In light of the foregoing considerations, we think it 
clear that public school teachers come well within the "govern-
mental function" principle recognized in Sugarman and Foley. 
Accordingly, the Constitution requires only that a citizenship 
requirement applicable to teaching in the public schools bears 
a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. See 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 
314 (1976). 
Section 3001 (3) does not inhibit appellees from expressing freely their 
political or social views or from associating with whomever they please. 
Cf. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist ., - U. S. -, -
(1979); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977); 
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Nor are appel-
lees discouraged from joining with others to advance particular political 
ends. Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1957). The only as:erted 
liberty of appellees withheld by the New York statute is the opportunity 
to teach in the State's schools so long as they elect not to become citizens 
of this country. This is not a liberty that is accorded constitutional 
protection . 
11 At the primary ;,chool level, for which both appelleei:; sought certifica-
tion, teachers are responsibJ,e for aII of the basic curriculum. 
·12 In New York, for example, all certified teachers, including those in the 
secondary schools, are required to be available for up to five hours of 
teaching a week in subjects outside their specialty. 8 N. Y. Gode o( 
Rules & R<.>gulations § 80.2 ( c) . 
12 
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III 
As the legitimacy of the State's interest in furthering the 
educational goals outlined above is undoubted, it remains only 
to consider whether § 3001 (3) bears a rational relationship 
to this interest. The restriction is carefully framed to serve its 
purpose, as it bars from teaching only those aliens who have 
demonstrated their unwillingness to obtain United States citi-
zenship.18 Appellees, and aliens similarly situated, in effect 
have chosen to classify themselves. They prefer to retain 
citizenship in a foreign country with the obligations it entails 
of primary duty and loyalty. 11 They have rejected the open 
invitation extended to qualify for eligibility to teach by 
applying for citizenship in this country. · The people of New 
York, acting through their elected representatives, have made 
a judgment that citizenship should be a qualification for 
teaching the young of the State in the public schools, and 
§ 3001 (3) furthers that judgment.15 
Reversed. 
1s See n. 2, infra. 
H As our case1 have emphasized, re:;ident aliens pay taxes, serve in the 
armed forces, and have made significant contributions to our country in 
private and public endeavors. See In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 722 
(1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 645 (1973); Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 376 (1971). No doubt many of them, and 
we do not exclude appellees, would make excellent public school teachers. 
But the legislature, having in mind the importance of education to state 
and local governments, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 
493 (1954), may determine eligibility for the key position in discharging 
that function on the assumption that generally persons who a.re citizens, 
or who have not declined the opportunit~, to seek U11ited States citizenship, 
are better qualified than are those who · have elected to remain aliens. 
W o note in this connection that regulations · promulgated pursuant to 
§ 3001 (3) do provide for situations where a particular alien's special 
qualifications as a teacher outweigh the policy primarily servro by the 
8tatute. See 8 N. Y. Code of Rules &Regulations§ 80.2 (i) (1). The State 
mforms us, however, that the authority conferred by this regulation has 
not been exercised . Brief for Appellant 7 n. *. 
' ~ Appellee~ argue that the Statr cannot rationally exclude aliens from 
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teaching positions and yet permit them to vote for and sit on certain 
local school boards. We note, first, that the State's legislature has not 
expre;;sly endorsed thi:s policy. Rather, appellants as an administrative 
matter have mterpreted thr :otatute governing New York City's unique 
community school board:o, N. Y. Educ. Law § 2590-c (McKinney Supp. 
1978-1979), to permit alien>, who arr the parents of public l:lChool studenti:; 
to participate m tl1ese beard>,. See App. 27, 29 . Further, in applying the 
rational basi:,; standard wr have ob~Nvecl that "mere underinclusivenes8" i:,; 
not fatal to the validity of a law under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 471 n. 33 
(1977); Erznoznik \'. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 215 (1975); 
cf. Geduldig v. Aiello. 417 ll. S. 484, 495 (1974). We also may assume, 
without havmg to decide, that there is a rational ba:si:o for a distinction 
betwren teacher8 and board members ba:oed on their re:opective responsi-
bilities. Alt hough posse::;smg substantial responsibility for the administra-
tion of the ;;choob, board members teach no classe,;, and rarel~· if ever are 
known or 1dent1fied by the studrnts. 
~ 
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MR. JuS'l'ICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court 
This case presents thP question whether a State,. co11sist-
ently with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourtee1tth 
~-\mendnwut . may rdusP to employ as Plenw11tary and second-
ary school tPachers aliens who are eligible for l · nitPd States 
citizenship but who refuse to seek naturalization, 
I 
New York Education Law§ 3001 (3) forbids certification as 
a public school teacher of any person who is not a citizen of 
the enited States, unless that person has manifrsted an 
intention to apply for citizenship.' The Commissioner of 
1 The statute providt':- : 
".\!o pt•r,-011 ;,;hall be nnployed or a11thol"ized to Ira.eh in the public 'Cl1001s: 
of t hi,: ;,;!,ate who i:- • 
"8. Not, a eitizetL Th<~ provi,-;ion,; of thi:- subdiv1,.:ion shall not apply, 
how(•w•r. to an nliPn !t'ac·hrr uow or herPaftPr <'mplo~ t•d prov1drd such 
ttrn:hrr >'hall make• due> applieatiou to ht><'ome a eitiz1•.11 and thrreafter 
withi11 tlw rime J)l'f',.:cribc><J by li1w ,:hall bt·<·omf' a f'ifoPtL The provisions: 
of thi~ .. ,ulJCli\'i,-1011 .,hall not, .ipply a.ftrr ,Jul~· ffr,-t, nitW1P('ll hundred sixty-









AMBACH v. NORWICH 
Education is authorized to create exemptions from this prol11-
bitioi1, and has done so with respect to alie11s who a.re not yet 
eligible for citizenship.1 Unless a teacher obtains certificat10H, 
he may not work in a public elementary or secondary school 
in New York.3 
Appellee N orwick was born i11 Scotland and is a sub.1ect of 
Great Britain. She has resided in this country since H!lif> aud 
is married to a United States citizen. Appellce Dachinger 
is a Finnish subject who came to this country iu 1966 and also 
is married to a United States citizen. Both Norwick atJd 
Dachinger currently meet. all of the educational requirements 
New York has set for certification as a public school teacher, 
but they consistently have refused to seek citizenship in spite 
of their eligibility to do so. Norwick applied in 1973 for a 
the Commi8sioner of Educat1011 p<>rm1tting :;uch employment .'' N l 
Educ. Law § :~001 (3) . 
The statute rontam,; an exrPpl1011 for per,;ons who are inelig1ble for Urnted 
State:;' citizen,;hip solely becau,;e of an oversub~crilwd quota. Id., § aOOl-n. 
Becau1:1e t.l1is ,;ta tutory provision is in all re:spt·<:t~ narrower lhan the 
exception provided by regulat10n, see 11 . 2, infra, a:,; a pructiC'al ma ttcr 1t 
ha11 no effect 
The State doe,; not errt.Jfy the riualifica.tion::1 of lPacher,; Ill the pnvate 
:-chool:>, although It doe::: require that ,;uch teacher:< be '"c•om(wtent " 
N. Y. Educ. Law § :3204 (2) (:\foKinney 1970). AccorJingly, WP an• not 
pre:sented with the que:::tion of, and C'Xpres::; no view a,,, to, the 1wrm1:::s1-
bility of a citizenship rrqmrement pertaining to teacher,; in pnv;1tP :;rhooh, 
2 The following regulation governs here : 
''Citizenship. A teacher who is not a citizen of the Ut11ted States or who 
has not declared intention of bccommg a citizrn may be i,;,;ued a prov1-
siona I rertificate providing such teacher ha1< the :tppropriatP edueat 10nal 
qualificnt10ns a::; defined in the regulation,; :t11d (I) pos::1e::;,;p,, ,.fol!~ or 
competencies not, rradily available among t,eacher~ holding c1t1zen:,;hip1 
or (2) i:; unable to drclare intention of becoming a cit,iz(•n for valid 
qtat11tory reasons." 8 N. Y. Code of Huie,; and Hcgulation" § 80.2 (1) 
3 Certification by the Commi:s,;;ioner of Educatiou is uot requireci of 
rt•acher~ at. ,:tatc mstitut1ons of higher edttcat1011 and the c1tiz<'n~l11p 
1·estrkt10n a.ccordmgly does not appl) to them. Bnef for Appdlants 
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AMBACH v. NORWICH 
teaching certificate covering nursery school through sixth 
grnde, and Dachi11ger sought a certificate covering the same 
grades in 1975.4 Both applications were denied because of 
appellees' failure to meet the requirements of § 3001 (3). 
Nor wick then filed this suit seekiug to enjoin the en forcPmen t 
of ~ 3001 (3), and Dachinger obtained leave to intervPne as 
a plain tiff . 
A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 
U. S. C. ~ 2281. Applying the "close judicial scrutiny'' sta1Jd-
ard of Graham"· Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971), the 
court held that ~ 3001 ( 3) discriminated against aliells ill vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause. 417 F. Rupp. Hl3 
(~DNY 1976). The court believed that the statute was over-
hroad. because it excluded all resident aliens from all teaching 
jobs regardless of the subJect sought to be taught, the alien's 
nationality, the nature of the alien's relationship to this couu-
try. and the alien's willingness to substitute some other sign 
of loyalty to this Nation's political values, such as an oath 
of a.Jlegiance. Id ... at 921. We noted probable Jur·isdiction 
over the State's appeal, 436 U.S. 902 (1978), and now reverse. 
II 
A 
The decisions of this Court regarding the permissibility of 
sttttutory classifications involving aliens have not formed an 
unwavering line over the years. State regulation of the em-
ploymeut of al.iens long has been subject to constitutional 
4 At the time of hPr application Norwick had not yet met, thr post-
grnd11a tc cduc::itional requ irrmen t:,; for a permanent certificate and accord-
mgly applied only for a temporary ecrtifieate, which also is governed b~· 
§ 3001 (3). She ;.;ince has obtainrd t,he ncce~,,arr graduate degree for full 
certification. Dachmger prt>v1011sl~· had obtained a temporary rertifira le, 
which had lnpr;ccl at the time of her Hl75 ,1ppliration. The re1•ord does 
not, mdicate wheth<'r Dachinger previously had declarPd an intent to 
obtain citizrnship or had obtained the temporary certificate because of 
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constraints. In Y-ick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. R. 3,56 (1886). 
the Court struck down an ordinance which was applied to 
prevent aliens from running laundries. and in Trua:i· v. Rairh, 
239 U. S. 33 (1915), a law requiring at least 800;1<- of the 
employees of certain busin('sses to be citizens was held to be 
an unconstitutional infringement of an alien's "right to work 
for a living in the common occupations of the community ... . " 
Id., at 41. At the same time. however, the Court also has 
recognized a greater degree of latitude for the States when 
aliens were sought to b(' excluded from public employmellt. 
At the time Truax was decided. the governing doctrine per-
mitted States to exclude aliens from various activities when 
the restriction pertained to "the regulation or distribution of 
the public domain. or of th(' common property or resources of 
the people of th(' State .... " f d., at 39. Hence. as part, 
of a larger authority to forbid aliens from owning land. 
Frick v. Webb, 263 U. S. 32n (1923); Webb v. ()'Brien. 263 
U. S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U. S. 22,5 (1923); 
Terrace v. Thmnpson, 263 U.S. Hl7 (1923); Blythe v. Hinkley. 
180 U. S. 333 < H)Ol) ; H a:uenstein v. Lynharn, 100 U. S. 483 
( 1880), harvesting wildlife. Patsone v. Pennsylvall'ia. 232 
tJ. S. 138 (1914); McCready v. Virrrinia, 94 lT. S. 391 (1877), 
or maintaining an inhere11tly dangerous enterprise. Clarke v. 
Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 (1927), States permissibly could 
exclude aliens from working on public construction projects, 
Crane v. 1Vew York, 239 F. S. 195 (1915). and, it appears, 
from engaging in any form of public employment at all, see 
1'rua~t, at 40. 
Over time. the Court's decisions gradually have restricted 
the activities from which States are free to exclude aliens. 
Thf' first sign that tlw Court would q uestio11 tlw cunstitu-
tio11ality of discriminatio11 agia11st aliPns f'Wn i11 an•as affected 
with a "public interest" appeared in OyaH1.a v. Calif orn'ia, :132 
U. S. 633 (1948 ). The Court there held that statutory pre-
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on alien landholding discriminated against the citizen children 
of aliens. The same Term, the Court held that the "owner-
ship'' a State exercises over fish found in its territorial waters 
"is inadequate to justify California in excluding auy or all 
aliens who are lawful residents of the State from making a 
living by fishing in the ocean off its shores while permitting 
all others to do so." Takahashi v. F-ish & Game Comm'n, 
334 U. S. 410. 421 (1948). This process of withdrawal from 
the former doctrine culminated in Graham v. Richardson, 403 
r. S. 365 ( 1971), which for the first time treated classifica-
tions based 011 alicnage as "inherently suspect and subject to 
close judicial scrutiny." ' Id., at 372. Applying Graham, this 
Court has held in valid statutes that preve11 ted aliens from 
entering a State's classified civil service, Sugarman v. Dougall, 
413 t:. R. 634 ( H>7:3). practicing law, In re Griffiths, 413 tT. S. 
717 (1973), working as an engineer, Examining Bd. v. Flores 
de Otero, 4261:J. S. 572 (1976). and receiving state educational 
bP11cfits, Xyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) . 
Although our more recent decisions have departed substan-
tially from thc> public interest doctrine of Trua:r's day, they 
h:1vc not abandoned the general principle that some state 
functions are so bound up with the operation of the State as 
a governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from those 
functions of all persons who have not become part of the 
process of srlf-government. In Sugarman, we recognized that 
::,, State could. "in an appropriately defined class of posi-
tion~. require citizenship as a qualification for office." 'We 
went 011 to observe . 
''Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its obliga-
tion. already noted above, 'to preserve the basic concep-
twn of a political community.' . . . And this power and 
responsibility of the State applies, not only to the 
qualifi<'at1ons of voters, but also to persons holdmg state 
elective or important nonclect1ve executive. legislative, 
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in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public 
policy perform functions that go to the heart of repre-
sentative government." Id., at 647 (citation omitted). 
The exclusion of aliens from such governmental position!:" 
woukl 11ot invite as demanding scrutiny from this Court. 
Id., at, 648. See also .Yyquisl v. Mauclet, supm, at 11: 
Perkins v. Smith , 370 F. Supp. 134 (Md. Hl74), affd, 42(, 
F . S. 1113 (1976). 
. \pplyin~ thr• rational ha:-is standard. we held la::::t T1·n11 Uwt 
l\""ew York could excluc!P aliens from the ra11k~ of rt:- polic<' 
force'. Foley"· Co1111el·if<. 43fi r. ~- 201 (197S). B(•caust• tlw 
polic<' functi(ln fulfil)p<) "a most fundamf•11tal obligation of 
governnrnnt to its constitunrcy'' and by 11t•cessity cloakt-•d 
policnnen with substantial discretionary pow(•rs. WP view,•d 
the police force as bei11g one• of those appropriately di>firH·d 
classes of positions for which a citizenship n·(1uin•11w11t could 
he imposed. Id .. at :2fl7. Accordingly. the f-tat<> wa~ n•quin-•d 
to .i ustify its classification 011ly "by a showing of so11H· ratiunal 
relationship betwee11 the interest sought to hf' prott•ctPd am! 
the limiting c·lassific11tio11." lrl .. at 290. 
The ruh• for governnwntal functions, which is an exception 
to the general standard applicable to classification:.; based on 
alienage, rests on important principles inherent in the Com;ti-
tution . The distinction between citizens and alie118. though 
ordinarily irrelevant to private activity, is fundamental to tlw 
definition and government of a State. The Co11stitution itself 
refers to the distinction no less than 11 times, see Sugorn,.an "· 
Douga.ll, supra, at 651- 652 (Ih,HNQU1ST, J.. dissPntiug1. indi-
cating that the statm, of citizenship was meant to hav0 siguifi-
cance in the structure of our government. Thi> assumption 
of that status, whether by birth or naturalization. denotes an 
association with the polity which, in a democratic republic , 
exercises the powers of governance. See Foley v. Co1111eti'e . 
supra, at 295. The form of this association is important : an 
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the unequivocal legal bo11d citizenship represents. It is be-
cause of this sprcial significance of citizenship that govern-
nwntal entities. when exercising the functions of government, 
have wider latitude in limiting the participation of noncitizens.5 
B 
In df'lerrnining wl1rther. for purposes of equal protection 
analysis. teaching i11 public schools constitute:- a governmental 
function, we look to the rolP of public <'ducation and to the 
degreP of responsibility a11d discretion tf'achns possess in ful-
filling that role. ~t'<' id., at 207. Each of thf'sf' c·onsidf'rations 
supports th<' condusion tliat public school tf'achrrs may he 
regarded as perforrni11g a taRk "that goles I to the heart of 
represP11tative ~overnnw11t." Sugarma.11 " · Do'Uga.ll. s-upra, 
at 647.U 
:, That, the s1gmfirantl' of c1t1zc•11:;l11p l1a,; <·on~t1tut1onal dimerwons al:;o 
has bren rerognizrd h~ :;f'vetal of our d!'t'i::<ion::<. In 7'rop ,·. Dulles, 356 
l ·. S. R(i (1958), ;i pluralit~· of tlw Court lwld that thl' expatriation of an 
Amrri<'an citizm con,tttutl'd cru<'l and 1mu~11al puni,hmrnt for the crime 
of d1-..,prt1on in timC' of war. In Afroyim '"' Rusk. 3~i l:. S. 25:3 (H)67), 
the ourt Jwld that thP Constit,1111011 forhad<' Co11gn'"~ from d<'pri,·ing a 
1wr;:nn of his citi zPn ,hip agam"t l11s will for an~· rc•a:<on. 
"Tlw di:':'Pnting op111io11 of \[n . .11 "'l'l<'E B1.A< 'KJ!l·,._, 111 rPad1i111,( all oppo-
,ik l'Olll'lll:'iou. :q>p1•11r., In appl~· :1 diff<'l'<'lll :111:il~"i" from 1h,,t <·1uplo~·t'<I 
m (lllt prior d1't·1 .-io11,. B:ttlll'r 1ha11 1·011:'ldt'l' \\'ht'tl1t•I' p11l,li1· .,('hool 
1eael1t' 1', p(·rfom1 a :'ig11ifi1·:tnl go,·1 ·rn111t•11r hin<·I io11, 1 h<· intiuir.,· 111a11datt·d 
l,.,· 1-'oley , . ('on.n1'iit'. -1:{.'i L 8. :291 (HJi:-.), :111d :,u1111r111a11 ,. lJuuoall . -H:{ 
I" . :-: . i;;; .1 (HJ7a). ll1t · di,,t•III ft1t·11,t·~ 111:'l(':td Oil ilw )!('ll('l'HI ~ut·it ·ral 
llllpor1:111ct• of prima r~· and ,;1•eo11dar~ .-!'houl i t•aclwr, hot h p11bh<· a11d 
pnv:111'. Thu, 011 ilH' 011t· hand 1i dl'pn•c·i:if1·, tlu · 1111porta1H·1 · of .'PW 
) 01k '., 1·it1zp11ship n·q11in•111Pnt l,1 ·t·a11,<· II i, IIPI applu·d to pnvai< ' ,('hool 
h•ac·ll!'r.-. 1111d 011 I hl' ollwr hand 11 aq~lll'" tha1 t hl' rol<· lt'al'll('r,; pl•rform 
Ill 011r .•o<·wt~· i~ 110 mon• ,1g-11ifi<·anl lh:lll 1hal fillnl l.,~- altot1H·.,·"· Tlu~ 
11 11.-~1 ·~ tht• point of F,,/,,y and ,',uyur11uw . '.\P\\' York '~ eitiz('[1,,hip l'<·quin'· 
n11·11i i.- limilPd 10 a g;o1·1·r11111t•llia l f11n!'t1011 U<·tallM' ii app(ip,- oul.1 lo 
it·adl('r., PlllJ)IO~<·d h~ aml a('fiug a., ag;\·llt:' of thc> St:1t\'. Tiu· ( 'omwcti\'ut 
,•tatllt<· hPld u1H·o11.,1ir u1iunal 1n /11 /'(' Orifjillus. -Ha l'. :-: . 717 (197:{), b~· 
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Public education. like the police function, "fulfills a most 
fundamental obligation of government to its constituency." 
Foley, at 297. The importance of public schools in the 
preparation of individuals for participation as citizens. and 
in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, 
long has been recognized by our decisions: 
"Today, education is perhaps the most important func-
tion of state and local governments. Compulsory school 
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education 
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of 
education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, 
even service in the armed forces. It is the very founda-
tion of good citizenship. Today it is a principa1 instru-
me11t in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in 
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.'' 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 1.7. S. 189, 246 (1973) 
(PowELL, J., concurring); San Antonio Ind. School D·ist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U. S. 205, 213 (1972); id., at 238-239 (WHITE, J., concur-
ring); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 230 
(1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Adler v. Board of Educa-
tion, 342 n. S. 485, 493 (1952); McCollurn v. Board of 
govPnJ1ne11t. The excln~ion of aliens rrom :1cce"'"' to iht· bar 1111plH·a1pcl 
the right to purtitte a eho:sen oc1·upation, not acn·ti~ to public t'tnpluymnll. 
Cf. Nwruist \', Maw·let. 432 CS. 1, 15-16, ll. ,;; (1!-lii) (POWELL,./., d1,-;-
"'(:'lltlllg). Tlw di,-;tinction betwC'en a privatP occupatio11 and a go\'('J'll-
llH·11t. f1111etion w11~ not!'CI Pxprp,-"(y Ill Oriffit!tN. 
' ·Law~·pr,- do mdPt'<l oc·c11p~· profp:,;:,;ional po::;i1ion:s of rPtipon,-ib1lit~· 1111d 
mll11e11c1• that m1pu~e 011 them dutie:s correlt1t1v1· with tlwir vit11l righ1 or 
atet•,-;,- to the court~. ;\loreovPr, b~· v1rt11l' of rlu-·1r prot'P~~iorntl aptitudP~ 
and natural mten•,-t", la w~·pr,- ha vr b1•p11 lf·ader,- m gov1·nnrH·111 t hro1111:hou t 
the hi:story of our ('UUn1 r~ . Y<·t, thl'~· an· 11ut oflieiali, of 1ron·rnm1·11t by 
virtue of being lawyt·r~:· .i13 C". S., at 7:!9 
... . ; .. 
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Education, 333 F. , . 203. 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring); Pierce v. SoC'iety of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); 
Meyer v . .Vebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); lntersta.te Con-
solidated Street R. Co.,·. Massachusetts, 207 1·. R. 79 (1907).~ 
Other authorities have perceived public schools as an "assimi-
lative force" by which diverse and conflicting elements in our 
society are brought together on a broad but common ground. 
See. e. y., J. Dewey. Democracy and Education 26 (1929); 
N. Edwards & H. Richey. The School in the American Social 
Order 623-624 (1963). These perceptions of the public 
schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the 
maintenance of a democratic political system have been con-
firmed by the observations of social scientists. See R. Dawson 
& K. Prewitt, Political Socialization 146-167 (1969); R. Hes 
& J. Tomey. The Development of Political Attitudes in 
Children 114, 158-171. 217-220 ( 1967); V. 0. Key. Public 
Opinion an<l .\mcrican Democracy 323-343 ( Hl61 ).' 
Within the public school system, teachers play a critical 
· A, :San :!1,/01110 Ind. S1·/11,o/ Dist . Y. Rodny11ez. 8ttprn. t'l'C·ogniied. 
there t8 no 111e011,;1:::tmc.v between our recognition of the vital ,1gnificance 
of publil' c•durat 1011 allCI our holding- that :t<·c·c·~, to Pdu<'ation i~ not g-uarau-
ll'l'd b~· rhe C'on~tit11t10n. Id .. at ::!0-:15. 
' Thl' <·t11T1<·ular n•q111r<·m<•nl, of :,.;pw York', p11hlie ,whoo! ,,_,·::'t<·n1 rC'tll•c•I , 
some of !he wa~·s a public· ,:('!1001 ~ystern promote,: the development of th<' 
under:;!anding that 1s prereqmsit•e to mtelligent partic1pat1on in tJ1e 
clC'mocmtic proee>'s. The ~chools are required to provide instruction "to 
promote a spirit. of patriotir and civic serv1cP and obligation and to foster 
in the children of the ,;fate moral and intPllectual qualities which are 
e,.:...:ential in preparing to meet the obligation, of citizenship m peacr or in 
war, . . .'' X. Y. Educ. L. § ROI (1) (:VIcKinney 19i0). Flag and other 
patriotic· exnei,P>' also ar<> pre,.;rribrd. a.~ loyalt~· i~ a rharaclPri>'tic of 
citizPn>'hip e:<,e11t1al to the pm·wrvation of a c·mmtry. Id.,§ ROZ. In addi-
tion , rrqui1wl cour,<"" mcfodt· C'lassrs in civic:<, l'nitrd Stntee and Krw York 
hi"'tory. and pr111riph of AnwriC'an govPrmnent. Id.,§ ;3204 (::!) (a) (1), (2). 
Although private i-ehool,.; also are bound by motit of the~e requirements, 
tho State ha,; a "' ronger mtrrest in ensuring that the schools it most 
direetly control>', and for wh1rh 1t heaIB tlw c·o~t, 11rc a,- 1'1fe<"tive as 
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part in developing students' attitude toward government and 
understanding of the role of citizens in our society. Alone 
among employees of the system, teachers are in direct. day-to-
day contact with students both in the classrooms and in the 
other varied activities of a modern school. In shaping the 
students' experience to achieve educational goals, teachers by 
necessity have wide discretion over the way the course ma-
terial is communicated to students. They are responsible for 
presenting and explaining the subject matter in a way that is 
both comprehensible and inspiring. No amou11t of standard-
ization of teaching materials or lesson plans can eliminate 
the personal qualities a teacher brings to beat· in achieving 
these goals. Further, a teacher serves as a role model for his 
students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their 
perceptions and values. Thus. through both the presentation 
of course materials and the example he sets, a teache,· has an 
opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward gov-
ernment, the political process, a.nd a citizen's social responsi-
bilities.1  This influence is crucial to the continued good 
health of a <lemocracy.10 
n Although the finding:-; of scholar:,; who havi> writtl'n on tlw :subject are 
not conclu:siv<>, they generally reinforre the commonl:>~nse judgment, and 
the experience of most of us, thnt a teacher exert:; con:;iderable influence 
ovier the development of fu!'damental social attitudei; in studenti;, including 
tl10:se attitudes which in the broade~t seni;e of the term may be viewed as 
political. See e. g., R. Dawson & K. Prewitt , Political Sorializntion 
158-1G7 (1969) ; R. Hess & J . Tomey , The Development of Political 
Attitude1:1 in Children 162-163, 217- 21, (1967). Cf. Note, Aliens· Right 
to Teach: Political Socialization and the Public Scl10ols, 85 Yale L. J . 90, 
90-104 (1975) . 
10 Appellees contrnd that restnction of 1111 alien·~ freedom 1o leach rn 
public schools is contrary to principles of diversity of thougl1t and 
neademic frf'rdom embodif'd 111 t11e First Amrndment. See also N otc , 
supra, n. 8, a1 106-109. We think the attempt to draw an annlogy 
bl'tween choice of citizcn~l11p and political expres:;ion or freedom of 
a~sociation ii; wide of the mark, as the argument would bar an~· effort hy 
th~ State to vrol\\ote 1iarficular value8 and attitudes toward goverumr!lli. 
76-808-0PINION 
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Furthermore. it is clear that all public school teachers. and 
not just those responsible for teaching the courses rno~t 
directly related to goYernment. history. and civic duties, should 
help fulfill the broader fu11ction of the public school system.n 
Teachers. regardless of their specialty. may be called upo11 
to teach other subjects. including those expressly dedicated 
to political and social subjects.'" More importa11tly. a State 
properly may regard all teachers as having an obligatio11 
to promote civic virtues and u11derstanding in their classes. 
regardless of the subject taught. Certainly a State also may 
take account of a teacher's function as an example for stu-
tlcuts. "'hich exists independently of particular classroom sub-
jects. In light of the foregoing considerations. \\'C think it 
clear that public school teachers come well withi11 the "govern-
mental function" principle rccog11ized in Sugarman and Foley. 
Accordingly. the Co11stitution requires 011ly that a citiienship 
requirement applicable to teaching in the public schools bears 
a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. See 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. M 'urgia, 427 l '. S. :107. 
314 ( H)7(5) 
S('rtion :3001 (:n doe:; not lllh1b1t appellt>eti from rxpre:;:;ing fn'<'ly tl lt'1r 
politiral or l-iOC'ial , ·iC'W:, or from a:-:-ociat inl! with whonH·1·c· r tlir~· pk:1:-1• . 
('f. Givha11 , . 11' es tern Line Cumwl. 8rlwo/ Dist . - l". 8. -, -
(1979); Mt. llealthy City School Dist. ,·. Doyle. -129 r. S. 27-1 (l!~77) ; 
l'ir-keri11r1 \'. Board of Hd ucatio11. :1!-J 1 l '. S. 5(i:1 ( HJ(j .<.; ). Xor :1 rP app<·l-
lN•s (h:,:eour:q~l'd from joiniug with otlwr~ to adrnnct' ,,:irtirular politif':11 
end::;. Cf. 8helto11 ,·. 'l'w·ker. :m-1 U. S. 479 (1957) . Thi' on!.,· a~ c·rtl'd 
libl'ft~· of appc·IIC'P~ withheld b~· tlw Xew York l:'tat11tt' i~ tlw opport11111t~· 
to t(•ach in thr Statr'~ ~rhool,- ~o long as ih('~· PIC'r:t not 10 bPrOllll' ritizt·n~ 
uf this ('01mt1y. Thi:,: 1~ not a liberty that 1:- arrordl'd co11~tituti011:tl 
prof Petton . 
11 At tlw prm1ar.1· school lewl. for whieh both a pp~·llt·c·~ :;ought <·t>ri iffra-
tion, tra(·hr1 • :trt' r<':spon:;ible for all of thr barn• currieul111n. 
'" In :'\rw York, for ('Xampl(•, all <·c•rtiffrd lt'acl1Pr:,:, i11cl11di11g tho~c· 111 ilH' 
~1·c-011dar~· srhool:-, an' n•quin'd to lJl' a,·a1lal>lt' for 11p ro fin• hour- of 
trarhing a WPPk Ill ~ubjerts out:-idc• thrir ~prl'iahy. ~ X . Y . C'cclt• of 
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As the legitimacy of the State's interest i11 furthering the 
educational goals outlined above is undoubted. it remains only 
to consider whether ~ 3001 (3) bears a rational relationship 
to this interest. The restriction is carefully framed to sf'rve its 
purpose. as it bars from teaching only those aliens who have 
~demonstrated their unwillingness to obtain t·nited Rtates citi-
. zenship.1 " Appellees. and aliens similarly situated. in eff<:'ct 
have chosen to classify themselves. They pref Pr to rrtain 
citizenship in a foreign country with the obligations it l'ntails 
of primary duty and loyalty." They havp rPjrctRcl tlw ope11 
invitation extended to qua.lify for eligibility to teach by 
applying for citizenship in this country. The people of New 
York, acting through their elected representatives. havP mnde 
a judgment that citizenship should be• a qualificatiou for 
teaching the young of the State in the public schools. and 
~ 3001 (3) furthers that .1udg11H:'11t.1" 
Revcr.~ed. 
rn See 11. 2, infra. 
11 A~ 011r ca;;e;; hav!' emphas1zPrl. n•"irlPnt aliP11, 1m~· tax<-'" . ,t-'l'Vl' i11 ill<' 
armed forces. 1111d ha.ve made ,-ig11ific:rnt. eontributio11;; to our eou11try in 
privMc and public endeavor:;. See In re Griffiths. 41a l'. S. 717, 72'.? 
(1978) ; Sugarman v. Dougall, 41a U. S. 534, (i45 (H)i:3): Gru!tam v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 3ifl (1971). No don ht many of them, am! 
we do not exclude appellees, woultl make excellent public ~rhool tra('hers. 
But the legi~lature, having in mind the importanC'e of rducario11 to :-tate 
and local governments, see Brown v. Board of Bducalio11. :H7 ll .•. -l83, 
493 (1954), may det,ermine eli1dbilit~· for the kc~ po~iti011 in (li:-chargiug 
that function on the assumption that ge11erall!I p(•r,;on~ ll'ho arc• ('iti,wn,, 
or who havE' not derliue<l the 01>port1111it~· tu ~1·Pk l'nitPd 8tate, l'itizl'n~hip, 
are better qualified tlrnn are tho:-(· who have l'll·cted io l'l'm:1111 alil'llS. 
We note 111 this connection that regulation~ promulgated pur~uant to 
§ 3001 (3) do provide for situations where a particular alie11'1< ;;pecial 
qualificati0m1 as a teacher . ouhvPigh the polic.,· primarily ,;c·r\'ecl b~· the 
statute. See 8 N. Y. Code of Hules & Hc•gulntion~ § i-0.2 (i J ( 1) . Tiu• St ate 
informs us, howeYer, that the authorit~· conferred by th1,; rc·gulution has 
not been exercised. Brief for Appellant 7 n . *. 
ir. Appt-llf't'i< argtw that t)I(' t,tatc (·annot rntionally c•xrludP alirn~ frorn 
i (i-1'01'-0 I ' I \ I () . . 
. \\JBA('H 1· . \OH\\. ll'H I .• ,) 
teaching po,itwn,; :111d ~-1:'1, fll'rtmt th1•m 10 , 1111 • for :ind ,-11 on 1·nt:11n 
lu!'al "rhool lionrcl:-. W1· noH·, ~ir:-t. th:11 1111· ~t:111'·:- ll'gi:-l:1t11n· ha~ 1101 
1·xprr~,.J~· rn<loro('d thi,- polir.,·. l!:11lwr, :1ppl'lla11t ., :1:- ,111 :1cln1ini,tr:1tiv1· 
m:itfpr havr int1•rprf-'tl'cl tilt' :-tat11t1· gon·rnini.: \1·w York { 'i1_,. ·" 1111iq111· 
c·om1t11111it~· school boarcl:-, \ . Y. bl11!'. L:iw § :2590-l' \\l1·Ki1111('~· ~11pp. , • ,..) 
Hlii--1Hi9), to _JH'l'lllit aliPn.- who '.II"(' 111(' Jl:11'~·111, of p,_il,lil" :-C'hool :<lt1d1•11t,- \ t) m• s~' 0 
to partH·1pat1 · 111 tlll':-<· hoard:-. ;:-i1•1 · .-\pp . :!, , :2!1. \\ 1· :d:-o 111:1.,· :1 .-,111111·. 
wi1ho11t havin)!; 10 cl1·rid1·. that tlwn · j,.. .1 rati1,11:il h:1:-i:- for :1 di"ti1)('1ion 
IJ1•IW<'<'II 1l'a!'h1•r:- :tlld l10:1rd IIH'llil>PI':- ha:-l'd on 1lu•ir n·:-p(·<·liv1· rl',;po11si-
J,ilitil',. Ahho11gh po:-"1 's:- i11g :-t1h:-t:111ti:d t'('~p1111:-il,ilit~· for IIH· ad111i11i,-11·11-
rio11 of llw "<'hook boanl 111t'rnl,c•r, n·al'h nu d:i"'t':-, :111cl ran·I~· if 1·,·cr :(I'(.: 




THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.i5u.prtutt <!lourt ltf tqt ~h .i5tatts 
Jhtltfyhtght14 ,. <II, 2.(JffeJ!.' 
March 22, 1979 
Re: 76-808 - Ambach v. Norwick 
Dear Lewis: 
I join. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
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NOTBI: Where It la teaalble, a a7Uabaa (headnote) wU1 be re-
leased, aa 18 being done In connection with thla case, at tbe time 
tbe opinion le lseued. Tbe ayllabu1 constitutes no part of tbe opinion 
of tbe Court but baa been prepared b7 the Reporter ot Declillona for 
tbe convenience of tbe reader. See UnOed Stole, Y. Dttrcrit Lta111fler 
Oo., 200 U.S. 321,337. 
Pauc proof of syllab·U$ as 
a7iproved. · 
- Lineup included. 
- Lineup still to be · 
added. Plrnsc :;rnd 
linrup to Print Shop 
when avail:-tblo a.nd 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATE 
Syllabus 
a copy to me. 
{nolhe1· c~py of paoe proof oj 
1llabus as apvrovcd to 
how-
I,i1w11p, which h:1:; now 
been adde<l. 
AMBACH, COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK STAT] 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL. v. 
1 - Additional changes 
NORW.ICK ET AL. 
,APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR •. L 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
No. 76-808. Argued January 10, 1979-Decided April-, 1979 
A New York statute forbidding permanent certification as a public school 
teacher of any person who is not a United States citizen unless that 
person has manifested an intention to apply for citizenship, held not to 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Pp. ;t-12-. 
(a) As a general principle some state functions are so bound up with 
the operation of the State as a governmental entity as to permit exclu-
sion from those functions of all persons who have not become part of 
the process of self-government. Accordingly, a State is required to 
justify its exclusion of aliens from such governmental positions only "by 
a showing of some rational relationship between the interest sought to 
be protected and the limiting classification." Foley v. Conneli,e, 435 
U. S. 291, 296. Pp. 5-6. 
(b) This rnle for governmental functions, which is an exception to 
the stricter general standard applicable to classifications based on 
alienage, rests on important principles inl1erent in the Constitution. 
The distinction between citizens and aliens, though ordinarily irrelevant 
to private activity, is fundamental to the definition and government of 
a State, and the references to such distinction in the Constitution itself 
indicate that the status of citizenship was meant to have significance in 
the structure of our government. It is because of this special significance 
of citizenship that governmental entities, when exercising the functions 
of government, have wider latitude in limiting the participation of 
11-oncitizens. Pp. 6-7. 
(c) Taking into consideration the role of public education and the 
degree of responsibility and discretion teachers possess in fulfilling that 
role, it is clear that public school teachers come well within the "govern• 
I 
in ;:,yllabus. 
IfaNHY PuTiEL, jr. 
Reporter of Decisions. 
,, 
II AMBACH v. NORWICH 
Syllabus 
mental function" principle recognized in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 
634, and Foley v. Connelie, supra, and, accordingly, the Constitution 
requires only that a citizenship requirement applicable to teaching in 
the public school bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. 
Pp. 7-11. 
(d) Here, the statute in question does bear a rational relationship to 
the State's interest in furthering its educational goals, especially with 
respect to regarding all teachers as having an obligation to promote civic 
virtues and understanding in their classes, regardless of tho subject 
taught. P. 12. 
417 F. Supp. 913, reversed. 
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., 
and STEWART, WHITE, and REHNQUIS'r, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed 
a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., 
joined. 
; 
lfp/ss 4/16779 76-808 Ambach v. Nor 1ck 
This case presents the questioo/whether New York 
may impose.! citizenship requiremeny"upon its public school 
teachers. A three-judge district court in the Southern 
~I , 
District of New York held ~this requirement /excluding 
resident aliens :;1violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Although the exclusion of aliens / from fields of 
priva~ employment) enerally serves no legitimate 
and our decisions make 
limit participation of 
. .o 





Only last Term we upheld New York's citizenship 
requirement with respect to police officers,/ because of the 
important role of the police functiory1in the exercise of 
governmen~i~· For essentially the same reasons, we 
think teaching in the public schoo1s;'a1so constitutes a 
governmental function/ that may be confined to citizens. 
Teachers, both through the instruction they give/ and the 
example they set, shape the basic attitudes of children 
toward our democratic form of governme~t,):;_..,d the 
..CV 'V / ff~ . .. --





A State rationally may decide/ that only those 
persons who have made an unequivoca3:., 1egal commitment to our 
form of government/through the !le of citizenship;'should be 
entrusted with this important public responsibility. 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court below. 
We also note that the resident aliens who brought 
2. 
this suit could have qualified to 
1 
law/ by applying for United States 
teach/ under the New York 
citizenship. They ~~ 
~ 
free to do this, but preferred to retain their citizenship 
allegiance to other countries. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun has filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Marshall 







Richmond Times Dispatch, May 3, 1979 
Aliens as Teachers 
By one of its paper-thin divisions, 
the U. S. Supreme Court ruled 5-to-4 
recently that a state may refuse 
to employ as a public school teacher 
an alien who is eligible for United 
States citizenship but who refuses to 
apply for It. 
The majority opinion was written 
by Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., for-
mer chairman of both the Richmond 
School Board and the Virginia State 
Board of Education. The decision is 
of interest in Virginia because Board 
of Education regulations state that 
an applicant for certification·as a 
school teacher must be a citizen. 
The four dissenters - Justices 
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. 
Brennan Jr., Thurgood Marshall and 
John Paul Stevens - described as 
"irrational" the New York law at 
issue in the case. 
"Is it better to employ a poor 
citizen-teacher than an excellent 
resident alien teacher?'' they asked. 
"Is it preferable to have a citizen 
who has never seen Spain or a Latin 
American country teach Spanish to 
eighth graders and to deny that op-
portunity to a resident alien who 
may have lived for 20 years in the 
culture of Spain or Latin America?'' 
But Justice Powell emphasized-
rightly, we think - that a teacher's 
influence extends beyond the 
academic subject matter. 
"Within the public school 
system," he wrote, "teachers play a 
criticai part in developing students' 
attitude toward government and un-
derstanding of the role of citizens in 
our society .... A teacher serves as a 
role model for his students, exerting 
a subtle but important influence 
over their perceptions and values. 
Thus, through both the presentation 
of course materials and the example 
he sets, a teacher has an opportunity 
to influence the attitudes of students 
toward government, the political 
process, and a citizen's social 
responsibilities. This influence is 
crucial to the continued good health 
of a democracy." 
The New York Jaw, as Justice 
Powell pointed out, applies only to 
aliens who manifest no intention of 
becoming U. S. citizens. Such 
people, he said, "prefer to retain 
citizenship in a foreign country with 
the obligations it entails of primary 
duty and loyalty." 
The majority opinion is a 
reasonable one. It does not, of cour-
se, say to the states that they must 
em ploy only citizens as public school 
teachers. It says, rather, that if a 
state itself wants to impose such a 
restriction, there is nothing in the 
U.S. Constitution to forbid it. 
In Virginia, the Board of 
Education's citizenship regulation 
apparently has relatively little prac-
tical force as it is now being ad-
ministered. From what we have 
been able to lear.n, education of-
ficials have been under the impres-
sion that the requirement might not 
withstand a court test, and for that 
and other reasons the State Depart-
ment of Education has been almost 
automatically granting one-year 
certificates, on application of local 
school superintendents, to aliens 
otherwise qualified. A state ~tatute 
permits such waivers from board 
regulations. 
We do not necessarily suggest any 
basic change in the department's 
practices in regard to this matter, 
but department officials might want 
to take another look at those prac-
tices in light of the recent court 
ruling. Many waivers are un-
questionably justified, such as those 
given In connection with teacher-
exchange programs. But rather than 
automatically granting a superin· 
tendent's request in every case, the 
department might want to consider 
whether it is always wise to certify 
an alien who has lived in this country 
. for years but whose interest in the 
United States is not sufficient to im-
, pel him or her to give up foreign 
citizenship and become a naturaliz-
ed American. 
